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Today	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  has	  no	  access	  to	  electricity,	  and	  
another	  third	  has	  only	  limited	  access.	  	  Driven	  by	  the	  push	  for	  development	  on	  one	  
hand	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  the	  other,	  a	  combination	  of	  for-­‐profit	  
companies,	  NGOs,	  missions,	  and	  aid	  organizations	  is	  looking	  for	  the	  silver	  bullet	  to	  
sustainable	  electricity	  development.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  challenges	  facing	  
off-­‐grid	  electricity	  projects	  I	  used	  recent	  literature	  in	  the	  form	  of	  peer-­‐reviewed	  
journals,	  agency	  reports,	  news	  articles,	  and	  technical	  documents;	  stakeholder	  
interviews;	  and	  on-­‐site	  observations	  in	  selected	  case	  studies	  in	  Nepal,	  India,	  and	  
Tanzania.	  In	  each	  case	  I	  explored	  and	  classified	  methods	  of	  electrification;	  
challenges	  facing	  each	  method;	  and	  the	  larger	  political,	  cultural,	  and	  economic	  
contexts	  of	  the	  projects	  in	  question.	  The	  full	  range	  of	  considerations	  precludes	  
drawing	  broad	  generalizations	  regarding	  effective	  and	  sustainable	  approaches	  to	  
rural	  electrification.	  I	  address	  questions	  raised	  by	  these	  case	  studies	  regarding	  the	  
role	  of	  off-­‐grid	  electricity	  globally.	  The	  sought-­‐after	  silver	  bullet	  does	  not	  exist;	  
instead,	  sustainable	  electrification	  requires	  unique,	  bottom-­‐up	  approaches	  specific	  
to	  each	  local	  community	  and	  environment.	  Ultimately,	  the	  diversity	  of	  methods	  is	  
an	  advantage	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  energy	  climate.	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Glossary	  of	  Terms	  and	  Acronyms	  
• AEPC	   	   Alternative	  Energy	  Promotion	  Center	  (Nepal)	  
• CO2e	   	   Carbon	  Dioxide	  Equivalent	  
• CSR	   	   Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  
• DG	   	   Distributed	  Generation	  
• DSM	   	   Demand-­‐Side	  management	  
• GHG	   	   Greenhouse	  Gas	  
• GP	   	   Gham	  Power	  (Nepal)	  
• INR	   	   Indian	  Rupees	  
• kWh	   	   Kilowatt-­‐Hour	  
• MDoD	   	   Maximum	  Depth	  of	  Discharge	  (Batteries)	  
• MGP	   	   Mera	  Gao	  Power	  (India)	  
• NEA	   	   National	  Electric	  Authority	  (Nepal)	  
• NGO	   	   Non-­‐Governmental	  Organization	  
• RET	   	   Renewable	  Energy	  Technology	  
• ROI	   	   Return	  on	  Investment	  
• Rs	   	   Nepali	  Rupees	  
• SHS	   	   Solar	  Home	  System	  
• Tsh	   	   Tanzanian	  Shillings	  
• UNFCCC	  	   United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
• USD	   	   United	  States	  Dollars	  
• VAT	   	   Value	  Added	  Tax	  
• W/kW/MW	   Watt/Kilowatt/Megawatt
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Introduction	  
It	  was	  a	  dark	  and	  stormy	  night.	  Pithy	  classic	  references	  aside,	  it	  really	  was	  as	  
I	  bounced,	  jolted	  and	  slid	  into	  a	  small	  village	  in	  the	  southern	  highlands	  of	  Tanzania,	  
my	  home	  for	  the	  next	  three	  years.	  A	  newly	  minted	  Peace	  Corps	  volunteer,	  I	  was	  
crammed	  in	  the	  cab	  of	  a	  pickup	  between	  two	  local	  headmasters,	  my	  worldly	  
belongings	  quickly	  becoming	  saturated	  with	  rainwater	  in	  the	  truck	  bed.	  The	  front	  
seat	  of	  the	  truck	  was	  reserved	  for	  a	  representative	  from	  a	  solar	  NGO	  –	  an	  engineer	  
or	  technician,	  perhaps	  –	  and	  I	  was	  informed	  via	  several	  translations	  into	  and	  out	  of	  
Swahili	  that	  he	  was	  here	  to	  check	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  installing	  solar	  on	  the	  new	  
secondary	  school.	  Though	  neither	  of	  us	  could	  have	  guessed	  it,	  this	  man,	  and	  the	  
industry	  he	  represented,	  would	  become	  the	  topic	  of	  introduction	  for	  a	  paper	  written	  
by	  the	  soggy,	  helpless	  American	  quietly	  coveting	  his	  spacious	  front	  seat.	  
Within	  a	  month,	  two	  technicians	  arrived	  at	  the	  secondary	  school	  with	  a	  truck	  
full	  of	  supplies	  –	  three	  large	  panels,	  spools	  of	  wire,	  aluminum	  frames,	  and	  several	  
large	  boxes	  I	  didn’t	  completely	  understand.	  Unwitting	  students	  were	  swept	  up	  in	  the	  
daylong	  labor	  of	  installing	  the	  system	  on	  the	  roof	  and	  running	  wires	  to	  bulbs	  and	  
switches	  in	  each	  classroom,	  mud	  brick	  flakes	  and	  curly	  steel	  roofing	  scraps	  
announcing	  their	  progress.	  That	  evening,	  with	  NGO	  staff	  and	  half	  the	  village	  
gathered	  around,	  the	  speeches	  were	  given,	  local	  Wahehe	  songs	  of	  thanks	  were	  sung,	  
and	  the	  switch	  was	  thrown.	  CFLs	  slowly	  glowed	  to	  life	  to	  the	  hum	  of	  the	  inverter	  fan	  
and,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  its	  history,	  electric	  light,	  these	  recycled	  rays	  from	  the	  sun,	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poured	  through	  the	  windows	  of	  Luhunga	  village.	  Within	  a	  year	  the	  system	  was	  all	  
but	  dead.	  
Development?	  
The	  story	  of	  solar	  at	  Luhunga	  Secondary	  School	  is	  not	  an	  exceptional	  one,	  nor	  is	  
it	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  of	  tragic	  misjudgment	  or	  uncommon	  failure	  in	  international	  
development	  (the	  solar	  NGO	  is	  based	  in	  the	  UK);	  if	  anything	  it	  is	  common.	  Similar	  
stories	  could	  be	  found	  across	  the	  country	  and	  world	  (see	  Adams	  2001,	  McMichael	  
2000,	  and	  Easterly	  2006	  for	  an	  extensive	  collection	  of	  case	  studies	  and	  examples).	  
Even	  many	  of	  the	  details	  are	  the	  same	  –	  the	  system	  specs,	  the	  brief	  educational	  
component	  accompanying	  the	  almost	  free	  system,	  the	  payback	  scheme…	  even	  the	  
speeches	  and	  songs	  of	  thanks	  are	  practically	  expected	  when	  completing	  
development	  “aid”	  projects	  such	  as	  these.	  But	  the	  failure	  of	  this	  particular	  project	  to	  
help	  a	  poor,	  rural	  community	  electrify	  raises	  a	  host	  of	  questions	  not	  only	  about	  the	  
project’s	  design	  and	  organization,	  but	  of	  the	  very	  question	  of	  “development”	  itself.	  
The	  more	  practical	  questions	  that	  this	  electrification	  project	  might	  elicit	  from	  
the	  casual	  observer	  include:	  
• Why	  did	  the	  system	  fail	  in	  such	  a	  short	  time?	  
• Who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  regulating	  the	  system’s	  use	  to	  ensure	  its	  longevity,	  and	  
why	  did	  they	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  that	  role?	  
• Are	  these	  problems	  systemic,	  or	  unique	  to	  this	  particular	  school	  and	  
community?	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• Did	  the	  NGO	  know	  these	  issues	  going	  in,	  or	  did	  they	  make	  assumptions	  that	  
didn’t	  pan	  out?	  
• If	  this	  is	  such	  a	  common	  problem,	  is	  it	  even	  possible	  to	  sustainably	  develop	  
and	  electrify	  poor,	  rural	  communities?	  
	  
Of	  more	  immediate	  concern,	  however,	  is	  the	  question:	  who	  are	  you	  and	  what	  do	  
you	  want?	  Are	  you	  a	  student	  at	  the	  school	  who	  received	  free	  electricity	  out	  of	  thin	  
air	  only	  to	  watch	  it	  degrade,	  or	  are	  you	  a	  teacher	  who	  has	  been	  left	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  
system	  without	  any	  understanding	  of	  how	  it	  works	  and	  why	  it	  is	  failing?	  Do	  you	  
represent	  the	  implementing	  NGO	  that	  put	  time	  and	  effort	  into	  bringing	  a	  sustainable	  
technology	  to	  a	  community	  in	  need	  only	  to	  see	  your	  efforts	  go	  to	  waste,	  or	  are	  you	  a	  
regular	  donor	  contributing	  a	  percentage	  of	  your	  income	  every	  year	  to	  further	  
sustainable	  development	  only	  to	  hear	  that	  the	  NGO	  you	  support	  has	  failed	  to	  make	  
much	  of	  a	  difference?	  The	  success	  of	  a	  project	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  who	  is	  given	  
the	  authority	  to	  define	  that	  success.	  Each	  person	  has	  a	  different	  perspective	  and	  a	  
different	  goal	  for	  the	  project:	  who	  are	  you	  and	  what	  do	  you	  want?	  
Take	  an	  example	  from	  Afghanistan,	  a	  development	  project	  funneling	  foreign	  
aid	  money	  to	  build	  a	  road	  to	  encourage	  trade.	  Aware	  of	  the	  need	  for	  local	  
sustainability,	  the	  project	  designers	  hired	  local	  artisans	  to	  lay	  cobblestones	  	  to	  pave	  
the	  road.	  At	  the	  ribbon	  cutting	  to	  celebrate	  the	  one-­‐sixth	  mile	  completion	  –	  a	  partial	  
milestone	  –	  foreign	  dignitaries	  and	  host	  country	  nationals	  rode	  in	  land	  cruisers	  
along	  the	  beautiful	  new	  road.	  Camels,	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  targeted	  trade,	  walked	  on	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the	  sand	  alongside	  the	  road	  (Chandrasekaran	  2009).	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  camels	  cannot	  
walk	  on	  cobblestones.	  
It	  is	  easy	  to	  point	  a	  finger	  and	  find	  fault	  with	  the	  research	  and	  planning,	  but	  a	  
more	  fundamental	  concern	  lies	  with	  the	  very	  concept	  and	  language	  of	  
“development.”	  This	  paper	  deals	  with	  energy,	  just	  one	  of	  the	  many	  infrastructure	  
areas	  considered	  a	  requirement	  for	  development,	  but	  rarely	  do	  we	  ask	  what	  that	  
word	  even	  means.	  Before	  sallying	  forth	  into	  the	  world	  of	  energy	  development,	  we	  
need	  to	  recognize	  and	  clarify	  our	  own	  assumptions	  and	  biases	  as	  practitioners,	  
academics,	  or	  laymen	  alike.	  
The	  Meaning	  of	  Development	  
In	  the	  broadest	  sense	  we	  tend	  to	  equate	  “development”	  with	  “growth”	  and	  
“progress,”	  words	  that	  are	  equally	  over-­‐used	  to	  the	  point	  of	  becoming	  meaningless.	  
“Growth”	  might	  be	  more	  accurately	  linked	  (in	  international	  development	  terms,	  
anyway)	  to	  a	  country’s	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP),	  while	  “Progress”	  could	  mean	  
any	  number	  of	  things	  including	  gender	  equality,	  access	  to	  education,	  mortality	  rate,	  
and	  more.	  However,	  as	  Adams	  notes	  in	  Green	  Development,	  our	  literature	  and	  
language	  tend	  to	  “portray	  the	  world	  in	  particular	  ways,	  often	  in	  crisis	  of	  some	  kind,	  
and	  almost	  always	  as	  requiring	  management	  and	  intervention	  by	  the	  development	  
planner”	  [broadly,	  ‘the	  West’]	  (Adams	  2001,	  1).	  Therefore	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  act	  of	  
development,	  beyond	  the	  metrics	  and	  ubiquitous	  use,	  remains	  open	  to	  scrutiny.	  
Taking	  its	  colloquial	  use	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  intention,	  the	  act	  of	  “development”	  
is	  largely	  synonymous	  with	  a	  gradual,	  linear	  movement	  towards	  the	  western	  ideal	  of	  
a	  high	  standard	  of	  living	  (Adams	  2001,	  6)	  or,	  at	  least,	  it	  is	  “identified	  with	  a	  Western	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lifestyle”	  (McMichael	  2000,	  4).	  On	  the	  surface	  the	  “western	  ideal”	  seems	  fairly	  
straightforward:	  urbanization	  of	  rural	  populations,	  mechanization	  of	  industry	  and	  
agriculture,	  universal	  electrification,	  modernization	  of	  transportation	  infrastructure,	  
and	  so	  on.	  Communities	  that	  have	  not	  achieved	  these	  standards	  are	  often	  termed	  
“undeveloped,”	  “underdeveloped,”	  “bush,”	  or	  “backward.”	  These	  terms	  are	  so	  
pervasive	  that	  individuals	  I	  worked	  with	  personally	  in	  Tanzania	  and	  Nepal	  referred	  
to	  themselves,	  their	  own	  families,	  and	  neighbors	  as	  backward.	  
A	  deeper	  historical	  look	  at	  these	  two	  countries	  reveals	  decades-­‐long	  
struggles	  between	  the	  dueling	  ideals	  of	  rural-­‐centric	  socialism	  and	  urban-­‐centric	  
capitalism.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  former	  to	  take	  hold	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  the	  latter	  and	  
the	  associated	  social	  divisions,	  which	  were	  further	  compounded	  by	  development	  
efforts	  (McMichael	  2000,	  80).	  In	  Nepal	  the	  long-­‐established	  caste	  system,	  in	  which	  
farmers	  occupy	  the	  lowest	  rung,	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  Maoist	  rebellion	  from	  1996	  
to	  2006.	  Its	  failure	  to	  overturn	  both	  the	  urban	  aristocracy	  (then	  monarchy)	  and	  
social	  hierarchy	  seemed	  to	  validate	  the	  inherent	  superiority	  of	  urban	  pursuits	  over	  
rural	  and	  agrarian	  lifestyles.	  Tanzania	  explored	  a	  longer	  experiment	  with	  socialism	  
under	  its	  first	  president,	  Julius	  Nyerere	  (“Mwalimu”).	  His	  policy	  of	  ujamaa,	  which	  
mixed	  the	  country’s	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  forced	  disparate	  communities	  into	  
agricultural	  villages	  succeeded	  in	  promoting	  inter-­‐tribal	  peace,	  but	  left	  the	  rural	  
populations	  poor	  and	  under-­‐served	  by	  a	  gradually	  growing	  urban	  elite.	  As	  a	  survival	  
measure,	  the	  rural	  and	  urban	  poor	  took	  advantage	  of	  parallel	  markets	  –	  more	  than	  
90%	  of	  household	  income	  at	  times	  -­‐	  that	  undermined	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  
regulate	  or	  drive	  economic	  activity	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  West’s	  terms	  of	  aid	  and	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assistance	  (McMichael	  2000,	  144).	  The	  shift	  to	  capitalism	  and	  relaxation	  of	  ujamaa	  
seemed,	  again,	  to	  leave	  a	  certain	  association	  of	  “badness”	  with	  rural	  life.	  
The	  association	  extends	  beyond	  physical	  amenities	  and	  roots	  itself	  in	  
people’s	  opinions	  of	  their	  own	  capacity	  –	  I	  heard	  the	  same	  refrain	  countless	  times	  in	  
Tanzania	  especially:	  “we	  Africans	  are	  not	  just	  poor	  in	  money,	  we	  are	  poor	  in	  our	  
ability	  to	  plan	  ahead	  or	  make	  good	  decisions.”	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  statement	  (and	  its	  
myriad	  variations)	  damaging	  and	  false,	  it	  is	  an	  entirely	  impossible	  opinion	  to	  have	  
unless	  it	  has	  been	  forced	  on	  you,	  or	  the	  concept	  exposed	  to	  you	  in	  terms	  of	  “better”	  
(me)	  and	  “worse”	  (you).	  Gone	  is	  the	  overtly	  racist	  and	  patronizing	  language	  of	  the	  
colonial	  era,	  but	  its	  essence	  lingers	  and	  continues	  to	  influence	  the	  views	  of	  
developer	  and	  developed	  alike.	  “‘Uncivilized’	  became	  ‘underdeveloped.’	  ‘Savage	  
people’	  became	  the	  ‘third	  world’”	  (Easterly	  2006,	  24).	  In	  census	  and	  development	  
reports	  from	  the	  Indian	  government,	  an	  entire	  subset	  of	  the	  population	  is	  formally	  
described	  as	  a	  “backward	  class,”	  often	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  tribes,	  lower	  castes,	  and	  
the	  economically	  deprived	  (RGGVY	  2014).	  The	  word	  choice	  may	  be	  entirely	  
objective,	  but	  the	  word	  itself	  implies	  something	  lacking	  on	  the	  part	  of	  people	  who	  
live	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  western	  ideal	  described	  above.	  In	  a	  development	  report	  on	  
Tanzania,	  the	  urbanization	  rate	  was	  described	  as	  “lacking,”	  implying	  an	  inherent	  
“goodness”	  to	  urban	  living	  and	  “badness”	  to	  rural	  living,	  again,	  a	  western	  ideal	  
adopted	  by	  the	  people	  to	  whom	  it	  was	  first	  applied	  (Smith	  2014).	  Even	  the	  term	  
“third	  world”	  has	  lost	  its	  original	  meaning	  –	  the	  alternative	  to	  the	  first	  (capitalist	  
West)	  and	  second	  (communist	  East)	  worlds	  –	  and	  has	  come	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  first	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world	  to	  mean	  “those	  less	  fortunate,”	  a	  paternalistic	  usage	  that	  somehow	  ignores	  
the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  West	  became	  so	  “fortunate.”	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  achieve	  the	  high	  standard	  of	  living	  equated	  with	  development	  
and	  defined	  for	  them	  by	  the	  first	  world,	  the	  undeveloped	  have	  pursued	  an	  agenda	  of	  
meeting	  that	  ideal.	  The	  end	  result	  is	  that	  the	  world	  now	  assumes	  those	  development	  
goals	  –	  mentioned	  above	  and	  in	  every	  UN	  report	  –	  are	  universally	  needed,	  desired,	  
and	  good.	  
This	  paper	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  support	  or	  refute	  the	  western	  model	  of	  
development,	  neither	  by	  arguing	  for	  universal	  modernization	  by	  western	  standards	  
nor	  by	  romanticizing	  low-­‐impact	  rural	  life	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  global	  south.	  Ultimately	  
the	  choice	  of	  how	  to	  develop,	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  of	  simply	  pursuing	  a	  self-­‐defined	  
ideal,	  is	  up	  to	  the	  community	  itself.	  When	  engaging	  in	  the	  global	  development	  
project,	  which	  this	  paper’s	  audience	  inherently	  does,	  there	  must	  always	  be	  a	  
consideration	  for	  whose	  ideal	  is	  being	  pursued.	  
To	  briefly	  break	  from	  abstraction,	  as	  a	  rule	  it	  is	  never	  the	  job	  of	  anyone	  
besides	  the	  community	  itself	  to	  decide	  that	  electric	  power	  is	  needed,	  why	  electric	  
power	  is	  needed,	  how	  much	  electric	  power	  is	  needed,	  or	  for	  what	  the	  electric	  power	  
will	  be	  used.	  Thus,	  the	  challenge	  of	  project	  implementation	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  service	  
that	  meets	  the	  expressed	  needs	  of	  the	  community	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  self-­‐sustaining	  
–	  to	  be	  a	  “servant	  of	  local	  passion”	  (Sirolli	  2012).	  It	  seems	  simple,	  even	  romantic,	  to	  
consider	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  successful	  project	  might	  manifest	  itself	  but,	  as	  
this	  paper	  will	  discuss,	  the	  challenges	  are	  great	  and	  numerous.	  Indeed	  a	  single,	  
unifying,	  successful	  model	  has	  not	  yet	  arisen	  in	  energy	  development,	  but	  scattered	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entities	  from	  large	  government	  utilities	  to	  small	  private	  businesses	  are	  learning	  to	  
work	  through	  the	  complexities	  and	  frustrations	  and	  find	  locally	  appropriate	  
solutions.	  
Weather	  of	  the	  Day;	  Climate	  of	  the	  Era	  
When	  we	  talk	  about	  energy,	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  climate.	  There	  are	  several	  
common	  arguments	  to	  leave	  climate	  out	  of	  the	  conversation	  about	  energy.	  For	  one,	  
the	  participants	  may	  not	  believe	  climate	  change	  is	  real,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  real	  but	  human	  
activity	  is	  not	  the	  cause.	  Second,	  though	  the	  participants	  may	  completely	  
understand	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  climate	  change,	  they	  may	  not	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  
urgency	  or	  responsibility,	  freeing	  their	  collective	  conscience	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  
quo	  and	  make	  decisions	  based	  entirely	  on	  economic	  considerations.	  
Last,	  and	  of	  more	  relevance	  to	  this	  paper,	  is	  the	  assertion	  that	  basing	  energy	  
project	  decisions	  on	  climate	  change	  automatically	  biases	  final	  project	  designs	  
towards	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies	  in	  cases	  where	  fossil	  fuels	  may	  actually	  be	  the	  
locally	  appropriate	  option.	  This	  (entirely	  valid)	  position	  is	  argued	  in	  depth	  by,	  
among	  others,	  Hisham	  Zerriffi	  in	  his	  book	  “Rural	  Electrification:	  Strategies	  for	  
Distributed	  Generation”	  (2010).	  As	  he	  explains,	  rural	  communities	  in	  developing	  
countries	  have	  contributed	  negligible	  amounts	  of	  GHGs	  and	  so	  should	  not	  be	  
saddled	  with	  the	  same	  demands	  for	  carbon-­‐free	  technologies	  as	  communities	  and	  
countries	  that	  have	  contributed	  greatly	  and	  benefited	  from	  the	  associated	  wealth.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  minimal	  energy	  requirements	  of	  these	  communities	  would	  mean	  that,	  
even	  if	  they	  did	  adopt	  carbon-­‐intense	  energy	  technologies,	  the	  overall	  contribution	  
to	  the	  atmospheric	  carbon	  stock	  would,	  again,	  be	  negligible.	  The	  second	  assertion	  is	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factually	  true	  (the	  contribution	  would	  be	  less	  than	  a	  percent	  of	  global	  carbon	  
emissions)	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  and	  the	  first	  assertion	  is	  a	  valid	  argument	  that	  has	  
been	  a	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  annual	  climate	  talks	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  (United	  Nations	  
Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change).	  The	  challenge	  of	  climate	  change,	  
however,	  requires	  us	  to	  think	  globally	  and	  long-­‐term,	  in	  which	  case	  neither	  of	  these	  
arguments	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  deal-­‐breakers	  for	  including	  climate	  considerations	  in	  
energy	  development.	  
First,	  the	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  (which	  we	  can	  approximate	  as	  diesel	  for	  small	  
electric	  generators)	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  poor,	  rural	  communities	  contributes	  
little	  to	  global	  carbon	  emissions	  (Sanchez	  2010).	  However,	  this	  is	  only	  true	  as	  long	  
as	  those	  communities	  continue	  to	  consume	  minimal	  energy	  indefinitely.	  In	  reality	  
these	  communities	  are	  likely	  to	  expand	  their	  energy	  consumption	  just	  as	  the	  
electrified	  world	  has	  done.	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  exposure	  to	  
electrification	  leads	  fairly	  rapidly	  to	  increased	  interest	  in	  acquiring	  more	  electrical	  
appliances	  as	  well	  as	  a	  greater	  willingness	  to	  pay	  (a	  term	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  
more	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  3)	  for	  those	  services	  (Zerriffi	  2010).	  Any	  consideration	  of	  
electricity	  use	  in	  poor,	  rural	  communities	  must	  assume	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  
consumption,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  point	  on	  par	  with	  the	  idealized	  standard	  of	  living.	  A	  
community’s	  contribution,	  though	  negligible	  at	  first,	  might	  eventually	  be	  equivalent	  
to	  a	  community	  of	  similar	  size	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐negligible.	  
Second	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  inherently	  unfair	  of	  those	  who	  drive	  climate	  
change	  to	  ask	  those	  who	  do	  not,	  and	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  suffer	  most	  from	  it,	  to	  bear	  the	  
burden	  for	  mitigation.	  This	  argument	  gains	  weight	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  West	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expects	  these	  communities	  to	  “catch	  up”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  the	  
communities	  whose	  resources	  were	  exploited	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  West,	  
(McMichael	  2000,	  13)	  and	  they	  are	  expected	  to	  catch	  up	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  
colonizing	  and	  exploiting	  anyone	  else,	  limiting	  their	  options.	  There	  are	  situations	  in	  
which	  fossil-­‐fuel-­‐based	  energy	  generation	  is	  the	  most	  accessible	  option;	  it	  is	  the	  
community’s	  right	  to	  choose	  that	  technology	  over	  another	  despite	  its	  climate	  
implications.	  But	  these	  situations	  are	  less	  common	  when	  other	  factors,	  often	  
externalized,	  are	  considered.	  These	  include	  other	  environmental	  costs	  (local	  water	  
and	  air	  pollution),	  health	  effects	  (indoor	  air	  quality),	  fuel	  price	  fluctuations,	  
international	  trade	  and	  politics,	  fuel	  transportation,	  equipment	  maintenance,	  and	  
others.	  
As	  Andrew	  Scott	  (2010)	  explains,	  “energy	  security	  has	  become	  a	  more	  
significant	  factor	  in	  domestic	  and	  international	  policy	  because	  of	  fluctuating	  oil	  
prices,	  climate	  change,	  and	  concerns	  about	  security	  and	  terrorism	  more	  generally.	  
Developing	  countries	  are	  particularly	  affected	  by	  variability	  in	  oil	  prices	  and	  the	  
new	  scramble	  for	  energy	  resources	  by	  energy	  importing	  countries”	  (Foreword	  from	  
Sanchez	  2010,	  xi).	  All	  told,	  the	  long-­‐term	  costs	  of	  depending	  on	  diesel	  (for	  example),	  
especially	  if	  it	  is	  imported,	  can	  come	  to	  dwarf	  the	  costs	  of	  renewable	  energy	  
technologies	  (RETs).	  In	  addition,	  in	  no	  case	  is	  diesel	  fuel	  the	  only	  option	  for	  
electricity	  generation;	  every	  community	  has	  access	  to	  some	  form	  of	  renewable	  
energy,	  whether	  it	  is	  moving	  water,	  sunlight,	  wind,	  surface-­‐subsurface	  thermal	  
gradients,	  or	  energy-­‐rich	  organic	  matter.	  In	  cases	  where	  fossil	  fuels	  are	  still	  the	  most	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accessible	  option,	  the	  responsibility	  to	  minimize	  carbon	  emissions	  may	  instead	  be	  
reflected	  in	  national	  or	  state	  policies	  that	  favor	  RETs.	  
The	  global	  community	  recognizes	  that	  it	  is	  now	  at	  a	  point	  where	  it	  must	  
reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  avoid	  technologies	  that	  increase	  them	  (UNFCCC	  2015).	  
With	  current	  emission	  trends,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  century	  we	  will	  have	  raised	  global	  
temperatures	  by	  over	  4C,	  raised	  sea	  levels	  by	  over	  a	  meter,	  and	  reduced	  the	  ocean	  
pH	  below	  7.8	  (IPCC	  2014).	  And	  these	  are	  not	  eventual	  setline	  points;	  these	  numbers	  
represent	  single	  data	  points	  on	  trends	  that	  are	  not	  only	  increasing	  in	  2100,	  but	  still	  
accelerating.	  
Collectively,	  developing	  countries,	  even	  excluding	  China	  and	  India,	  will	  
account	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  projected	  emissions	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  century,	  
and	  their	  energy	  development	  choices	  will	  define	  the	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  
(IPCC	  2015).	  Off-­‐grid,	  or	  Distributed	  Generation	  (DG),	  is	  emerging	  as	  a	  viable	  but	  
challenging	  approach	  to	  both	  climate	  mitigation	  and	  electricity	  access.	  This	  paper	  
will	  discuss	  methods	  and	  challenges	  of	  DG	  in	  developing	  countries,	  outline	  viability	  
and	  sustainability	  considerations,	  and	  present	  case	  studies	  from	  Nepal,	  India,	  and	  
Tanzania	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  complexity	  of	  and	  potential	  for	  off-­‐grid	  
electricity	  development.	  A	  more	  complete	  understanding	  will	  help	  practitioners	  
pursue	  DG,	  not	  as	  energy	  development	  for	  development’s	  sake,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  
recognize	  when	  RETs	  are	  the	  most	  appropriate	  option	  and	  then	  make	  them	  
accessible	  and	  successful	  when	  needed.	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Chapter	  1:	  Business	  as	  Usual	  
The	  image	  of	  “electricity	  service”	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  for	  many	  in	  the	  West	  is	  
of	  sprawling	  grids	  linking	  a	  few	  large,	  centralized	  power	  plants	  to	  consumers	  via	  
interstate	  transmission	  lines	  and	  tree-­‐like	  distribution	  networks.	  Much	  of	  the	  West,	  
especially	  the	  US,	  has	  achieved	  near-­‐100%	  electricity	  access	  primarily	  through	  this	  
centralized	  system.	  The	  large	  power	  plants	  powering	  the	  grid	  have	  traditionally	  
taken	  advantage	  of	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  accessible	  energy	  resource,	  whether	  
through	  the	  construction	  of	  large	  hydroelectric	  dams	  or	  the	  burning	  of	  coal	  mined	  
locally	  or	  as	  far	  away	  as	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  globe.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  centralized	  grid	  
spanning	  entire	  countries	  or	  even	  continents	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  coal	  (~39%),	  
nuclear	  (~13%),	  hydropower	  (~17%)	  and,	  more	  recently,	  natural	  gas	  (~21%)	  (EIA	  
2015).	  Non-­‐hydro	  renewable	  energy	  for	  electricity	  generation	  was	  negligible	  until	  
the	  early	  2000s,	  but	  has	  since	  seen	  rapid	  expansion	  to	  account	  for	  roughly	  9%	  of	  
world	  net	  electricity	  generation.	  These	  approximate	  proportions	  have	  been	  the	  
trend	  for	  the	  western	  grid’s	  nearly	  century	  history,	  making	  it	  unlikely	  that	  RETs	  will	  
take	  over	  quickly	  without	  concerted	  efforts	  on	  national	  scales.	  This	  does	  not	  account	  
for	  everyone,	  however;	  nor	  do	  past	  trends	  accurately	  predict	  the	  future	  of	  electricity	  
generation,	  for	  several	  key	  reasons.	  
First,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  electricity	  generation	  is	  not	  static.	  Total	  world	  
generation	  is	  expected	  to	  increase	  about	  70%	  between	  2015	  and	  2040	  (EIA	  2015),	  
and	  most	  of	  that	  is	  expected	  within	  developing	  countries	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  west	  
where	  electricity	  production	  has	  recently	  begun	  to	  decrease.	  Among	  the	  “developing	  
countries”	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  BRICS	  countries	  –	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China,	  and	  South	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Africa	  –	  also	  called	  “rapidly	  developing”	  or	  “emerging”	  economies.	  Within	  these	  
countries,	  where	  electricity	  consumption	  and	  generation	  are	  expected	  to	  grow	  
considerably,	  fossil	  fuels	  like	  coal	  and	  natural	  gas	  will	  play	  a	  large	  role,	  especially	  
considering	  that	  all	  of	  these	  countries	  sit	  on	  top	  of	  plentiful	  reserves	  (2015).	  The	  
BRICS	  countries	  are	  also	  developing	  their	  extensive	  renewable	  energy	  resources.	  
Fossil	  fuels	  are	  typically	  less	  accessible	  in	  other	  developing	  countries	  –	  much	  of	  
Central	  and	  South	  America,	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  South	  and	  Central	  Asia,	  Southeast	  
Asia,	  and	  the	  South	  Pacific	  –	  necessitating	  the	  development	  of	  RETs.	  In	  addition	  
developed	  countries	  have	  dramatically	  increased	  their	  development	  of	  RETs,	  
driving	  cost	  reduction	  worldwide.	  All	  told,	  RETs	  are	  expected	  to	  account	  for	  over	  a	  
quarter	  of	  total	  energy	  generation	  by	  2020.	  That	  portion	  is	  expected	  to	  level	  out	  
around	  that	  time,	  but	  consistent	  policies	  supporting	  continued	  growth	  could	  drive	  
RET	  development	  further	  over	  the	  hump	  to	  replacing	  Business	  as	  Usual.	  
Second,	  there	  is	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  direction	  developing	  countries	  will	  take	  
energy	  generation.	  Considering	  that	  about	  1.6	  billion	  people	  are	  currently	  without	  
any	  access	  to	  electricity,	  and	  roughly	  another	  third	  of	  the	  population	  has	  only	  
limited	  access,	  the	  expectation	  for	  growth	  rivals	  all	  current	  generation	  combined.	  In	  
terms	  of	  global	  emissions,	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  meet	  that	  growing	  demand	  with	  
RETs	  would	  provide	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Business	  as	  Usual.	  
Third,	  and	  most	  pertinent	  to	  this	  paper’s	  discussion,	  central	  grid	  extension	  is	  
not	  the	  only,	  or	  even	  the	  best,	  method	  for	  meeting	  electricity	  demand	  in	  every	  case.	  
The	  grid’s	  design	  presents	  some	  challenges	  to	  using	  RETs	  as	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  work	  
with	  one-­‐way	  transmission	  of	  power	  from	  large	  coal	  and	  hydro	  plants	  to	  nearby	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population	  centers.	  This	  structure	  does	  not	  cater	  well	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  much	  of	  the	  
developing	  world,	  leaving	  local	  entities	  to	  either	  brute-­‐force	  a	  utility	  grid	  or	  explore	  
alternatives.	  These	  alternatives,	  which	  are	  comprised	  more	  and	  more	  of	  local	  
renewable	  energy	  resources,	  may	  not	  only	  set	  the	  norm	  for	  sustainable	  energy	  
development	  in	  developing	  areas.	  Through	  rapid	  iteration	  these	  alternatives	  may	  
collectively	  build	  a	  market	  for,	  and	  industry	  around,	  distributed	  renewable	  energy	  
that	  may	  even	  find	  its	  place	  in	  the	  energy	  future	  of	  the	  West.	  
1.1:	  The	  Current	  Trajectory	  
The	  direction	  of	  global	  energy	  demand	  is	  only	  up.	  Generation	  has	  begun	  to	  
decrease	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe,	  but	  much	  of	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  
exporting	  industry	  to	  developing	  countries	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper,	  low	  or	  negative	  
population	  growth,	  and	  increased	  efficiency.	  But	  consumption	  continues	  to	  grow	  
worldwide,	  and	  generation	  must	  grow	  accordingly.	  We	  might	  consider	  generation	  to	  
be	  at	  a	  fork	  in	  the	  road:	  developed	  countries	  are	  dealing	  with	  aging	  national	  grids	  
and	  a	  dependence	  on	  fossil	  fuel-­‐based	  power,	  while	  developing	  countries	  are	  just	  
now	  at	  the	  point	  where	  they	  can	  take	  major	  strides	  to	  increase	  electricity	  access.	  
The	  question	  is:	  where	  do	  we	  take	  our	  energy	  infrastructure?	  Let	  us	  focus	  for	  now	  
on	  the	  preferred,	  tried-­‐and-­‐true	  methods	  of	  establishing	  electricity	  access.	  
Electricity	  service	  was	  first	  developed	  in	  the	  eastern	  U.S.	  with	  its	  large	  urban	  
centers	  and	  relatively	  tame	  geography,	  lending	  itself	  to	  centralized	  generation,	  long-­‐
distance	  transmission,	  and	  tree-­‐like	  distribution	  networks.	  Most	  subsequent	  
electricity	  service	  has	  followed	  suit	  and,	  from	  an	  efficiency	  standpoint,	  such	  systems	  
are	  ideal	  in	  comparable	  areas.	  The	  scale	  of	  necessary	  infrastructure	  often	  requires	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government-­‐scale	  investment,	  and	  large-­‐scale	  generation	  using	  cheap	  fossil	  fuels	  is	  
more	  cost-­‐effective	  (when	  externalizing	  social	  costs)	  for	  electrifying	  large	  
population	  centers	  than	  distributed,	  intermittent	  generation.	  With	  a	  few	  exceptions	  
for	  countries	  rich	  in	  hydro	  or	  geothermal	  resources	  (e.g.	  Iceland),	  RETs	  continue	  to	  
make	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  to	  total	  generation.	  Rarely	  does	  a	  renewable	  energy	  
power	  plant	  actually	  replace	  a	  traditional	  power	  plant;	  that	  honor	  goes	  to	  natural	  
gas.	  
Natural	  gas	  has	  become	  so	  affordable	  and	  versatile	  that	  it	  discourages	  
adoption	  of	  other,	  cleaner	  technologies.	  From	  a	  climate	  perspective,	  the	  decline	  of	  
the	  coal	  industry	  ideally	  is	  met,	  kWh	  per	  kWh,	  by	  the	  rise	  RETs.	  But	  natural	  gas	  has	  
effectively	  inserted	  itself	  as	  a	  so-­‐called	  “bridge	  fuel”	  that	  reduces	  carbon	  emissions	  
at	  a	  much	  lower	  cost	  than	  with	  renewable	  energy.	  Natural	  gas	  is	  also	  comparatively	  
versatile	  and	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  direct	  fuel	  for	  heating	  and	  cooking,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
electricity	  generation.	  That	  it	  can	  be	  compressed	  (CNG)	  or	  liquefied	  (LNG)	  for	  easy	  
transportation	  means	  that	  it	  is	  marketable	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  countries.	  Add	  to	  this	  
the	  support	  from	  public	  health	  specialists	  that	  prefer	  natural	  gas	  to	  biomass	  for	  
cooking	  and	  heating,	  and	  you	  have	  a	  fuel	  that	  is	  not	  easily	  displaced	  from	  the	  world	  
energy	  market.	  Considering	  only	  non-­‐externalized	  monetary	  costs,	  natural	  gas	  is	  the	  
fuel	  of	  choice	  and	  is	  likely	  here	  to	  stay	  (its	  reserves	  remain	  plentiful).	  
This	  raises	  some	  concerns,	  however.	  First,	  the	  carbon	  intensity	  of	  burning	  
natural	  gas	  is,	  indeed,	  preferable	  to	  that	  of	  burning	  coal,	  but	  it	  is	  nowhere	  near	  
negligible.	  Second,	  like	  all	  fossil	  fuels,	  natural	  gas	  is	  not	  evenly	  distributed	  across	  the	  
globe,	  leaving	  the	  same	  geopolitical	  tensions	  that	  currently	  exist	  due	  to	  oil	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distribution.	  If	  there	  is	  any	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  economic	  power	  in	  energy	  resources,	  one	  
need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  Russia’s	  influence	  over	  European	  and	  Central	  Asian	  
politics	  as	  the	  overwhelmingly	  dominant	  source	  of	  natural	  gas	  despite	  its	  current	  
(2016)	  economic	  crisis.	  In	  response,	  energy	  independence	  has	  become	  a	  buzzword	  
and	  developing	  countries	  especially	  have	  begun	  exploring	  alternatives	  to	  their	  grids.	  
Falling	  prices	  and	  increased	  efficiency	  have	  begun	  to	  turn	  the	  tables,	  bringing	  RETs	  
and	  DG	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  affordability.	  What	  would	  this	  shift	  look	  like,	  and	  what	  
would	  it	  take	  to	  make	  it	  happen?	  
1.2:	  A	  Conscious	  Effort	  
What	  if	  the	  world	  opted	  out	  of	  the	  current	  trends	  and	  focused	  on	  sustainable	  
development	  –	  what	  would	  that	  involve?	  Though	  it	  may	  be	  attractive	  to	  make	  a	  
massive	  transition	  to	  grid-­‐scale	  RETs,	  geographical	  and	  economic	  limitations	  make	  
this	  nearly	  impossible.	  The	  challenge	  is	  two-­‐fold:	  current	  electrification	  needs	  to	  
transition	  to	  RETs,	  and	  the	  global	  un-­‐	  and	  under-­‐electrified	  majority	  demands	  
access.	  Not	  only	  would	  a	  grid-­‐scale	  transition	  to	  RETs	  be	  unrealistic	  for	  most	  
countries,	  but	  simultaneous	  and	  rapid	  grid	  extension	  would	  make	  such	  a	  transition	  
impossible.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  grid	  extension	  issue	  may	  also	  
provide	  the	  most	  practical	  alternative	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  expansion.	  
Distributed	  Generation	  (DG)	  simply	  means	  the	  generation	  of	  electricity	  
separate	  from,	  or	  in	  addition	  to,	  a	  regionally	  centralized	  grid	  (author’s	  definition).	  
Everything	  from	  rooftop	  solar	  panels	  on	  a	  forest	  cabin	  to	  village-­‐scale	  micro-­‐grids	  
counts	  as	  DG,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  the	  variations	  possible.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  
popular	  version	  currently	  is	  the	  solar	  home	  system	  (SHS)	  –	  prefabricated	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generation,	  storage,	  and	  end-­‐use	  units	  that	  have	  sprung	  up	  all	  over	  the	  developing	  
world.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  start-­‐up	  funds	  from	  donors	  and	  scattered	  subsidies	  from	  
governments,	  SHS	  companies	  have	  long	  been	  established	  and	  self-­‐sustaining,	  
providing	  electricity	  service	  quickly	  and	  (relatively)	  cheaply	  to	  areas	  that	  are	  not	  
likely	  to	  see	  more	  advanced	  alternatives	  any	  time	  soon.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  move	  
beyond	  just	  the	  basic	  service	  provided	  by	  something	  like	  a	  SHS	  and	  toward	  a	  more	  
scalable,	  high	  quality	  method	  of	  DG.	  
Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  will	  directly	  address	  the	  major	  logistical	  and	  social	  
considerations	  for	  DG	  in	  general,	  setting	  up	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  4	  and	  
discussion	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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Chapter	  2:	  Technology	  Selection	  and	  Demand-­‐Side	  Management	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  factors	  of,	  and	  challenges	  facing,	  
renewable	  micro-­‐grid	  technology	  in	  rural	  villages.	  Beyond	  generation	  technologies,	  
which	  will	  be	  discussed,	  one	  of	  the	  larger	  challenges	  facing	  project	  developers	  is	  the	  
management	  of	  electrical	  loads	  from	  customers	  on	  micro-­‐grids.	  This	  practice,	  
commonly	  called	  Demand-­‐Side	  Management,	  or	  DSM,	  includes	  methods	  ranging	  
from	  flat	  load	  limiting	  to	  complex	  tiered	  pricing	  structures	  and	  auxiliary	  circuits,	  all	  
of	  which	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  DSM	  options	  will	  be	  applied	  
to	  projects	  in	  Nepal,	  India,	  and	  Tanzania,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  relevant	  
technology,	  policy,	  and	  socioeconomics	  of	  the	  communities	  involved.	  
	  
2.1:	  Generation	  Type	  by	  Limiting	  Factor	  
DSM	  as	  a	  practice	  does	  not	  originate	  from	  rural	  electrification;	  utilities	  of	  any	  
kind	  implement	  DSM	  strategies	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  world	  wide,	  from	  leveling	  
electrical	  loads	  to	  incentivizing	  water	  conservation.	  By	  definition	  DSM	  simply	  means	  
the	  influence	  of	  consumer	  electricity	  use	  through	  incentives,	  which	  can	  be	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  price	  structuring,	  supply	  restrictions,	  conditional	  financial	  benefits,	  
metering,	  education,	  and	  more	  (Harper	  2013;	  Powers	  2014).	  The	  question,	  though,	  
is:	  why	  would	  we	  want	  to	  control	  customer	  electricity	  usage?	  The	  answer	  depends	  
as	  much	  on	  the	  customers	  themselves	  as	  it	  does	  on	  the	  type	  of	  generation	  being	  
used,	  both	  of	  which	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  changing	  from	  site	  to	  site	  and	  
even	  customer	  to	  customer.	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Not	  all	  power	  generation	  is	  created	  equal:	  the	  average	  generation	  of	  a	  solar	  
PV	  array,	  small	  wind	  turbine,	  or	  micro-­‐hydro	  system	  might	  be	  comparable	  over	  a	  
year’s	  time,	  but	  the	  minute-­‐to-­‐minute	  generation	  behavior	  is	  not.	  Taking	  solar	  PV	  
and	  hydro	  as	  examples,	  we	  can	  characterize	  generation	  in	  two	  ways:	  power-­‐limited	  
or	  energy-­‐limited	  (Harper	  2013).	  
In	  hydro	  generation,	  the	  supply	  of	  energy	  is	  relatively	  constant,	  meaning	  that	  
power	  (the	  rate	  of	  energy	  conversion)	  does	  not	  fluctuate	  up	  or	  down	  very	  far	  or	  
frequently.	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  is	  preferred	  because	  it	  is	  largely	  immune	  to	  the	  
intermittency	  issues	  plaguing	  other	  renewable	  energy	  sources,	  and	  so	  hydro	  is	  often	  
considered	  a	  must-­‐use	  if	  it	  is	  available.	  However,	  because	  power	  is	  limited	  to	  what	  
the	  river	  can	  provide,	  consumers	  at	  any	  given	  time	  might	  draw	  more	  power	  than	  is	  
being	  generated,	  over-­‐taxing	  the	  generator	  and	  causing	  a	  brownout	  (Harper	  2013).	  
This	  is	  surprisingly	  common,	  even	  where	  DSM	  measures	  are	  used,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
regulate	  customers’	  appliance	  choices,	  system	  bypasses,	  or	  other	  decisions	  not	  
made	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  greater	  good	  of	  the	  grid.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  accountability	  of	  
over-­‐consumers	  and	  justice	  for	  under-­‐consumers	  who	  unfairly	  experience	  frequent	  
brownouts,	  hydro	  grid	  operators	  can	  employ	  DSM	  to	  encourage	  consistent	  use	  of	  
low-­‐power	  appliances	  as	  opposed	  to	  intermittent	  use	  of	  high-­‐power	  appliances.	  
In	  solar	  PV	  generation,	  the	  opposite	  problem	  exists.	  Solar	  generates	  
intermittently:	  it	  is	  predictable	  on	  a	  diurnal	  cycle	  but	  is	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  any	  
kind	  of	  shading,	  especially	  cloud	  cover.	  As	  such,	  solar	  PV	  is	  almost	  always	  installed	  
in	  conjunction	  with	  some	  type	  of	  storage,	  typically	  lead-­‐acid	  batteries	  (which	  are	  in	  
abundance	  in	  developing	  areas	  as	  car	  and	  motorcycle	  batteries)	  or	  Lithium-­‐ion	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batteries	  (Kazempour	  2009).	  Solar	  generation	  can	  therefore	  be	  considered	  “energy-­‐
limited:”	  the	  sun	  only	  provides	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  energy	  each	  day,	  which	  is	  stored	  
in	  the	  batteries	  (Harper	  2013).	  A	  consumer	  can	  draw	  as	  much	  power	  as	  they	  want	  
from	  the	  batteries,	  but	  they	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  energy.	  
Someone	  could	  use	  a	  high-­‐power	  appliance,	  like	  a	  water	  boiler,	  for	  a	  short	  time,	  or	  
they	  could	  use	  a	  low-­‐power	  LED	  light	  for	  a	  longer	  time,	  drawing	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  
energy	  in	  either	  case.	  This	  provides	  some	  options,	  particularly	  in	  places	  where	  
certain	  industrial	  activities	  are	  expected,	  such	  as	  grinding	  flour.	  The	  downside,	  
however,	  is	  that	  the	  batteries	  can	  easily	  be	  drawn	  down	  by	  over-­‐zealous	  customers	  
to	  the	  point	  that	  a	  brownout	  occurs	  –	  this	  time	  there	  isn’t	  an	  option	  of	  simply	  
restarting	  the	  generator,	  as	  with	  hydro	  –	  and	  damages	  the	  batteries	  such	  that	  the	  
overall	  capacity	  of	  the	  batteries	  is	  permanently	  reduced.	  Again,	  DSM	  can	  be	  
employed	  in	  this	  case	  to	  encourage	  overall	  efficiency	  and	  conservation.	  The	  
limitations	  for	  DSM	  with	  solar	  PV	  are	  fewer	  than	  with	  hydro,	  but	  the	  potential	  
consequences	  of	  poor	  DSM	  are	  greater	  (Harper	  2013).	  
In	  summary,	  the	  greater	  goal	  of	  DSM	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  brownouts	  
and	  the	  need	  for	  power	  rationing	  while	  still	  providing	  equitable	  and	  affordable	  
service.	  While	  the	  utility	  itself	  can	  control	  supply,	  as	  with	  power	  rationing,	  
customers	  might	  end	  up	  paying	  for	  service	  that	  they	  do	  not	  receive,	  and	  the	  
unreliability	  of	  power	  could	  be	  a	  hurdle	  to	  economic	  development,	  the	  presumed	  
goal	  of	  electrification.	  In	  other	  ways,	  however,	  DSM	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  viability	  and	  
long-­‐term	  success	  of	  any	  grid,	  micro	  or	  otherwise.	  Excess	  electricity	  is	  financially	  
wasteful	  while	  insufficient	  electricity	  makes	  for	  poor	  service,	  unhappy	  customers,	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inequitable	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  burdens,	  brownouts	  and,	  ultimately,	  damage	  
to	  the	  system	  itself	  (Deshmukh	  2013).	  
There	  are	  countless	  methods	  of	  encouraging	  particular	  electricity	  use	  
patterns	  among	  customers,	  and	  every	  power	  provider	  encounters	  different	  
challenges.	  Most	  strategies,	  however,	  fall	  into	  the	  following	  categories:	  (1)	  efficient	  
appliances,	  (2)	  commercial	  load	  scheduling,	  (3)	  restricted	  residential	  use,	  (4)	  price	  
incentives,	  (5)	  community	  enforcement,	  and	  (6)	  consumer	  education	  (Harper,	  
2013).	  These	  are	  each	  described	  briefly	  below.	  
2.2.1:	  Efficient	  Appliances	  
A	  straightforward	  solution	  to	  energy	  load	  matching	  issues	  of	  any	  kind	  is	  the	  
use	  of	  low-­‐power	  appliances.	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  conservation,	  which	  is	  
encouraged	  through	  other	  means,	  efficiency	  reduces	  the	  overall	  consumption	  of	  all	  
customers	  without	  sacrificing	  services,	  allowing	  for	  greater	  range	  of	  service	  (more	  
customers)	  or	  more	  appliances	  per	  customer	  given	  a	  fixed	  generation	  capacity.	  
Efficient	  appliances	  tend	  to	  come	  at	  a	  higher	  upfront	  cost	  than	  common	  appliances,	  
but	  the	  energy	  savings	  over	  time	  can	  make	  up	  for	  this.	  In	  developed	  countries	  with	  
expansive	  utilities	  and	  strict	  policies	  addressing	  energy	  efficiency,	  such	  appliances	  
tend	  to	  be	  subsidized	  either	  by	  the	  government	  or	  by	  the	  utilities	  themselves,	  with	  
extra	  cost	  reductions	  for	  low-­‐income	  households	  (UNDP	  2011).	  In	  rural	  developing	  
countries,	  however,	  upfront	  cost	  is	  the	  single	  greatest	  barrier	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  
most	  technology	  (Deshmukh	  2013).	  
This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  project	  developers	  in	  these	  areas	  should	  
also	  incorporate	  the	  sale	  or	  distribution	  of	  efficient	  appliances	  into	  their	  business	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models,	  a	  la	  d.light,	  which	  produces	  solar	  lamps	  that	  commonly	  accompany	  the	  
installation	  of	  rural	  solar	  systems	  by	  NGOs	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (d.light	  2014).	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  personal	  experience	  shows	  that,	  given	  the	  right	  conditions,	  efficient	  
appliances	  may	  be	  the	  only	  appliances	  available	  to	  some	  communities	  given	  the	  
adaptable	  infrastructure	  and	  rural	  grid	  limitations.	  For	  example,	  again	  from	  
personal	  experience,	  the	  only	  electric	  lighting	  available	  to	  89%	  of	  Tanzanians	  as	  of	  
2008	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  small,	  battery-­‐powered	  LED	  lamps	  (UNDP	  2009).	  
Incandescent,	  fluorescent,	  and	  halogen	  bulbs	  are	  entirely	  unavailable	  except	  in	  
historically	  urban	  areas	  where	  decades-­‐old	  development	  has	  left	  its	  mark	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  fixtures	  that	  require	  these	  inefficient	  light	  bulbs.	  
Overall,	  the	  provision	  of	  or	  access	  to	  efficient	  appliances	  is	  a	  commonly	  
recommended	  form	  of	  DSM.	  It	  reduces	  the	  chance	  of	  a	  brownout	  during	  peak	  hours	  
and/or	  extends	  the	  potential	  reach	  of	  the	  grid	  to	  more	  customers	  or	  more	  
appliances,	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  community	  and	  existing	  industrial	  
electricity	  uses	  (Harper	  2013).	  Efficiency	  is	  recommended	  regardless	  of	  the	  type	  of	  
generation,	  whether	  power-­‐limited	  or	  energy-­‐limited.	  
2.2.2:	  Commercial	  Load	  Scheduling	  
As	  rural	  electrification	  expands	  beyond	  the	  classic	  SHS	  model	  of	  small	  DC	  
appliances	  attached	  to	  a	  few	  panels	  and	  batteries,	  electrical	  appliances	  tend	  to	  grow	  
in	  size	  as	  more	  commercial	  or	  industrial	  scale	  activities	  come	  into	  play.	  Beyond	  the	  
home,	  where	  most	  electricity	  use	  is	  from	  lighting,	  radio,	  or	  phone	  charging,	  larger	  
consumers	  may	  need	  to	  run	  grain	  mills,	  large	  water	  pumps,	  computers,	  and	  more.	  In	  
a	  worst	  case,	  these	  loads	  will	  draw	  power	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  potentially	  creating	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large	  changes	  in	  voltages	  in	  the	  grid	  (the	  high	  current	  needed	  to	  run	  industrial	  
machinery	  will	  cause	  the	  grid	  to	  drop	  the	  voltage	  to	  compensate	  and	  maintain	  
constant	  power)	  and,	  at	  worst,	  a	  brownout	  of	  the	  entire	  grid.	  Rural	  customers	  
paying	  a	  substantial	  percentage	  of	  their	  income	  for	  electricity	  are	  decidedly	  
underserved	  if	  voltage	  drops	  or	  brownouts	  are	  frequent	  due	  to	  commercial	  or	  
industrial	  use.	  
Load	  scheduling	  can	  solve	  this	  issue	  by	  requiring	  commercial	  or	  industrial	  
customers	  to	  operate	  during	  hours	  of	  low	  demand	  or	  high	  generation,	  assuming	  that	  
large-­‐scale	  storage	  has	  not	  been	  pursued	  as	  an	  option	  (especially	  unlikely	  in	  a	  rural	  
village	  setting).	  By	  scheduling	  customers	  of	  a	  solar	  PV	  micro-­‐grid,	  for	  example,	  the	  
operator	  can	  clump	  the	  larger	  consumers	  into	  the	  hours	  of	  peak	  generation,	  around	  
noon,	  and	  require	  that	  they	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  their	  load	  in	  the	  mornings	  and	  
evenings.	  In	  addition,	  because	  load	  scheduling	  may	  become	  an	  inconvenience	  for	  
commercial	  customers,	  it	  will	  ultimately	  encourage	  investment	  into	  energy	  storage,	  
particularly	  with	  intermittent	  energy	  sources	  or	  low-­‐power	  hydro.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Nepal	  pilot	  projects	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.2,	  battery	  
storage	  is	  installed	  with	  the	  panels,	  allowing	  operators	  to	  monitor	  the	  energy	  usage	  
centrally.	  The	  mini-­‐grid	  currently	  only	  serves	  small	  businesses	  and	  households,	  but	  
the	  arrival	  of	  a	  larger	  commercial	  customer	  may	  require	  (besides	  an	  upgrade	  to	  the	  
system	  generation	  capacity)	  the	  use	  of	  load	  scheduling	  and	  the	  consideration	  of	  
additional	  storage.	  
In	  essence,	  commercial	  load	  scheduling	  can	  serve	  a	  range	  of	  purposes	  and	  
may	  be	  suitable	  under	  both	  generation	  types	  (power-­‐	  and	  energy-­‐limited).	  In	  the	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case	  of	  consistent,	  low-­‐power	  generation	  such	  as	  hydro	  it	  helps	  to	  smooth	  the	  load;	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  highly	  intermittent	  but	  anticipated	  generation,	  such	  as	  solar	  or	  wind,	  it	  
helps	  to	  reduce	  wasted	  energy	  during	  peak	  generation	  and	  decrease	  peak	  demand	  
(Harper	  2013).	  In	  all	  cases	  load	  scheduling	  encourages	  investment	  in	  storage	  
technologies	  that	  will	  allow	  businesses	  to	  operate	  independent	  of	  the	  grid’s	  
generation	  tendencies.	  
2.2.3:	  Restricted	  Residential	  Use	  
One	  of	  the	  more	  problematic	  practices	  in	  DSM	  is	  the	  restriction	  of	  allowable	  
appliances	  or	  customer	  electricity	  use.	  Ideally,	  an	  energy	  project	  developer	  will	  
supply	  the	  exact	  number	  and	  types	  of	  appliances	  that	  will	  work	  in	  conjunction	  on	  
the	  home	  system	  or	  grid,	  and	  customers	  will	  stick	  to	  those	  restrictions.	  In	  reality,	  
however,	  it	  can	  be	  in	  a	  customer’s	  short-­‐term	  interest	  to	  have	  an	  additional	  
appliance,	  or	  to	  bypass	  the	  system	  altogether	  and	  install	  a	  full	  outlet	  in	  their	  home.	  
DC	  systems	  don’t	  usually	  have	  outlets,	  but	  instead	  supply	  power	  directly	  to	  lights,	  
chargers,	  etc.,	  making	  them	  more	  difficult	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  and	  reducing	  the	  
need	  for	  restriction.	  AC	  systems,	  however,	  can	  support	  outlets,	  and	  frequently	  do	  
despite	  design	  intentions.	  The	  result,	  naturally,	  is	  frequent	  voltage	  drops	  and	  
brownouts	  (Harper	  2013).	  
The	  most	  direct	  solution	  is	  to	  ban	  or	  restrict	  certain	  appliances	  or	  usage;	  but	  
without	  a	  method	  of	  enforcement	  this	  quickly	  falls	  by	  the	  wayside	  as	  customers	  find	  
bigger	  and	  better	  appliances	  or	  bypass	  individual	  metering	  to	  overdraw	  the	  system.	  
Culture	  and	  community	  involvement	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  type	  of	  restriction	  that	  
works:	  according	  to	  a	  2013	  study	  by	  Berkeley	  Labs,	  communities	  served	  by	  mini-­‐
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grids	  with	  restrictions	  based	  on	  verbal	  agreements	  routinely	  broke	  the	  agreements	  
and	  caused	  regular	  brownouts.	  The	  noted	  exception	  was	  in	  a	  village	  identified	  by	  
the	  authors	  (though	  no	  indicators	  or	  methods	  were	  given)	  as	  “predisposed”	  to	  rule	  
by	  consensus	  (Harper	  2013).	  The	  global	  development	  community	  has	  largely	  
misunderstood	  the	  question	  of	  “predisposition”	  or	  informal	  social	  arrangements,	  
discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  later	  (Easterly	  2006,	  87).	  Development’s	  “planners”	  
(Easterly	  2006;	  Sirolli	  2012)	  have	  long	  pursued	  the	  top-­‐down	  application	  of	  the	  
West’s	  market	  structures	  and	  social	  laws,	  including	  DSM,	  to	  little	  success	  in	  
developing	  areas,	  ignoring	  and	  even	  undermining	  local	  structures	  (Easterly	  2006,	  
101).	  Harper’s	  admission	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  energy	  developers	  to	  utilize	  or	  even	  
understand	  local	  methods	  of	  accountability/consensus	  indicates	  that	  the	  energy	  
development	  community	  is	  as	  inexperienced	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  development	  
community,	  if	  not	  more	  so.	  
2.2.4:	  Price	  Incentives	  
A	  common	  DSM	  measure	  in	  many	  areas	  is	  the	  use	  of	  adaptive	  pricing	  to	  
encourage	  conservation	  and	  efficiency,	  as	  well	  as	  load	  leveling.	  These	  pricing	  
schemes	  come	  in	  many	  forms,	  the	  most	  common	  of	  which	  are	  capacity-­‐based	  
(power-­‐based)	  and	  consumption-­‐based	  (energy-­‐based),	  appropriately	  called	  for	  
their	  applications	  to	  the	  power-­‐limited	  and	  energy-­‐limited	  generation	  types	  (see	  
Section	  2.1).	  In	  addition,	  pricing	  schemes	  are	  necessarily	  often	  paired	  with	  metering	  
devices	  to	  monitor	  usage	  and	  inform	  both	  customer	  and	  provider	  (Deshmukh	  
2013).	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Capacity-­‐based	  pricing	  is	  the	  simpler	  of	  the	  two:	  customers	  are	  charged	  by	  
the	  maximum	  power	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  use	  at	  any	  given	  time	  (e.g.	  they	  can	  use	  up	  
to	  30W	  for	  $5	  a	  month,	  or	  60W	  for	  $8	  a	  month,	  etc.).	  Typically,	  multiple	  power	  tiers	  
will	  exist	  for	  customers	  to	  choose	  from	  (analogous	  to	  a	  monthly	  mobile	  phone	  plan),	  
but	  overall	  the	  billing	  is	  easier	  to	  monitor	  and	  enforce	  through	  written	  
agreements/contracts	  or,	  more	  directly,	  with	  current	  limiters	  that	  gauge	  the	  power	  
into	  a	  home	  and	  limit	  the	  current	  (voltage	  is	  already	  set	  by	  the	  generator),	  thereby	  
limiting	  power	  (INENSUS	  2014).	  Current	  limiters	  are	  fairly	  standard	  devices	  used	  to	  
prevent	  fault	  currents	  and	  surges,	  among	  other	  tasks,	  and	  are	  increasingly	  used	  as	  a	  
standard	  DSM	  measure	  for	  micro-­‐grids	  (Gham	  Power	  2014).	  Though	  capacity-­‐based	  
pricing	  is	  simple	  to	  apply	  to	  power-­‐limited	  generation	  systems,	  the	  downside	  is	  that	  
customers	  will	  not	  always	  use	  the	  power	  they	  are	  paying	  for	  (again,	  like	  a	  cell	  phone	  
plan),	  a	  major	  problem	  in	  a	  community	  that	  already	  has	  trouble	  affording	  electricity	  
or	  predicting	  electricity	  needs.	  Also,	  anyone	  wanting	  to	  use	  a	  single	  high-­‐power	  
device	  like	  a	  water	  heater,	  even	  infrequently,	  is	  forced	  to	  pay	  a	  higher	  flat	  rate.	  
Consumption-­‐based	  pricing	  is	  able	  to	  get	  around	  many	  of	  the	  challenges	  
facing	  capacity-­‐based	  pricing	  systems	  by	  removing	  restrictions	  on	  the	  types	  of	  
appliances	  or	  consistency	  with	  which	  they	  are	  used	  (Harper	  2013).	  Instead,	  this	  
pricing	  scheme	  looks	  only	  at	  the	  actual	  energy	  consumed	  and	  bills	  customers	  on	  a	  
per-­‐kWh	  basis.	  Most	  people	  in	  developed	  areas	  will	  recognize	  this	  as	  the	  basic	  
billing	  mechanism	  used	  by	  utilities,	  where	  monthly	  bills	  inform	  customers	  of	  their	  
kWh	  consumed	  and	  charge	  a	  (usually)	  consistent	  rate.	  This	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  
metering,	  which	  adds	  disproportionate	  upfront	  cost	  to	  the	  system.	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One	  of	  the	  greatest	  benefits	  of	  consumption-­‐based	  over	  capacity-­‐based	  
pricing	  is	  the	  encouragement	  of	  conservation.	  A	  customer	  paying	  for	  maximum	  
power	  all	  the	  time	  will	  be	  incentivized	  to	  be	  more	  thoughtful	  about	  when	  they	  use	  
appliances,	  but	  will	  actually	  fare	  better	  by	  using	  as	  much	  energy	  as	  possible	  to	  make	  
the	  most	  of	  their	  allotment.	  With	  consumption-­‐based	  pricing,	  customers	  always	  fare	  
better	  by	  using	  less.	  The	  downsides,	  however,	  include	  the	  need	  for	  reliable	  and	  
accurate	  metering,	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  peak	  power	  demand	  will	  exceed	  supply	  
at	  any	  given	  time,	  resulting	  in	  a	  brownout.	  
One	  way	  to	  mitigate	  this	  uncertainty	  is	  through	  price	  incentives,	  such	  as	  
time-­‐of-­‐use	  pricing,	  tiered	  pricing,	  and	  real-­‐time	  pricing	  (Harper	  2013).	  Time-­‐of-­‐use	  
pricing	  identifies	  peak	  and	  off-­‐peak	  demand	  periods	  and	  then	  assigns	  higher	  prices	  
during	  peak	  and	  lower	  prices	  during	  off-­‐peak	  to	  incentivize	  load	  leveling,	  which	  is	  
an	  enormous	  benefit	  to	  utilities	  and	  therefore	  customers	  (PG&E-­‐2	  2014).	  This,	  
however,	  requires	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  grid	  load	  dynamics	  on	  a	  yearly	  scale	  or	  
longer.	  In	  addition	  consumption	  trends	  become	  more	  difficult	  to	  predict	  with	  
smaller	  grids,	  as	  the	  variation	  in	  individual	  customer	  usage	  becomes	  a	  larger	  
proportion	  of	  total	  demand	  (someone	  turning	  on	  a	  light	  bulb	  in	  Kathmandu	  would	  
not	  be	  noticed	  by	  the	  utility,	  while	  the	  same	  light	  bulb	  in	  a	  small	  village	  would	  cause	  
a	  noticeable	  spike).	  Nonetheless,	  time-­‐of-­‐use	  pricing	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  DSM	  of	  rural	  
grids,	  especially	  where	  storage	  is	  limited	  or	  industrial	  uses	  coincide.	  This	  scheme	  is	  
fairly	  common	  in	  large	  utilities	  in	  developed	  countries,	  but	  is	  still	  largely	  
experimental	  in	  other	  areas	  (2014).	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Tiered	  pricing	  targets	  conservation	  and	  efficiency	  rather	  than	  load	  leveling	  
(though	  the	  two	  are	  related).	  The	  energy	  provider	  sets	  block	  prices	  on	  ranges	  of	  
energy	  consumption	  per	  billing	  period,	  with	  the	  lowest	  range	  of	  consumption	  
costing	  the	  least	  per	  kWh	  and	  the	  highest	  costing	  the	  most	  (PG&E-­‐1	  2014).	  This	  
particular	  form	  of	  tiered	  pricing	  is	  called	  “inverted	  block	  rate”	  pricing,	  and	  it	  has	  
several	  effects.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  “nudge”	  heavy	  consumers	  towards	  conserving	  their	  
energy	  use	  and/or	  investing	  in	  more	  efficient	  appliances.	  These	  consumers	  pay	  the	  
lowest	  price	  until	  their	  consumption	  crosses	  into	  the	  next	  tier,	  at	  which	  point	  they	  
start	  paying	  a	  higher	  price	  per	  additional	  kWh,	  and	  so	  on	  into	  the	  subsequent	  tiers,	  
resulting	  in	  an	  overall	  higher	  average	  price	  per	  kWh	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  billing	  period	  
(AEP	  2014).	  The	  potential	  to	  avoid	  the	  upper	  tiers	  incentivizes	  conservation	  habits	  
and	  smarter	  appliance	  purchases.	  
A	  more	  straightforward	  approach	  to	  encouraging	  conservation	  is	  to	  simply	  
raise	  the	  price	  of	  electricity,	  but	  this	  disproportionately	  affects	  low-­‐income	  
households,	  particularly	  those	  with	  poorly	  insulated	  homes	  or	  cheap	  appliances.	  
The	  inverted	  block	  rate	  bypasses	  this	  potential	  pitfall	  by	  maintaining	  or	  even	  
lowering	  the	  cost	  of	  energy	  for	  customers	  who	  consume	  the	  least,	  who	  are	  typically	  
low-­‐income.	  The	  downside,	  however,	  is	  its	  accessibility.	  Inverted	  block	  rates	  tend	  to	  
be	  confusing	  to	  customers,	  and	  can	  penalize	  certain	  customers	  that	  share	  grid	  
connection	  with	  heavy	  consumers,	  as	  may	  be	  the	  case	  with	  renters	  and	  sub-­‐letters,	  
or	  in	  rural	  micro-­‐grid	  systems	  depending	  on	  the	  distribution	  network	  (Harper	  
2013).	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Real-­‐time	  pricing	  works	  similarly	  to	  tiered	  pricing	  in	  that	  higher	  rates	  are	  
charged	  during	  peak	  demand.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  real-­‐time	  pricing	  adjusts	  the	  
price	  in	  response	  to	  demand,	  rather	  than	  in	  anticipation.	  This	  is	  a	  newer	  strategy	  in	  
developed	  countries	  that	  can	  afford	  the	  necessary	  smart	  metering	  and	  notification	  
mechanisms	  (Harper	  2013).	  To	  work	  effectively	  customers	  require	  real-­‐time	  
monitoring	  and	  notification	  so	  that	  they	  can	  adjust	  their	  usage	  accordingly.	  
Wirelessly	  controlled	  smart	  power	  strips	  and	  smart-­‐phone	  apps	  have	  made	  real-­‐
time	  pricing	  more	  viable	  and	  adaptable	  to	  fluctuations	  in	  demand,	  allowing	  the	  few	  
utilities	  that	  have	  implemented	  this	  option	  to	  smooth	  the	  load.	  
2.2.5:	  Community	  Enforcement	  and	  Involvement	  
While	  the	  methods	  discussed	  to	  this	  point	  have	  been	  direct	  and	  measurable	  
in	  their	  implementation	  and	  evaluation	  strategies,	  other	  DSM	  methods	  can	  be	  more	  
nuanced	  and	  unpredictable.	  On	  a	  city	  or	  county	  scale,	  blanket	  policies	  and	  financial	  
incentives	  are	  the	  only	  practical,	  tried-­‐and-­‐true	  ways	  to	  address	  collective	  electricity	  
usage;	  a	  population	  of	  such	  size	  and	  diversity	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  agree	  on	  social	  
methods	  of	  self-­‐regulation.	  On	  a	  village	  scale,	  however,	  collective	  self-­‐regulation	  
may	  find	  success.	  Smaller,	  rural	  communities	  regularly	  set	  their	  own	  policies	  around	  
the	  use	  of	  “commons,”	  resources	  that	  are	  used	  by	  all	  but	  potentially	  at	  risk	  of	  abuse	  
by	  a	  few.	  In	  rural	  Tanzania,	  for	  example,	  each	  village	  adopts	  its	  own	  policy	  for	  
addressing	  deforestation,	  voluntarily	  restricting	  the	  harvesting	  of	  certain	  trees	  for	  
firewood	  or	  agricultural	  burning	  practices.	  In	  rural	  Nepal,	  villages	  manage	  water	  
resources	  collectively	  to	  ensure	  upkeep	  of	  dykes	  and	  canals,	  and	  to	  regulate	  
irrigation.	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Community	  agreements	  are	  often	  used	  for	  electricity	  usage	  as	  well;	  
representatives	  from	  the	  community	  form	  a	  committee	  that	  then	  works	  with	  the	  
project	  designer	  to	  determine	  appropriate	  appliances	  to	  allow	  or	  restrict,	  informal	  
load	  scheduling,	  or	  any	  other	  measure	  deemed	  appropriate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  that	  
particular	  generation	  scheme	  in	  that	  particular	  community	  (Deshmukh	  2013).	  The	  
difficulty,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  “commons”	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  observed	  in	  common:	  
the	  electricity	  itself	  is	  commonly	  available,	  however	  the	  actual	  usage	  is	  hidden	  from	  
public	  eye	  and	  therefore	  easily	  abused.	  The	  result,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  is	  
sufficiently	  widespread	  dismissal	  of	  the	  community	  agreements	  resulting	  in	  
frequent	  brownouts	  and	  gradual	  degradation	  of	  the	  generation	  and/or	  storage	  
systems	  (Harper	  2013).	  
For	  community	  agreements	  to	  succeed,	  they	  would	  need	  to	  be	  structured	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  builds	  on	  that	  particular	  community’s	  cultural	  norms	  and	  values.	  Harper	  
(2013)	  refers	  in	  the	  Berkeley	  Labs	  study	  to	  several	  cases	  in	  which	  adjustment	  to	  the	  
community	  electrical	  usage	  agreement	  resulted	  in	  dramatically	  reduced	  brownouts,	  
but	  implies	  that	  these	  are	  rare.	  Whether	  in	  addition	  or	  response	  to	  this,	  the	  relevant	  
literature	  (as	  cited	  in	  this	  paper)	  tends	  to	  treat	  these	  social	  DSM	  methods	  with	  
skepticism,	  acknowledging	  them	  as	  options	  but	  not	  ones	  that	  are	  well	  understood	  or	  
predictable.	  While	  the	  actual	  decision	  of	  what	  behavior/appliances	  should	  or	  should	  
not	  be	  allowed	  on	  a	  village	  micro-­‐grid	  is	  fairly	  straightforward	  –	  it	  is	  determined	  by	  
the	  system’s	  capacity	  and	  availability	  –	  the	  chosen	  method	  of	  enforcement	  is	  not.	  It	  
is	  possible	  that	  enforcement	  is	  not	  considered	  adequately	  in	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  
some	  electrification	  projects,	  allowing	  for	  unchecked	  customer	  abuse	  of	  the	  system	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and,	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  corruption	  of	  the	  supposed	  enforcement	  entity.	  Methods	  of	  
community	  information	  gathering	  and	  project	  design	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
The	  extent	  of	  corruption	  around	  these	  grids,	  while	  recognized,	  would	  be	  
difficult	  to	  identify;	  therefore	  an	  analogous	  example	  (again	  from	  personal	  
experience	  in	  Tanzania)	  may	  illustrate	  the	  type	  of	  corruption	  that	  can	  exist.	  A	  
cluster	  of	  three	  villages	  in	  Tanzania’s	  southern	  highlands	  collectively	  installed	  a	  
large	  well	  and	  distribution	  system	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  primary	  
freshwater	  source	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  villages,	  where	  drought	  had	  become	  more	  
frequent	  with	  deforestation	  and	  climate	  change.	  The	  village	  governments	  appointed	  
one	  resident	  to	  operate	  the	  water	  distribution	  network	  as	  a	  part-­‐time	  job,	  
responding	  to	  the	  need	  of	  each	  village	  by	  rationing	  water	  equally	  between	  them.	  
Instead	  the	  operator	  cut	  one	  entire	  village	  off	  from	  the	  supply	  and	  demanded	  bribes	  
before	  he	  would	  continue	  the	  service.	  Once	  he	  had	  been	  paid	  and	  resumed	  service	  to	  
the	  village,	  the	  other	  villages	  (who	  had	  been	  receiving	  more	  water	  recently)	  offered	  
bribes	  to	  repeat	  the	  shut-­‐off,	  and	  the	  cycle	  continued.	  
While	  this	  is	  an	  extreme	  example,	  the	  remoteness	  of	  many	  communities	  in	  
developing	  countries	  makes	  law	  enforcement	  difficult.	  Oftentimes	  business	  owners	  
in	  smaller,	  remote	  communities	  represent	  the	  local	  political	  and	  economic	  power.	  If	  
energy	  generation	  and	  distribution	  is	  controlled	  by	  businesses,	  project	  developers	  
and	  stakeholders	  will	  have	  to	  consider	  enforcement	  and	  accountability	  where	  
community	  agreements	  are	  pursued	  as	  a	  method	  of	  DSM.	  In	  other	  cases	  a	  mafia,	  
illegal	  but	  legitimate	  as	  far	  as	  the	  community	  is	  concerned,	  enforces	  and	  directs	  
local	  laws	  (Easterly	  2006,	  89).	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2.2.6:	  Education	  and	  Outreach	  
A	  common	  response	  to	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  user	  behavior	  in	  any	  electrical	  
grid	  is	  customer	  outreach	  and	  education	  (UNDP	  2011;	  Goulden	  2014).	  This	  can	  
manifest	  itself	  in	  any	  number	  of	  ways,	  but	  generally	  the	  goal	  of	  an	  electrical	  grid	  
project	  developer	  is	  to	  provide	  education	  or	  training	  in	  the	  following	  areas:	  
technical	  limitations	  of	  the	  grid,	  consequences	  of	  overload,	  methods	  of	  distributing	  
electricity,	  power	  ratings	  of	  appliances,	  home	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  phantom	  loads,	  
load	  management	  devices,	  tariff	  structures	  and	  collection/billing,	  enforcement	  
methods	  and	  penalties,	  and	  incentives	  for	  smart	  consumption	  (Harper	  2013).	  These	  
can	  be	  pursued	  via	  community	  meetings,	  small	  group	  workshops,	  or	  even	  in-­‐home	  
visits	  depending	  on	  the	  community’s	  needs	  and	  availability.	  However,	  education	  
should	  not	  be	  assumed	  as	  a	  catchall	  for	  addressing	  “tragedy	  of	  the	  commons”	  issues	  
–	  indeed	  it	  has	  proven	  less	  effective	  than	  many	  had	  hoped	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate	  
change	  –	  but	  may	  instead	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  any	  project	  introducing	  
a	  new	  service	  with	  new	  challenges	  to	  a	  community.	  Indeed,	  reviews	  of	  case	  studies	  
of	  mini-­‐grid	  projects	  concluded	  that	  outreach	  and	  education	  should	  be	  presumed	  
aspects	  of	  any	  project	  implementation	  (Harper	  2013;	  Sarangi	  2014)	  and	  should	  be	  
pursued	  on	  the	  community’s	  own	  terms.	  
In	  addition,	  developers	  should	  not	  view	  community	  outreach	  and	  education	  
as	  a	  legitimate	  excuse	  to	  apply	  Western	  structures	  to	  a	  given	  project.	  A	  community’s	  
education	  about	  a	  project	  does	  not	  imply	  acceptance	  or	  even	  interest.	  Such	  
education,	  if	  done	  poorly,	  can	  even	  undermine	  a	  community’s	  ability	  to	  invent	  and	  
develop	  homegrown	  solutions	  that	  the	  developer	  never	  considered.	  As	  Ernesto	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Sirolli	  quotes,	  “’There	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  public	  meetings:	  entrepreneurs	  never	  
come’”	  (2012).	  Instead	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  communication	  to	  bestow	  the	  developer’s	  
values	  on	  the	  community,	  education	  is	  first	  used	  to	  help	  a	  community	  make	  an	  
informed	  decision	  about	  potential	  project	  mechanisms	  and	  DSM	  to	  adopt	  or	  invent,	  
and	  finally	  to	  ensure	  that	  everyone	  is	  aware	  of	  what	  the	  grid	  provides	  them	  and	  the	  
impact	  of	  their	  own	  consumption	  decisions	  on	  the	  grid.	  
2.3:	  Case	  Example	  
Examples	  of	  tiered	  pricing	  and	  time-­‐of-­‐use	  pricing	  were	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  large	  utilities	  such	  as	  Pacific	  Gas	  and	  Electric	  (PG&E).	  These	  methods	  
are	  largely	  practicable	  in	  developed	  countries	  but	  less	  so	  in	  small	  mini-­‐grids	  where	  
the	  technology	  required	  is	  too	  expensive	  or	  the	  grid	  infrastructure	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  
support	  it.	  The	  following	  brief	  example	  and	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  4	  illustrate	  
attempts	  at	  some	  of	  the	  other	  methods	  of	  DSM	  discussed	  so	  far,	  particularly	  
incentives	  for	  using	  efficient	  appliances,	  community	  education,	  and	  community	  
agreements	  and	  enforcement.	  
Northwestern	  Energy	  (NWE),	  which	  serves	  most	  of	  western	  and	  central	  
Montana	  and	  parts	  of	  South	  Dakota,	  spends	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  its	  annual	  
budget	  on	  promoting	  energy	  efficiency	  among	  its	  customers.	  This	  can	  take	  the	  form	  
of	  anything	  from	  city	  retrofit	  programs	  to	  outreach	  campaigns	  targeting	  large	  
energy	  consumers.	  Perhaps	  their	  most	  popular	  program	  is	  the	  Energy-­‐Plus	  (E+)	  
program	  that	  provides,	  among	  other	  services,	  free	  home	  energy	  audits	  and	  minor	  
retrofits	  to	  any	  customer	  that	  requests	  assistance	  (NWE	  2014).	  The	  assumption	  is	  
that	  greater	  efficiency	  among	  consumers	  will	  result	  in	  reduced	  loads,	  especially	  at	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peak	  hours,	  reducing	  NWE’s	  need	  to	  purchase	  peaking	  power	  (much	  more	  
expensive	  per	  kWh	  than	  base	  load	  power,	  such	  as	  from	  coal	  or	  hydro)	  and	  thereby	  
recouping	  the	  utility’s	  E+	  expenses.	  The	  externalized	  savings,	  and	  the	  impetus	  for	  
the	  efficiency	  program	  mandate,	  are	  those	  of	  emissions	  from	  power	  plants	  that	  are	  
no	  longer	  being	  run.	  
2.4:	  DSM	  Technology	  
Throughout	  the	  previous	  section	  several	  forms	  of	  technology	  were	  
referenced	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  associated	  DSM	  methods.	  This	  section	  will	  go	  into	  
greater	  detail	  about	  the	  two	  major	  types	  of	  technology	  –	  meters	  and	  limiters	  -­‐	  
available	  for	  DSM	  as	  highlighted	  by	  practitioners	  and	  researchers	  of	  rural	  
electrification	  and	  mini-­‐grids.	  
2.4.1:	  Meters	  
A	  common	  form	  of	  DSM	  on	  any	  grid	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  command-­‐and-­‐
control	  style	  of	  DSM	  that	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  term,	  but	  is	  instead	  more	  
closely	  associated	  with	  methods	  of	  billing.	  Meters	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  DSM	  by	  
monitoring	  some	  aspect	  of	  electricity	  use	  and	  informing	  the	  customer	  and/or	  the	  
provider	  in	  order	  to	  accurately	  bill	  for	  the	  service	  provided	  and	  help	  both	  parties	  
make	  decisions	  about	  good	  usage	  or	  service	  practices.	  
The	  vast	  majority	  of	  customers	  in	  developed	  countries	  use	  conventional	  
meters,	  namely	  those	  meters	  that	  simply	  measure	  and	  report	  the	  total	  kWh	  used	  in	  
a	  given	  time	  period	  (typically	  a	  month)	  allowing	  the	  provider	  to	  charge	  the	  
customer	  accordingly.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  small,	  renewable	  energy	  mini-­‐grids,	  these	  
meters	  can	  be	  most	  effective	  in	  energy-­‐limited	  systems	  (wind,	  solar)	  as	  the	  power	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provider	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  customers	  using	  too	  much	  energy	  than	  too	  much	  
power	  (see	  previous	  section).	  One	  advantage	  of	  conventional	  metering	  is	  its	  
potential	  to	  be	  coupled	  with	  smart	  billing	  (per	  kWh)	  to	  encourage	  conservation	  
(Harper	  2013).	  While	  the	  meter	  alone	  can	  help	  to	  decrease	  consumption,	  further	  
combining	  it	  with	  a	  current	  limiter	  (discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below)	  could	  further	  
encourage	  the	  use	  of	  efficient	  appliances	  and	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  brownouts.	  The	  
downside	  of	  conventional	  meters	  is	  that	  they,	  themselves,	  draw	  energy.	  In	  addition	  
to	  the	  upfront	  cost	  (around	  20	  USD),	  customers	  would	  have	  to	  factor	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  
electricity	  for	  their	  own	  meters,	  potentially	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  their	  total	  usage	  
if	  they	  only	  want	  electricity	  for	  occasional,	  basic	  services.	  
An	  alternative	  to	  the	  conventional	  meter	  is	  the	  prepaid	  meter	  (Harper	  2013).	  
The	  operation	  of	  a	  prepaid	  meter	  is	  analogous	  to	  buying	  phone	  vouchers.	  In	  many	  
developing	  countries	  (most	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  for	  instance),	  cell	  phones	  are	  
operated	  not	  on	  monthly	  plans	  but	  on	  a	  system	  of	  buying	  vouchers	  and	  texting	  a	  
code	  to	  the	  phone	  company	  to	  increase	  the	  balance.	  The	  prepaid	  meter	  works	  the	  
same	  way;	  customers	  can	  purchase	  vouchers	  from	  a	  vendor	  in	  the	  village	  and	  text	  
the	  code	  to	  a	  server	  that	  automatically	  increases	  that	  customer’s	  electricity	  
allotment	  (in	  kWh)	  (GP	  2014).	  On	  the	  surface	  the	  prepaid	  meter	  resolves	  many	  of	  
the	  issues	  presented	  by	  the	  conventional	  meter.	  Payments	  and	  service	  are	  more	  
reliable	  due	  to	  the	  automatic	  nature	  of	  the	  billing,	  customers	  can	  make	  smaller	  
payments	  on	  their	  own	  schedule	  and	  without	  the	  need	  for	  meter	  readers,	  and	  the	  
system	  of	  vouchers	  is	  already	  a	  comfortable	  one	  for	  many	  rural	  communities.	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The	  challenges	  arise	  in	  the	  logistics.	  Each	  meter	  runs	  from	  35	  to	  50	  USD	  on	  
the	  low	  end	  (Harper	  2013);	  while	  this	  cost	  can	  be	  paid	  off	  through	  the	  greater	  
efficiency	  and	  lower	  billing	  costs,	  the	  upfront	  cost	  may	  be	  too	  steep	  for	  individual	  
customers	  to	  afford.	  Also	  the	  prepaid	  meter	  system	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  method	  of	  
restricting	  peak	  power	  use,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  pair	  the	  meters	  with	  current	  
limiters,	  an	  additional	  cost.	  One	  method	  proposed	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  peak	  usage	  
is	  to	  separate	  customers	  into	  primary	  and	  auxiliary	  circuits	  (Sarangi	  2014;	  Harper	  
2013);	  primary	  circuit	  customers	  are	  the	  last	  to	  be	  shut	  off	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  
impending	  brownout	  (such	  as	  clinics	  that	  need	  to	  keep	  vaccines	  and	  blood	  cold)	  
while	  auxiliary	  customers	  are	  the	  first	  to	  be	  shut	  off.	  The	  determination	  of	  who	  
counts	  as	  primary	  or	  auxiliary	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  community’s	  values	  and	  
consensus.	  This	  can	  be	  (and	  often	  is)	  a	  method	  of	  “load	  shedding,”	  in	  certain	  
contexts	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “rolling	  blackout.”	  More	  intense	  versions	  of	  this	  
method	  keep	  a	  rotation	  of	  customers	  that	  are	  blacked	  out	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
reducing	  load.	  
One	  of	  the	  primary	  concerns	  for	  project	  developers	  is	  the	  assurance	  that	  
vendors	  will	  appear	  in	  order	  to	  sell	  vouchers	  or	  codes	  for	  use	  with	  the	  prepaid	  
meters	  (Harper	  2013).	  The	  lack	  of	  vendor	  could	  present	  a	  challenge	  both	  to	  the	  
developer	  and	  the	  customers.	  There	  is	  also	  great	  potential	  for	  a	  business	  
opportunity,	  however,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  the	  conclusion	  of	  case	  studies	  in	  Tanzania	  
and	  Haiti.	  In	  these	  cases	  customers	  were	  charged	  a	  small	  connection	  fee	  and	  then	  
purchased	  scratch	  cards	  (vouchers)	  from	  local	  vendors.	  Personal	  experience	  in	  
Tanzania	  provides	  similar	  evidence:	  the	  rise	  of	  cell	  phone	  usage	  in	  the	  region	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resulted	  in	  business	  opportunities	  for	  tens	  of	  thousands	  who	  took	  up	  the	  job	  of	  
selling	  phone	  vouchers	  on	  buses,	  on	  street	  corners,	  in	  traveling	  markets,	  and	  so	  on	  
down	  to	  individual	  students	  selling	  vouchers	  during	  tea	  break	  at	  school.	  The	  same	  
village	  that	  saw	  the	  solar	  installation	  on	  the	  school	  was	  connected,	  three	  years	  later,	  
to	  a	  nearby	  hydroelectric	  dam.	  Customers	  were,	  again,	  charged	  a	  small	  connection	  
fee	  and	  then	  purchased	  electricity	  by	  the	  kWh	  using	  codes	  from	  local	  vendors.	  
Personal	  reports	  from	  the	  village	  consistently	  indicate	  that	  the	  business	  is	  
expanding:	  one	  resident	  remarked	  recently	  ni	  kama	  mjini	  kabisa	  –	  “it’s	  just	  like	  in	  
town.”	  
On	  the	  more	  expensive	  end	  of	  the	  meter	  spectrum	  are	  smart	  meters,	  or	  
advanced	  metering.	  These	  are	  fairly	  expensive	  and	  not	  widely	  tested	  in	  poor,	  rural	  
areas	  (and	  so	  won’t	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  paper)	  because	  they	  require	  the	  combination	  
of	  real-­‐time	  metering	  and	  control	  systems	  that	  manage	  generation	  and	  storage	  in	  
addition	  to	  distribution	  and	  billing.	  
2.4.2:	  Current	  Limiters	  
Beyond	  metering,	  current	  limiting	  is	  the	  most	  common	  method	  of	  DSM	  
(Harper	  2013).	  The	  goal	  is	  straightforward:	  limiters	  keep	  customers	  from	  drawing	  
too	  much	  power	  at	  any	  given	  time	  while	  simplifying	  billing	  at	  low	  cost.	  The	  
technology	  available	  for	  current	  limiting	  is	  varied,	  ranging	  from	  basic	  fuses	  (cheap	  
but	  inaccurate)	  to	  electronic	  circuit	  breakers	  (expensive	  but	  accurate)	  (ESMAP	  
2000).	  In	  each	  case	  the	  mode	  of	  action	  is	  simple:	  limiters	  open	  the	  circuit	  if	  current	  
rises	  above	  a	  given	  limit,	  a	  standard	  safety	  requirement	  in	  almost	  all	  appliances	  and	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households.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  current	  limiting	  also	  offers	  power	  distributers	  a	  way	  to	  
avoid	  brownouts	  from	  peak	  loads.	  
Two	  current	  limiters	  are	  designed	  primarily	  for	  mini-­‐grids:	  load	  checker	  
thermistors	  and	  electronic	  circuit	  breakers	  (Harper	  2013).	  The	  thermistor	  restricts	  
current	  within	  a	  certain	  range	  but	  is	  easy	  to	  tamper	  with	  or	  bypass.	  It	  is	  relatively	  
cheap,	  around	  5	  USD,	  but	  is	  inaccurate	  and	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  without	  
disconnecting	  all	  loads.	  The	  electronic	  circuit	  breaker	  represents	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  
the	  spectrum:	  it	  is	  more	  expensive	  (15	  USD	  unless	  produced	  locally)	  but	  much	  more	  
accurate	  (ESMAP	  2000).	  Other	  than	  price	  the	  downside	  is	  that	  breakers	  are	  easy	  to	  
bypass	  with	  limiters	  that	  have	  higher	  current	  ratings	  (essentially	  ignoring	  the	  
breaker’s	  effects	  by	  providing	  a	  path	  of	  less	  resistance,	  to	  borrow	  a	  colloquialism)	  
(Harper	  2013).	  
In	  general	  these	  simple	  current	  limiters	  can	  provide	  a	  fundamental	  service	  
for	  grid	  stability	  as	  long	  as	  they	  can	  be	  secured	  from	  tampering	  and	  the	  degrading	  
effects	  of	  weather.	  However	  they	  do	  restrict	  consumers	  in	  several	  ways.	  As	  noted	  
earlier,	  a	  set	  current	  (and	  therefore	  power)	  limit	  means	  that	  customers	  using	  
capacity-­‐base	  billing	  and	  who	  aren’t	  using	  their	  allotment	  are	  paying	  for	  a	  service	  
they	  are	  not	  receiving.	  In	  addition	  customers	  who	  want	  to	  occasionally	  use	  high-­‐
power	  appliances	  are	  forced	  to	  pay	  a	  higher	  flat	  rate.	  The	  combination	  of	  factors	  
could	  incentivize	  people	  to	  use	  as	  much	  power	  as	  possible	  under	  their	  limit,	  and	  
potentially	  bypass	  the	  current	  limiters	  in	  order	  to	  use	  larger	  appliances	  without	  
paying	  an	  unfairly	  (from	  their	  perspective)	  high	  rate.	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Smart	  current	  limiters	  address	  this	  issue	  by	  monitoring	  supply	  and	  adjusting	  
the	  current	  limit	  accordingly.	  During	  peak	  supply	  customers	  are	  alerted	  and	  allowed	  
to	  use	  high-­‐power	  appliances;	  they	  are	  similarly	  alerted	  when	  supply	  goes	  down	  
and	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  appliances	  will	  cause	  them	  to	  be	  cut	  off	  (Harper	  2013).	  This	  
technology	  is	  still	  in	  development,	  but	  pilot	  projects	  so	  far	  have	  shown	  significant	  
drops	  in	  brownout	  rates	  while	  reducing	  wasted	  energy	  and	  increasing	  welfare	  
services	  associated	  with	  electricity	  usage	  (2013).	  
A	  similar	  technology	  is	  a	  distributed	  intelligent	  load	  controller.	  As	  with	  the	  
smart	  current	  limiter	  it	  is	  likely	  expensive	  and	  still	  in	  development,	  but	  it	  operates	  
by	  selecting	  and	  disconnecting	  dispensable	  consumers	  at	  peak	  (on	  a	  meter-­‐by-­‐
meter	  or	  even	  appliance-­‐by-­‐appliance	  level)	  and	  allowing	  them	  during	  off-­‐peak.	  
Neither	  the	  load	  controller	  nor	  the	  smart	  limiter	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  widely	  used	  by	  
poorer	  communities,	  but	  the	  expansion	  of	  distributed	  generation	  in	  developed	  
countries	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  2014	  announcement	  by	  the	  largest	  European	  utility	  
that	  it	  will	  begin	  focusing	  on	  distributed	  generation)	  may	  provide	  a	  strong	  market	  
for	  these	  that	  will	  eventually	  make	  the	  market	  more	  accessible	  to	  developing	  
countries.	  
Further	  details	  about	  specific	  technology	  and	  devices	  used	  for	  DSM	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  Appendix	  A,	  Tables	  1	  and	  2.	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Chapter	  3:	  Viability	  and	  Sustainability	  Considerations	  
If	  any	  statement	  can	  sum	  up	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  rural	  energy	  
development,	  it	  is	  this:	  there	  is	  no	  silver	  bullet.	  In	  fact,	  the	  search	  for	  such	  a	  single	  
plan	  is	  a	  disservice	  to	  those	  in	  need:	  while	  the	  West	  searches	  for	  a	  catch-­‐all	  to	  drive	  
economic	  development,	  it	  overlooks	  the	  successes	  of	  smaller,	  homemade	  solutions	  
discovered	  in	  the	  name	  of	  business	  or	  chance.	  “...	  asking	  the	  aid	  agencies	  and	  
development	  workers	  to	  attain	  utopian	  ideals	  makes	  them	  much	  worse	  at	  achieving	  
the	  doable	  things…	  It	  also	  makes	  them	  much	  less	  accountable	  for	  making	  specific	  
things	  work,	  as	  focus	  on	  the	  Big	  Goals	  of	  the	  Big	  Plan	  distracts	  everyone’s	  attention	  
from…	  more	  modest,	  doable	  steps	  to	  make	  poor	  people’s	  lives	  better”	  (Easterly	  
2006,	  29).	  
Literature	  on	  the	  topic	  has	  been	  able	  to	  communicate	  this	  reality,	  at	  times	  
using	  case	  studies	  like	  the	  ones	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  illustrate	  the	  range	  of	  
challenges	  facing	  everyone	  from	  un-­‐electrified	  residents	  to	  national	  policy-­‐makers.	  
But	  where	  most	  literature	  informs	  policy,	  financing,	  or	  engineering,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  
to	  inform	  project	  development	  as	  a	  whole	  within	  a	  range	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  
environments.	  Project	  designers	  exploring	  rural	  electrification	  may	  not	  have	  
influence	  over	  policy	  and	  economic	  development	  in	  their	  respective	  regions,	  but	  
they	  can	  recognize	  the	  aspects	  of	  their	  given	  environments	  that	  make	  one	  
technology	  choice	  or	  finance	  scheme	  more	  viable	  than	  another.	  Similarly,	  a	  savvy	  
policy-­‐maker	  can	  recognize	  and	  address	  gaps	  in	  national	  or	  local	  policy	  that	  inhibit	  
sustainable	  energy	  development	  or	  discourage	  investment.	  In	  either	  case,	  there	  are	  
key	  indicators	  and	  factors	  that	  can	  inform	  decisions	  to	  accommodate	  a	  unique	  social	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environment,	  or	  alter	  the	  greater	  environment	  to	  encourage	  the	  desired	  
development.	  
Before	  beginning	  any	  quantitative	  aspect	  of	  project	  design,	  developers	  must	  
consider	  the	  following	  to	  gauge	  viability:	  
• What	  energy	  resource	  is	  being	  replaced	  or	  challenged?	  
• What	  has	  been	  the	  customers’	  exposure	  to	  electricity	  services,	  and	  what	  is	  
their	  expectation	  or	  demand?	  
• Will	  electricity	  need	  to	  be	  scaled	  up	  gradually,	  immediately,	  or	  not	  at	  all?	  
• What	  is	  the	  customers’	  willingness	  to	  pay?	  
• Is	  grid	  extension	  expected	  in	  the	  area	  and,	  if	  so,	  will	  customers	  demand	  
compatibility?	  
• What	  policies	  exist	  to	  promote	  or	  discourage	  the	  proposed	  project,	  and	  are	  
those	  policies	  expected	  to	  persist?	  
3.1.1:	  Viability:	  Competing	  Resources	  
The	  immediate	  success	  of	  introducing	  a	  new	  energy	  resource	  depends	  on	  the	  
resource	  that	  is	  being	  replaced.	  Diesel	  and	  hydro	  in	  Khotang	  replaced	  biomass	  and	  
kerosene	  and	  have	  been,	  in	  turn,	  partially	  replaced	  by	  SHSs.	  Those	  SHSs	  are	  now	  
facing	  competition	  from	  solar	  micro-­‐grids.	  In	  Luhunga,	  solar	  directly	  replaced	  
kerosene,	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  hydro	  and	  a	  different	  model	  of	  solar.	  Some	  relative	  
advantage,	  whether	  higher	  quality	  service	  or	  lower	  costs,	  drove	  each	  transition.	  But	  
while	  a	  project	  developer	  must	  accurately	  gauge	  the	  competition	  before	  making	  
initial	  design	  decisions,	  simple	  logistical	  considerations	  do	  not	  account	  for	  every	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factor.	  Cultural	  momentum	  is	  a	  powerful	  driver	  of	  change,	  and	  resistance	  to	  change,	  
anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  most	  directly	  analogous	  examples	  of	  this	  inertia	  are	  the	  
pushes	  for	  efficient	  cook	  stoves	  and	  water	  pumps,	  particularly	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  Luhunga	  case	  study	  (Chapter	  4.4.1),	  residents	  have	  relied	  
on	  biomass	  for	  cooking	  for	  their	  entire	  history;	  a	  pot	  sits	  on	  three	  large	  stones	  and	  
firewood	  (kuni)	  is	  placed	  between	  the	  stones	  (a	  method	  called	  mawe	  matatu,	  or	  
“three	  stones”).	  The	  one	  common	  variant	  is	  a	  charcoal	  stove,	  similar	  to	  charcoal	  
burners	  in	  the	  west.	  The	  social	  effects	  of	  firewood	  dependence	  are	  far	  reaching:	  lung	  
disease,	  disproportionate	  burdens	  on	  women	  and	  girls,	  absences	  from	  school,	  
increased	  risk	  of	  kidnap	  or	  rape,	  deforestation,	  and	  the	  resulting	  damage	  to	  water	  
systems	  and	  local	  ecosystems	  are	  all	  quantifiable	  effects	  on	  the	  HDI	  tracked	  by	  the	  
UN	  (UNSTATS	  2010;	  WHO	  2016).	  In	  response,	  hundreds	  of	  organizations	  have	  
poured	  resources	  into	  designing,	  purchasing,	  and/or	  proliferating	  efficient	  cook	  
stoves	  among	  rural	  populations.	  Results	  have	  been	  meager	  at	  best	  with	  only	  a	  few	  
taking	  hold,	  and	  many	  of	  those	  have	  been	  of	  local	  design.	  The	  failure	  of	  these	  
initiatives	  to	  take	  hold,	  beyond	  the	  usual	  problems	  of	  non-­‐sustainability	  or	  cultural	  
impropriety,	  can	  often	  be	  attributed	  to	  cultural	  inertia:	  people	  are	  accustomed	  to	  
what	  they’ve	  always	  used,	  and	  the	  negative	  effects	  are	  too	  gradual	  to	  cause	  alarm.	  
My	  own	  attempt	  at	  building	  efficient	  cook	  stoves	  in	  Luhunga	  met	  strong	  curiosity	  
and	  interest	  at	  the	  beginning,	  followed	  by	  disinterest	  and	  abandonment	  in	  favor	  of	  
customary	  methods.	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The	  massive	  aid	  effort	  to	  drill	  wells	  and	  install	  pumps	  in	  drought-­‐affected	  
areas	  has	  illustrated	  similar	  inertia.	  One	  classic	  story	  comes	  from	  Tanzania,	  where	  
aid	  organizations	  have	  drilled	  and	  installed	  thousands	  of	  well-­‐pump	  systems,	  and	  
thousands	  of	  these	  now	  sit	  abandoned.	  In	  one	  village	  westerners	  installed	  a	  pedal-­‐
powered	  well	  and	  the	  residents	  used	  it	  for	  a	  short	  time	  before	  abandoning	  it	  for	  the	  
original	  method	  –	  walking	  several	  kilometers	  to	  the	  river	  to	  fetch	  water	  and	  wash	  
clothes.	  As	  the	  developers	  discovered	  too	  late,	  it	  was	  considered	  inappropriate	  for	  
women,	  the	  primary	  users,	  to	  lift	  their	  legs	  in	  public.	  And	  since	  the	  pump	  was	  in	  the	  
middle	  of	  town,	  the	  women	  missed	  the	  social	  freedom	  and	  connection	  they	  felt	  at	  
the	  river.	  
Electricity	  development	  faces	  its	  own	  challenges.	  Some	  societies,	  for	  
example,	  place	  spiritual	  importance	  on,	  and	  are	  therefore	  protective	  of,	  traditional	  
energy	  resources	  like	  wind,	  water,	  sun,	  or	  anything	  removed	  from	  below	  the	  earth’s	  
surface.	  Developers	  will	  not	  encounter	  the	  same	  limits	  or	  freedoms	  in	  any	  two	  sites	  
and	  must	  be	  open	  to	  exploring	  alternatives	  that	  complicate	  preconceived	  notions	  of	  
optimization.	  Readers	  should	  also	  note	  that	  this	  section	  is	  not	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  
“other”	  culture:	  local	  idiosyncrasies	  are	  universal	  and	  stem	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
religious	  views,	  poor	  understanding	  (as	  in	  the	  2015	  case	  of	  a	  North	  Carolina	  town	  
refusing	  solar	  because	  it	  might	  deplete	  the	  sun),	  or	  simple	  inertia	  (Osborne	  2015).	  
3.1.2:	  Viability:	  Customer	  Expectations	  
One	  catch-­‐22	  of	  the	  product	  development	  world	  is	  that	  customers	  sometimes	  
(often?)	  do	  not	  know	  what	  they	  “want”	  or	  “need”	  until	  they	  are	  presented	  with	  an	  
option.	  Electricity	  development	  faces	  the	  same	  issue.	  One	  might	  expect	  that	  a	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previously	  un-­‐electrified	  village	  will	  settle	  for	  minimal	  service	  –	  some	  lights	  and	  
phone	  charging	  capacity.	  And	  at	  times	  this	  may	  be	  the	  case:	  William	  Kamkwamba’s	  
village	  in	  Malawi,	  featured	  in	  the	  book	  The	  Boy	  Who	  Harnessed	  the	  Wind	  (2009),	  had	  
never	  had	  electricity	  before	  William	  built	  a	  home-­‐made	  wind	  turbine.	  Without	  the	  
resources	  to	  pursue	  more	  sophisticated	  systems,	  and	  emboldened	  by	  the	  use	  of	  local	  
resources	  and	  local	  ingenuity,	  the	  village	  continued	  to	  expand	  and	  improve	  its	  own	  
turbines,	  content	  with	  and	  proud	  of	  the	  limited	  service	  they	  were	  able	  to	  provide.	  
Other	  communities	  have	  different	  expectations.	  Either	  their	  proximity	  to	  
electrified	  areas	  or	  history	  with	  development	  projects	  may	  have	  instilled	  higher	  
expectations	  for	  what	  an	  electricity	  system	  should	  provide.	  A	  project	  developer	  is	  
therefore	  best	  served,	  along	  with	  the	  community	  itself,	  by	  thorough	  research.	  
Higher	  levels	  of	  expectation	  require	  higher	  quality	  service	  and	  associated	  increase	  
in	  cost.	  Once	  grid-­‐quality	  service	  is	  required	  –	  involving	  transformers,	  inverters,	  and	  
code-­‐compliant	  components	  –	  cost	  increases	  disproportionately	  to	  the	  service	  
quality	  as	  perceived	  by	  the	  customer	  (individuals	  do	  not	  necessarily	  observe	  the	  
difference	  between	  aluminum	  and	  copper	  wires,	  or	  between	  DC	  and	  AC	  power).	  As	  
such,	  customer	  expectations	  are	  a	  primary	  indicator	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  to	  be	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
3.1.3:	  Viability:	  Willingness	  to	  Pay	  
Embedded	  within	  the	  question	  of	  expectations	  is	  the	  surety	  of	  payment.	  Put	  
simply,	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  as	  a	  describable	  quantity,	  depends	  on	  too	  many	  variables	  
to	  be	  accurately	  predicted	  by	  indirect	  means.	  After	  gauging	  the	  scope	  and	  quality	  of	  
service	  that	  a	  community	  might	  expect,	  a	  project	  developer	  can	  design	  several	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options	  to	  present	  for	  feedback.	  Each	  will	  have	  a	  cost	  associated	  with	  it	  and	  an	  
expected	  upfront	  and	  continuing	  input	  from	  the	  community.	  Based	  on	  these	  options	  
a	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  in	  terms	  of	  monetary	  payment	  rate	  (per	  kWh	  or	  per	  month,	  
depending	  on	  the	  payment	  method),	  can	  be	  determined	  as	  a	  threshold.	  The	  
developers	  can	  make	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  that	  would	  keep	  payment	  within	  
that	  range.	  
Despite	  its	  unpredictability,	  willingness	  to	  pay	  can	  be	  estimated	  for	  at	  least	  a	  
cursory	  understanding.	  A	  community’s	  level	  of	  poverty	  can	  tell	  a	  developer	  the	  
rough	  range	  that	  might	  be	  expected,	  but	  not	  to	  great	  detail.	  A	  solar	  engineer	  visiting	  
a	  village	  in	  Nepal’s	  Terai	  region	  (southern	  lowlands)	  found	  the	  community’s	  poverty	  
to	  be	  so	  visible	  that	  he	  declined	  to	  even	  ask	  what	  residents	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  
for	  electricity.	  But	  an	  Indian	  solar	  technician	  visiting	  a	  similar	  village	  in	  the	  same	  
region	  referred	  to	  the	  community	  as	  “wealthy”	  because	  of	  its	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  
grid	  and	  corresponding	  high	  expectations	  for	  electricity	  service	  despite	  its	  poverty	  
(MGP	  2015).	  
Willingness	  to	  pay	  also	  draws	  from	  local	  economic	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  
relative	  prices	  of	  other	  goods	  and	  services,	  or	  general	  awareness	  of	  local	  limitations	  
to	  cheap	  electricity.	  	  The	  U.S.	  state	  of	  Hawaii,	  for	  example,	  pays	  electricity	  rates	  
almost	  triple	  those	  of	  Montana,	  while	  the	  cost	  of	  living	  and	  income	  ratios	  between	  
the	  two	  states	  are	  much	  less	  (EIA	  2016;	  MERIC	  2015).	  Lacking	  direct	  access	  to	  
traditional	  forms	  of	  energy	  generation,	  Hawaiians	  are	  aware	  of	  (or	  at	  least	  
accustomed	  to)	  the	  higher	  cost	  of	  importing	  fuel	  oils	  and	  natural	  gas,	  and	  therefore	  
“willing”	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  electricity.	  In	  areas	  where	  transportation	  and	  trade	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infrastructure	  is	  still	  a	  limiting	  factor	  of	  village-­‐to-­‐village	  commerce,	  price	  
localization	  can	  still	  play	  a	  deciding	  role	  in	  making	  one	  energy	  technology	  more	  
affordable	  than	  another.	  
3.1.4:	  Viability:	  Grid	  Arrival	  
The	  arrival	  of	  the	  national	  grid	  can	  either	  encourage	  or	  discourage	  scalability	  
and,	  though	  it	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  accurately	  predict,	  developers	  must	  consider	  
and	  discuss	  the	  eventuality	  with	  the	  community.	  If	  customers	  expect	  the	  grid	  to	  
arrive,	  they	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  accept	  minimal	  service	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  will	  become	  
obsolete	  when	  grid	  power	  becomes	  available.	  Otherwise,	  any	  electrification	  project	  
will	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  grid-­‐quality	  service	  from	  the	  
beginning,	  or	  scaling	  up	  with	  demand	  over	  time.	  
3.1.5:	  Viability:	  Policy	  
The	  broadest	  of	  the	  viability	  considerations,	  government	  policy	  can	  make	  or	  
break	  an	  electricity	  development	  project	  at	  any	  point	  in	  its	  lifetime.	  Subsidies	  that	  
existed	  one	  year	  may	  be	  gone	  the	  next;	  trade	  tariffs	  may	  change	  to	  favor	  one	  import	  
over	  another.	  The	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  4	  illustrate	  that	  even	  mild	  subsidies	  can	  be	  
powerful	  in	  driving	  one	  technology	  over	  another,	  unpublicized	  subsidies	  are	  easily	  
abused,	  and	  supportive	  policy	  can	  cause	  as	  much	  harm	  as	  good	  when	  it	  is	  
inconsistent.	  A	  classic	  example	  comes,	  again,	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  where	  production	  and	  
investment	  tax	  credits	  were	  renewed	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  until	  2016.	  Each	  year,	  the	  
priorities	  of	  the	  Congress	  could	  cause	  final	  decisions	  to	  be	  put	  off	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
year,	  leaving	  investors	  and	  energy	  companies	  in	  limbo	  and	  therefore	  uncertain	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about	  pursuing	  projects	  until	  the	  next	  year	  (Nussbaum	  2015).	  This	  slowed	  
development	  considerably	  and	  kept	  technology	  from	  advancing	  and	  prices	  from	  
dropping	  as	  quickly	  as	  they	  would	  with	  a	  longer	  renewal	  period.	  
Many	  developing	  countries	  experience	  even	  greater	  legislative	  tumult	  that	  
leaves	  energy	  developers	  without	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  which	  policies	  are	  dependable.	  
Especially	  with	  micro-­‐grids	  or	  other	  community-­‐scale	  projects,	  research	  alone	  can	  
take	  over	  a	  year,	  and	  the	  first	  year	  or	  two	  of	  operation	  is	  subject	  to	  rapid	  iteration	  as	  
the	  implementing	  entity	  “patches”	  its	  product	  and	  adjusts	  to	  early	  changes	  in	  
demand.	  But	  project	  developers	  can	  also	  have	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  policy	  by	  
proposing	  pilot	  projects	  that	  require	  policy	  changes.	  Industry	  proposals	  can	  serve	  to	  
meet	  a	  demand	  that	  the	  government	  has	  so	  far	  struggled	  to	  meet	  due	  to	  scarce	  
resources,	  limited	  expertise,	  or	  high	  turnover,	  and	  can	  therefore	  encourage	  new	  
policy.	  Conversely,	  where	  government	  seeks	  to	  develop,	  it	  can	  open	  the	  door	  via	  
subsidies	  and	  other	  policy	  mechanisms	  for	  industry	  to	  drive	  that	  development.	  
Generally,	  however,	  it	  is	  upon	  the	  project	  developer	  (industry)	  to	  identify	  existing	  
policies,	  predict	  which	  will	  be	  in	  effect	  throughout	  the	  project’s	  development,	  and	  
design	  accordingly.	  
3.2:	  Sustainability	  
While	  viability	  considerations	  can	  help	  get	  a	  project	  off	  the	  ground,	  there	  
remains	  the	  pervasive	  question	  of	  sustainability.	  Naturally	  we	  must	  be	  wary	  of	  using	  
the	  term	  “sustainability”	  too	  lightly,	  given	  its	  over-­‐use	  in	  the	  development	  world.	  
“The	  literature	  is	  strewn	  with	  the	  terms	  ‘sustainability’	  and	  ‘sustainable	  
development’…	  but	  too	  seldom	  are	  [they]	  given	  a	  clear	  and	  consistent	  meaning”	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(Adams	  2001,	  5).	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  and	  to	  avoid	  making	  “high-­‐sounding	  
statements	  with	  very	  little	  meaning	  at	  all”	  (2001),	  sustainability	  requires	  the	  
thorough	  consideration	  and	  adequate	  resolution	  of	  the	  following	  questions.	  Can	  the	  
project	  survive	  and	  remain	  relevant	  through	  changes	  in	  demand,	  new	  technology,	  
competition,	  and	  more?	  Once	  the	  original	  developer	  completes	  installation,	  can	  the	  
developer	  and	  its	  creation	  survive	  apart?	  Should	  they?	  The	  following	  considerations	  
form	  the	  framework	  through	  which	  designers	  can	  gauge	  and	  plan	  the	  longevity	  of	  
their	  electrification	  projects.	  
• Independence	  from	  outside	  funding,	  even	  if	  only	  after	  start-­‐up	  funds	  have	  
been	  secured	  
• Developer	  buy-­‐in	  for	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  project’s	  lifetime	  
• Customer	  ownership,	  either	  immediate	  or	  gradual	  
• Flexibility	  in	  response	  to	  changing	  demand,	  climate,	  or	  competition	  
• Reasonable	  upfront	  cost	  to	  customers	  
• Demand-­‐side	  management	  that	  minimizes	  misuse	  and	  system	  degradation	  
while	  respecting	  customers’	  independence	  
3.2.1:	  Sustainability:	  Donor	  Dependence	  
The	  already	  impressive	  flow	  of	  donor	  funding	  into	  the	  global	  development	  
project	  is	  likely	  only	  to	  grow	  as	  donor	  countries	  fulfill	  their	  commitments	  to	  the	  
COP21	  Paris	  climate	  agreement,	  or	  equivalent.	  But	  the	  equally	  impressive	  rate	  of	  
electricity	  development	  cannot	  be	  matched,	  dollar	  of	  donation	  for	  dollar	  of	  expense,	  
by	  donor	  funding	  alone	  (IEA	  2011).	  Dependence	  on	  outside	  funding	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	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the	  system,	  or	  for	  its	  continued	  operation,	  can	  deprive	  the	  recipient	  community	  of	  
ownership	  and	  lower	  the	  incentive	  of	  both	  the	  developer	  and	  the	  community	  to	  
thoughtfully	  design	  the	  system	  for	  optimal	  performance,	  relying	  instead	  on	  initial	  
excitement	  and	  good	  publicity	  to	  ensure	  continued	  funding	  (Moss	  et	  al.	  2006).	  
Donor	  funding	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  tool,	  probably	  even	  a	  necessary	  one,	  but	  only	  in	  
certain	  contexts.	  
All	  but	  one	  of	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  Chapter	  4	  relied	  on	  large	  
donors	  at	  one	  time,	  but	  the	  duration	  and/or	  repetition	  of	  that	  dependence	  is	  one	  
indicator	  of	  success.	  When	  a	  developer’s	  business	  model	  depends	  on	  donor	  funds	  to	  
sustain	  it	  from	  project	  to	  project,	  it	  aligns	  its	  priorities	  accordingly.	  A	  typical,	  for-­‐
profit	  business	  may	  receive	  start-­‐up,	  or	  seed,	  funding	  to	  begin	  a	  new	  type	  of	  project	  
or	  explore	  new	  territory,	  but	  ultimately	  its	  goal	  is	  self-­‐reliance.	  If	  its	  income	  from	  
one	  project	  cannot	  sustain	  it	  through	  to	  the	  next	  project,	  it	  will	  fail	  as	  a	  business.	  
Therefore	  longevity	  and	  the	  associated	  guaranteed	  profits	  of	  each	  project	  becomes	  
the	  top	  priority,	  leading	  to	  consideration	  of	  its	  own	  buy-­‐in,	  customer	  ownership,	  
project	  flexibility,	  cost,	  and	  demand-­‐side	  management	  –	  namely	  the	  following	  
sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	  In	  short,	  playing	  within	  a	  market,	  rather	  than	  in	  spite	  of	  it,	  
demands	  constant	  feedback	  and	  accountability,	  or	  exactly	  what	  the	  “big	  
development	  plan”	  community	  lacks	  (Easterly	  2006,	  27).	  
When	  outside	  funding	  drives	  development,	  however,	  the	  priority	  for	  the	  
developers	  themselves	  is	  to	  guarantee	  more	  funding	  and	  thus	  continue	  working.	  But	  
outside	  donors	  (historically	  speaking)	  tend	  to	  respond	  more	  to	  a	  project’s	  or	  
developer’s	  positive	  publicity	  than	  to	  decade-­‐long	  performance	  reports	  when	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deciding	  what	  to	  fund	  (Kopinak	  2013).	  Examples	  abound	  of	  catchy	  internet	  videos	  
advocating	  causes	  of	  all	  kinds,	  from	  freeing	  child	  soldiers	  in	  East	  Africa	  to	  lighting	  
up	  slums	  in	  India.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  urgency	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  cause,	  clever	  
marketing	  attracts	  donors.	  Therefore	  a	  developer	  (NGO,	  mission,	  non-­‐profit,	  etc.)	  
has	  to	  dedicate	  funds	  and	  effort	  towards	  fundraising	  and	  outreach	  to	  its	  donor	  base,	  
often	  necessitating	  a	  home	  office	  elsewhere,	  additional	  staff,	  and	  attention	  to	  early	  
project	  success	  and	  excitement	  among	  clients.	  
At	  this	  point	  the	  longevity	  of	  a	  single	  project	  does	  not	  necessarily	  affect	  
donor	  satisfaction	  compared	  to	  that	  initial	  publicity.	  It	  is	  more	  the	  expression	  of	  
need	  (Porter	  et	  al.	  2002),	  ability	  to	  have	  positive	  impact,	  and	  the	  positive	  response	  
from	  the	  community	  (a	  la	  the	  songs	  of	  thanks	  recalled	  in	  this	  paper’s	  opening	  
paragraphs)	  that	  encourages	  funding.	  Individual	  projects	  could	  completely	  fail	  
several	  years	  later	  with	  little	  or	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  greater	  effort.	  The	  following	  
considerations	  are,	  therefore,	  paramount	  to	  any	  developer’s	  attempt	  to	  create	  
effective,	  lasting	  electrification	  opportunities	  for	  invested	  communities.	  
3.2.2:	  Sustainability:	  Developer	  Buy-­‐In	  
Under	  the	  old	  model	  of	  distributed	  energy,	  companies	  sell	  and	  install	  
systems	  to	  customers,	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  paying	  the	  upfront	  cost.	  Financed	  
and	  leased	  systems	  followed,	  particularly	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  SolarCity,	  which	  was	  the	  
first	  to	  perfect	  the	  model	  of	  financing	  the	  systems	  they	  sold	  (Martin	  2014;	  Malik	  
2015).	  Customers	  can	  pay	  over	  time	  at	  a	  low	  interest	  rate	  until	  the	  total	  cost	  plus	  
interest	  is	  paid	  off	  and	  they	  acquire	  total	  ownership.	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  method	  
mimics	  the	  auto	  industry,	  with	  loans	  or	  leases	  managed	  by	  the	  company	  itself	  rather	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than	  a	  third	  party.	  The	  most	  recent	  step	  in	  this	  evolution	  is	  the	  separation	  of	  
sourcing/installation	  from	  financing,	  and	  is	  most	  common	  with	  solar.	  Firms	  entirely	  
dedicated	  to	  financing	  are	  able	  to	  process	  requests	  from	  customers	  all	  over	  the	  
country	  or	  world	  and	  contract	  local	  companies	  to	  source	  and	  install	  components,	  
and	  often	  provide	  technical	  support	  for	  a	  specified	  period	  of	  time.	  But	  while	  these	  
methods	  have	  largely	  evolved	  in	  developed	  areas,	  they	  have	  only	  recently	  expanded	  
into	  rural	  or	  developing	  areas.	  
Without	  financing	  mechanisms	  in	  place,	  energy	  developers	  are	  limited,	  by	  
logical	  extension,	  to	  three	  options:	  they	  can	  (1)	  pay	  out	  of	  pocket	  and	  essentially	  
“gift”	  the	  system	  to	  the	  community	  (total	  developer	  buy-­‐in),	  (2)	  demand	  that	  the	  
community	  pay	  for	  the	  system	  up	  front	  (zero	  developer	  buy-­‐in),	  or	  (3)	  gift	  the	  
system	  and	  demand	  some	  level	  of	  partial	  repayment	  (see	  Chapter	  4.4.1).	  If	  
communities	  are	  too	  poor,	  upfront	  payment	  (2)	  or	  partial	  repayment	  (3)	  are	  not	  
likely	  options,	  leaving	  a	  developer	  in	  a	  poor	  area	  few	  options.	  But	  if	  the	  system	  is	  
gifted	  (1),	  the	  developer	  cannot	  guarantee	  community	  buy-­‐in	  and	  thus	  longevity,	  
and	  must	  depend	  on	  donor	  funds.	  In	  either	  extreme	  –	  total	  developer	  buy-­‐in	  
through	  gifting	  (1)	  or	  zero	  developer	  buy-­‐in	  through	  complete	  community	  payment	  
(2),	  there	  is	  little	  incentive	  for	  both	  parties	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  sustainable	  system.	  
The	  alternative	  to	  these	  three	  scenarios	  is	  for	  the	  developer	  itself	  to	  buy	  into	  the	  
system	  in	  some	  way,	  similar	  to	  the	  model	  employed	  by	  SolarCity	  and	  others.	  
With	  developer	  buy-­‐in,	  the	  installing	  firm	  or	  even	  a	  third	  party	  pays	  for	  the	  
upfront	  cost	  of	  the	  components	  and	  installation,	  and	  then	  determines	  a	  payback	  
time	  and	  percentage,	  as	  with	  any	  loan,	  that	  will	  give	  the	  company	  a	  suitable	  ROI.	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This	  period	  is	  usually	  around	  ten	  years	  -­‐	  well	  within	  the	  project	  lifetime	  of	  25-­‐30	  
years	  but	  long	  enough	  to	  keep	  payback	  rates	  palatable.	  Over	  that	  time,	  customers	  
pay	  their	  power	  bills	  directly	  to	  the	  developer	  at	  a	  rate	  that	  will	  guarantee	  the	  ROI	  
and	  also	  be	  acceptable	  to	  the	  customers.	  At	  the	  end,	  the	  developer	  hands	  over	  full	  
ownership	  to	  the	  community	  to	  act	  as	  its	  own	  utility,	  set	  its	  own	  rates,	  and	  
determine	  its	  own	  expansion.	  Aside	  from	  a	  smoother	  financial	  ride	  for	  all	  involved,	  
this	  model	  also	  guarantees	  that	  the	  developer	  will	  continue	  to	  provide	  technical	  
support	  and	  advise	  local	  stakeholders	  in	  best	  management	  practices,	  all	  beneficial	  
for	  its	  profit	  and	  for	  the	  community’s	  capacity	  upon	  ownership	  transfer.	  
A	  slight	  modification	  of	  this	  model	  involves	  a	  SPV,	  or	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicle	  
(Wilmington	  Trust	  2016;	  GP	  2015),	  which	  involves	  joint	  ownership	  between	  the	  
developer	  and	  the	  collective	  customer	  (and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  donor).	  Rather	  than	  the	  
developer	  retaining	  full	  ownership	  until	  transferring	  it	  to	  a	  local	  entity,	  the	  two	  (or	  
more)	  retain	  ownership	  together	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  -­‐	  again,	  usually	  ten	  years.	  The	  
same	  advantages	  apply,	  namely	  developer	  investment	  in	  technical	  support,	  
customer	  satisfaction,	  and	  efficiency;	  but	  the	  community	  itself	  has	  more	  active	  
control	  over	  and	  investment	  in	  system	  performance.	  If	  the	  developer	  alone	  is	  
responsible	  for	  collecting	  payments	  to	  bolster	  its	  ROI,	  the	  community	  is	  not	  terribly	  
affected	  by	  under-­‐payment	  or	  misuse.	  But	  with	  community	  ownership	  from	  the	  
beginning,	  a	  local	  representative	  entity	  is	  necessarily	  concerned	  with	  its	  own	  
members’	  activities.	  This	  gives	  the	  developer,	  who	  is	  usually	  not	  local,	  a	  break	  from	  
dealing	  with	  customer	  accountability,	  and	  gives	  the	  community	  experience	  with	  
management	  from	  day	  one.	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In	  truth,	  any	  combination	  or	  iteration	  of	  the	  above	  models	  may	  be	  applicable	  
depending	  on	  circumstances.	  Community	  interest,	  the	  presence	  of	  local	  businesses	  
or	  other	  economic	  activities,	  poverty	  level,	  and	  other	  factors	  will	  inform	  the	  most	  
suitable	  method	  of	  financing.	  It	  also	  may	  be	  most	  efficient	  to	  separate	  the	  financing	  
from	  the	  installation,	  with	  one	  firm	  providing	  a	  payback	  scheme	  and	  outsourcing	  
acquisition	  and	  labor	  to	  a	  local	  company,	  thereby	  supporting	  local	  business	  and	  
reducing	  the	  literal	  and	  figurative	  distance	  between	  technician	  and	  customer	  
(SunLender	  2016).	  Some	  consider	  such	  specialization	  to	  be	  the	  future	  of	  off-­‐grid	  
energy	  development	  (GP	  2015).	  Whatever	  the	  chosen	  model,	  however,	  developers	  
should	  avoid	  either	  extreme	  –	  total	  developer	  buy-­‐in	  or	  zero	  developer	  buy-­‐in	  –	  and	  
focus	  instead	  on	  creating	  long-­‐term	  interest	  and	  accountability	  to	  create	  a	  
sustainable	  project.	  
3.2.3:	  Sustainability:	  Ownership	  
Ownership	  can	  be	  synonymous	  with	  Buy-­‐In	  in	  many	  cases,	  so	  this	  section	  
defers	  financial	  ownership	  considerations	  to	  the	  previous	  section,	  and	  focuses	  
instead	  on	  the	  intangible	  concept	  of	  ownership.	  A	  related	  discussion	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
Chapter	  5.5.	  
Generally	  speaking,	  ownership	  includes	  power	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  self-­‐
reliance	  in	  terms	  of	  maintenance	  and	  operation,	  control	  over	  planning	  and	  
expansion,	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  accountability	  for	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  
system’s	  success.	  As	  a	  developer	  in	  any	  sector,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  confuse	  sense	  of	  
ownership	  for	  real	  ownership.	  A	  researcher	  working	  in	  Tanzania	  noted	  that	  outside	  
organizations	  working	  with	  local	  communities	  frequently	  described	  their	  work	  as	  
	   54	  
an	  “equal	  partnership,”	  indicating	  a	  high	  level	  of	  local	  ownership.	  But	  further	  
investigation	  showed	  that	  local	  partners	  did	  not	  feel	  the	  same	  way,	  describing	  the	  
arrangement	  as	  decidedly	  unequal	  (Bickel	  2009).	  Many	  others,	  both	  in	  academia	  
and	  on	  the	  ground,	  have	  observed	  this	  misrepresentation,	  making	  truly	  equal	  
arrangements	  all	  the	  more	  notable.	  
Energy	  project	  developers	  automatically	  enter	  into	  a	  rural	  electrification	  
arrangement	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power.	  Experience	  and	  expertise	  give	  them	  an	  
advantage	  over	  local	  entities	  and	  place	  them	  in	  a	  position	  to	  override	  decisions	  with	  
relative	  credibility.	  In	  most	  situations	  this	  is	  appropriate,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  
developer’s	  responsibility	  to	  acknowledge	  its	  advantage	  and	  recognize	  when	  it	  does	  
not	  or	  should	  not	  sway	  local	  decisions.	  The	  developer	  knows	  its	  craft	  better	  than	  the	  
community,	  but	  the	  community	  knows	  its	  capacity	  better	  than	  the	  developer.	  
Capacity	  can	  include	  resource	  options,	  ability	  to	  pay,	  ability	  to	  collectively	  manage	  
resources,	  etc.	  The	  solution	  is	  not	  for	  one	  entity	  or	  the	  other	  to	  dominate,	  but	  for	  
both	  to	  communicate	  freely	  and	  listen	  readily	  through	  all	  steps	  of	  the	  process.	  	  A	  
developer’s	  pre-­‐determined	  plan	  is	  the	  “kiss	  of	  death	  of	  entrepreneurship,”	  
undermining	  local	  ingenuity	  and	  problem	  solving	  (Sirolli	  2012).	  Despite	  the	  
abstraction,	  the	  mutual	  trust	  this	  creates	  leads	  to	  real	  ownership	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
customer	  or	  community.	  
3.2.4:	  Sustainability:	  Scalability	  
With	  regards	  to	  two	  previous	  sections	  regarding	  viability	  –	  Customer	  
Expectations	  and	  Willingness	  to	  Pay,	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin	  is	  that	  each	  of	  these	  
factors	  changes	  over	  time.	  A	  community	  that	  will	  only	  pay	  for	  limited	  service	  now	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will	  almost	  certainly	  demand	  expanded	  services	  in	  the	  future,	  potentially	  the	  near	  
future.	  Neighbors	  will	  expose	  a	  community	  to	  other	  services;	  or	  its	  own	  economic	  
growth,	  spurred	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  electricity	  or	  other	  factors,	  will	  drive	  demand	  
up.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  cause,	  project	  developers	  should	  assume	  scalability	  as	  a	  
requirement	  from	  the	  beginning.	  Whether	  it	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  generation	  
modularity,	  oversized	  distribution	  capacity,	  or	  some	  other	  technical	  preemption,	  
scalability	  should	  factor	  into	  the	  system	  design	  when	  presenting	  the	  community	  
with	  design	  options	  and	  gauging	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  	  
Scalability	  will	  also	  affect	  the	  method	  and	  duration	  of	  developer	  buy-­‐in.	  If	  
customers	  expect	  a	  gradual	  expansion	  of	  service,	  the	  developer	  may	  benefit	  from	  
extending	  the	  payback	  time	  to	  assist	  with	  a	  planned	  up-­‐scaling.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
customers	  expect	  a	  sudden	  expansion	  due	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  industry	  or	  the	  national	  
grid,	  the	  developer	  may	  prefer	  an	  earlier	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  
its	  ROI	  before	  investing	  in	  a	  second,	  major	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  
3.2.5:	  Sustainability:	  Cost	  of	  Participation	  
Section	  3.1.3	  discussed	  the	  effect	  of	  customers’	  willingness	  to	  pay	  on	  
viability,	  but	  this	  term	  is	  rather	  broad	  when	  considering	  the	  design	  details	  of	  each	  
project.	  Connection	  fees,	  monetary	  or	  in-­‐kind	  contributions	  for	  installation,	  home	  
appliance	  installation,	  ongoing	  electricity	  rates,	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  all	  factor	  in.	  
All	  of	  the	  upfront	  costs	  –	  connection	  fee,	  pre-­‐connection	  home	  installation,	  and	  
contributions	  to	  the	  installation	  cost	  (see	  Section	  3.2.2)	  –	  might	  be	  considered	  the	  
“cost	  of	  participation”	  and	  affect	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  service	  might	  be	  expanded	  or	  
even	  adopted	  elsewhere.	  This	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  upfront	  costs.	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There	  are	  several	  reasons	  that	  customers	  might	  encounter	  participation	  
costs	  depending	  on	  the	  project	  design.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  SPV	  or	  partial	  payback	  
mechanism,	  particularly	  with	  a	  micro-­‐grid,	  the	  community	  shareholders	  may	  be	  
expected	  to	  share	  part	  of	  the	  up-­‐front	  cost	  with	  the	  developer	  and	  any	  donors	  (GP	  
2015).	  It	  may	  be	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  cost,	  but	  it	  requires	  each	  customer-­‐to-­‐
be	  to	  contribute	  money	  or	  in-­‐kind	  labor.	  For	  systems	  that	  offer	  grid-­‐quality	  power,	  
each	  household	  or	  business	  will	  need	  to	  install	  wires,	  switches,	  sockets,	  etc.,	  that	  are	  
up	  to	  code	  before	  the	  connection	  can	  be	  made.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  community	  
micro-­‐grids,	  each	  customer	  typically	  pays	  a	  connection	  fee,	  equivalent	  to	  a	  month	  or	  
two	  of	  electricity	  bills,	  for	  installers	  to	  run	  the	  distribution	  network	  to	  that	  
customer.	  Together	  these	  fees	  can	  create	  a	  barrier	  to	  participation	  if	  they	  account	  
for	  a	  disproportionate	  fraction	  of	  a	  customer’s	  income.	  
Due	  to	  economies	  of	  scale,	  any	  given	  electrification	  project	  requires	  a	  critical	  
mass	  of	  participants	  before	  being	  considered	  viable	  (GP	  2015),	  and	  each	  component	  
of	  a	  community’s	  willingness	  to	  pay	  can	  be	  discussed	  and	  set	  accordingly.	  But	  the	  
long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  the	  project	  depends	  on	  growth	  and	  therefore	  assurance	  
that,	  once	  exposed,	  other	  residents	  will	  opt	  into	  the	  system.	  Whereas	  the	  initial	  
participants	  had	  a	  say	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  upfront	  to	  ongoing	  costs	  via	  information	  
gathering	  sessions,	  the	  outcome	  will	  more	  likely	  favor	  their	  perspective.	  With	  the	  
system	  and	  payment	  rules	  already	  in	  place,	  newer	  customers	  will	  instead	  be	  
confronted	  with	  the	  take-­‐it-­‐or-­‐leave-­‐it	  upfront	  cost	  of	  participation.	  It	  is	  therefore	  in	  
a	  developer’s	  (and	  community’s,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  joint	  ownership)	  best	  interest	  to	  keep	  
the	  cost	  of	  participation	  as	  low	  as	  possible.	  Affordable	  entrance	  can	  be	  achieved	  any	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number	  of	  ways,	  but	  most	  commonly	  through	  slightly	  inflated	  ongoing	  costs	  (higher	  
electricity	  rates)	  or	  a	  longer	  payback	  period.	  
Analogous	  schemes	  abound	  in	  which	  companies	  offer	  reduced	  entrance	  fees	  
knowing	  that,	  once	  someone	  is	  participating	  as	  a	  consumer,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  
continue	  and	  thereby	  guarantee	  a	  profit/ROI	  for	  the	  business.	  Mobile	  network	  
companies,	  auto	  dealers,	  banks,	  and	  just	  about	  any	  type	  of	  business	  short	  of	  public	  
utilities	  will	  advertise	  the	  low	  cost	  of	  entry.	  In	  cases	  where	  an	  electrification	  project	  
is	  meant	  to	  expand	  and	  evolve,	  the	  lower	  cost	  of	  participation	  can	  drive	  faster	  
expansion	  and	  therefore	  more	  rapid	  iteration	  and	  flexibility.	  In	  short,	  treating	  such	  
projects	  as	  a	  business,	  even	  when	  they	  are	  not,	  can	  create	  greater	  sustainability.	  
3.2.6:	  Sustainability:	  Demand-­‐Side	  Management	  
Chapter	  2	  outlined	  the	  specific	  DSM	  technologies	  available	  or	  in	  common	  use,	  
as	  well	  as	  their	  respective	  ideal	  contexts.	  In	  terms	  of	  pure	  design,	  DSM	  choices	  
should	  be	  straightforward:	  the	  common	  appliances,	  usage	  patterns,	  and	  generation	  
types	  should	  dictate	  clearly	  which	  combination	  of	  technologies	  or	  rules	  will	  result	  in	  
optimal	  system	  performance.	  The	  challenge,	  rather,	  is	  to	  balance	  ideal	  technology	  
with	  appropriate	  technology.	  In	  many	  cases	  the	  ideal	  technology	  choice	  is	  not	  
affordable	  or	  easily	  maintained,	  and	  therefore	  not	  appropriate.	  Project	  developers	  
must	  therefore	  find	  a	  way	  around	  barriers	  to	  engineering	  decisions	  and	  consider	  the	  
less	  tangible	  aspects	  of	  design.	  How	  can	  local	  resource	  management	  practices	  play	  a	  
role?	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  community	  ownership	  alleviate	  the	  burden	  of	  DSM	  on	  the	  
developer?	  Can	  technicians	  and	  engineers	  design	  a	  similar	  device	  locally,	  thereby	  
bringing	  down	  cost	  and	  creating	  local	  business	  (see	  Chapter	  4.2.1.3)?	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The	  viability	  of	  DSM	  technology	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  change	  as	  new	  devices	  and	  
programs	  make	  their	  way	  onto	  the	  market.	  Long	  a	  niche	  industry,	  individualized	  
electricity	  management	  devices	  are	  quickly	  becoming	  popular	  in	  the	  developed	  
world,	  driving	  innovation	  and	  reducing	  costs	  for	  all	  markets.	  Even	  a	  decade	  ago,	  
mobile	  phones	  were	  not	  common	  enough	  to	  make	  prepaid	  metering	  possible,	  and	  
charge	  controllers	  could	  not	  typically	  respond	  to	  batteries’	  maximum	  depth	  of	  
discharge.	  But	  even	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  two-­‐month	  research	  period	  in	  Nepal,	  GP	  
and	  MGP	  engineers	  noted	  cheaper	  prepaid	  meters	  appeared	  on	  the	  Chinese	  market,	  
likely	  contributing	  to	  DSM	  decisions	  for	  the	  next	  several	  years	  (Chapter	  4.2	  and	  4.3).	  
In	  this	  context	  it	  behooves	  the	  project	  designer	  to	  keep	  a	  close	  eye	  on	  available	  DSM	  
technologies	  rather	  than	  continue	  to	  only	  use	  familiar	  devices	  from	  familiar	  
suppliers.	  
3.3:	  In	  Context	  
This	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  largely	  abstract.	  Chapter	  4	  illustrates	  
the	  challenges	  developers	  have	  faced,	  or	  are	  facing,	  in	  a	  range	  of	  contexts,	  and	  
provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  put	  these	  considerations	  to	  the	  test.	  No	  one	  approach	  is	  
ideal	  –	  indeed	  there	  may	  be	  no	  such	  thing	  –	  but	  each	  has	  its	  strengths	  and	  
weaknesses	  that	  can	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  local	  complexities	  and	  
opportunities.	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Chapter	  4:	  Case	  Studies	  
Case	  studies	  are	  not	  an	  exact	  science;	  they	  are	  by	  nature	  anecdotal,	  they	  tend	  
to	  represent	  a	  statistically	  insignificant	  sample	  size	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  drawing	  
general	  conclusions,	  and	  their	  value	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  comparisons	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  
between	  them.	  One	  would	  not,	  for	  instance,	  take	  a	  lesson	  learned	  from	  one	  case	  
study	  and	  apply	  it	  wholesale	  to	  a	  new	  challenge.	  It	  is	  more	  constructive	  to	  take	  the	  
lesson	  from	  one	  case	  study	  and	  consider	  if	  or	  why	  it	  applies	  to	  a	  new	  challenge.	  
When	  reading	  the	  following	  anecdotes	  and	  analyses,	  consider	  the	  greater	  context	  of	  
the	  communities,	  regions,	  and	  countries	  in	  which	  they	  occur.	  There	  are	  historical,	  
political,	  cultural,	  economic,	  and	  technological	  forces	  in	  play,	  all	  of	  which	  form	  the	  
context	  for,	  and	  directly	  affect,	  a	  developer’s	  approach	  to	  electricity	  development.	  
	   Each	  case	  study	  evolved	  from	  direct	  interviews	  with	  developers,	  customer	  
interviews,	  field	  observations,	  literature	  review,	  or	  a	  combination.	  The	  analysis	  in	  
each	  study	  is	  based	  on	  experience	  and	  quantities	  (cost,	  capacity,	  etc.)	  were	  acquired	  
from	  literature,	  interviews,	  or	  directly	  from	  vendors.	  While	  not	  quantified	  or	  coded	  
as	  qualitative	  research,	  these	  case	  studies	  illustrate	  by	  example	  the	  deep	  
complexities	  of	  DG	  development	  and	  the	  (perhaps)	  surprising	  variety	  of	  approaches	  
to	  apparently	  similar	  challenges.	  
4.1	  Site	  Selection	  and	  Research	  Methods	  
Given	  the	  comparative	  value	  of	  case	  studies,	  I	  found	  it	  necessary	  from	  the	  
start	  to	  explore	  DG	  development	  in	  two	  or	  more	  countries	  that	  exhibited	  apparent	  
similarities	  from	  a	  traditional	  “development”	  perspective	  (see	  Introduction)	  as	  well	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as	  local	  differences	  that	  would	  profoundly	  alter	  an	  observant	  developer’s	  approach	  
to	  DG	  projects.	  My	  personal	  experience	  and	  ongoing	  communication	  with	  local	  
residents,	  government	  officials,	  NGO	  staff,	  and	  ex-­‐pats	  made	  Tanzania	  an	  ideal	  
launching	  point	  for	  this	  paper’s	  research.	  	  Seemingly	  ideal	  as	  a	  comparison	  was	  
Nepal	  with	  its	  similar	  economic	  history,	  brush	  with	  socialism,	  and	  overwhelmingly	  
rural,	  un-­‐electrified	  population.	  These	  similarities	  hid	  the	  vast	  cultural	  and	  
geographical	  differences	  that	  would	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  notable	  variation	  in	  DG	  
approaches.	  But	  the	  bipolar	  comparison,	  even	  with	  its	  local	  variations,	  was	  still	  too	  
simplistic.	  
	   While	  in	  Nepal	  I	  corresponded	  with	  an	  Indian	  company	  as	  they	  explored	  and	  
partially	  abandoned	  plans	  to	  extend	  their	  service	  across	  the	  border.	  Intrigued	  by	  the	  
more	  immediate	  illustration	  of	  local	  variation,	  I	  added	  India	  to	  the	  analysis.	  Thus	  
this	  paper	  explores	  DG	  approaches	  across	  an	  ocean	  through	  the	  countries	  and	  
individual	  communities	  of	  Tanzania	  and	  Nepal,	  and	  across	  a	  single	  border	  through	  
Nepal	  and	  India.	  
	   Within	  each	  country,	  individual	  communities	  became	  the	  subjects	  of	  this	  
paper	  purely	  by	  chance.	  In	  Tanzania,	  I	  drew	  on	  the	  one	  community	  from	  which	  I	  
could	  gain	  the	  most	  direct	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  and	  personal	  correspondence	  
–	  my	  own	  community	  of	  Luhunga.	  In	  Nepal,	  I	  worked	  with	  and	  shadowed	  the	  only	  
company	  pursuing	  rural	  solar	  micro-­‐grids	  and	  so	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  study	  their	  
three	  pilot	  villages	  of	  Harkapur,	  Kaduwa,	  and	  Chyasmitar.	  And	  in	  India,	  though	  there	  
are	  countless	  rural	  electrification	  projects	  happening	  across	  the	  country,	  the	  largest	  
and	  most	  accessible	  operation	  was	  just	  south	  of	  the	  Nepali	  border	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	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which,	  though	  not	  an	  individual	  community,	  represented	  a	  collection	  of	  
communities	  whose	  average	  need	  was	  being	  met	  by	  a	  single	  company.	  
	   Time	  and	  resources	  allowed	  me	  to	  study	  just	  one	  country	  directly	  –	  Nepal	  –	  
and	  it	  was	  through	  the	  fortune	  of	  personal	  experience	  and	  chance	  encounters	  that	  I	  
was	  able	  to	  add	  Tanzania	  and	  India	  to	  the	  mix	  with	  a	  comparable	  depth	  of	  analysis.	  
Therefore	  each	  case	  study,	  though	  heavily	  grounded	  in	  statistics	  and	  literature,	  is	  
observed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  individual	  experience.	  
	   This	  chapter	  makes	  liberal	  use	  of	  statistics	  to	  paint	  broad	  pictures	  of	  national	  
or	  regional	  demographics	  in	  order	  to	  give	  a	  rough	  sense	  of	  scale	  and	  context.	  
Considering	  national	  census	  data,	  the	  village	  of	  Luhunga,	  for	  example,	  is	  clearly	  not	  
an	  exception	  in	  Tanzania;	  by	  contrast,	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  is	  an	  exception	  in	  India,	  if	  only	  
slightly.	  In	  addition,	  I	  include	  recent	  literature	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  base	  of	  accepted	  
practice	  and	  current	  wisdom	  in	  the	  energy	  development	  world.	  	  This	  is	  to	  avoid	  
reinventing	  the	  wheel	  with	  regards	  to	  common	  technology,	  modern	  information	  
gathering	  practices,	  financial	  structures,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	   I	  based	  the	  bulk	  of	  this	  analysis	  on	  personal	  interviews	  and	  observations,	  
though	  the	  numbers	  and	  positions	  of	  people	  interviewed	  are	  not	  uniform	  across	  all	  
case	  studies.	  In	  each	  case	  I	  interviewed	  anyone	  willing	  to	  give	  me	  the	  time,	  with	  
results	  ranging	  from	  three	  in	  India	  (the	  co-­‐founders	  and	  lead	  technician	  of	  the	  solar	  
company)	  to	  several	  dozen	  in	  Nepal	  and	  hundreds	  in	  Tanzania.	  	  
In	  Tanzania	  I	  spoke	  with	  people	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  society,	  including	  secondary	  
school	  students,	  shopkeepers,	  farmers,	  local	  government	  officials,	  national	  
government	  officials,	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  ex-­‐pat	  NGO	  staff,	  transient	  workers,	  and	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village	  elders.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  after	  leaving	  there	  in	  2011,	  I	  
received	  updates	  from	  teachers	  and	  former	  students	  still	  living	  in	  the	  village.	  
Conversations	  always	  varied,	  but	  they	  tended	  to	  center	  around	  the	  history	  of	  
electricity	  in	  the	  country	  and	  village,	  their	  hopes	  for	  newfound	  business	  
opportunities	  and	  youth	  retention,	  and	  fears	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  to	  village	  
culture	  due	  to	  such	  sudden	  change.	  I	  recorded	  many	  of	  these	  conversations	  in	  
journals,	  but	  ultimately	  relied	  on	  three	  years	  of	  daily	  life	  and	  encounters	  to	  inform	  
my	  understanding	  of	  electricity	  in	  rural	  Tanzania.	  
In	  Nepal	  I	  took	  a	  more	  direct	  approach	  to	  gathering	  opinions	  and	  information	  
about	  electricity	  development,	  recording	  all	  conversations	  and	  formal	  interviews	  
with	  company	  staff,	  local	  and	  national	  government	  officials,	  rural	  and	  urban	  
business	  owners	  and	  vendors,	  and	  community	  members	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  
electrification.	  Though	  I	  administered	  and/or	  analyzed	  several	  rounds	  of	  surveys,	  
mistranslations	  and	  other	  shortcomings	  prevented	  me	  from	  including	  their	  results	  
in	  this	  analysis.	  While	  working	  with	  the	  company	  I	  interviewed	  all	  administration	  
and	  management	  employees	  as	  well	  as	  several	  technicians	  and	  engineers	  to	  learn	  
project	  details,	  planning	  methods,	  competition,	  challenges	  of	  working	  with	  various	  
entities,	  and	  so	  on.	  These	  interviews	  and	  those	  conducted	  along	  similar	  lines	  with	  
rural	  participants	  informed	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Nepal	  case	  study.	  
In	  summary	  these	  research	  methods,	  though	  non-­‐uniform,	  allowed	  me	  to	  
explore	  a	  range	  of	  challenges	  and	  methods	  in	  rural	  DG	  at	  a	  level	  consistent	  with	  
what	  a	  project	  developer	  might	  encounter	  before	  choosing	  to	  begin	  a	  project	  or	  not.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  “shut	  up	  and	  listen”	  approach	  (Sirolli	  2012)	  led	  me	  down	  paths	  of	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inquiry	  I	  would	  not	  have	  thought	  to	  pursue	  and	  that	  informed	  areas	  of	  research	  for	  
subsequent	  visits.	  More	  formal,	  coded	  information	  gathering	  would	  provide	  a	  level	  
of	  detail	  necessary	  for	  technical	  project	  design	  that,	  though	  informative,	  is	  beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  
4.2:	  Nepal	  
We	  had	  found	  the	  little	  homemade	  hydroelectric	  generator	  in	  several	  pieces,	  its	  
hand-­‐welded	  Pelton	  wheel	  discarded	  not	  far	  from	  the	  tractor	  motor,	  awaiting	  repairs.	  
The	  plastic	  penstock	  emerged	  unannounced	  from	  the	  shaded	  brush	  above	  us,	  its	  
mountain	  spring	  water	  gurgling	  onto	  the	  stones	  of	  the	  generator	  hut	  before	  
disappearing	  again	  down	  the	  gulch.	  We	  had	  heard	  that	  the	  man	  who	  made	  it	  lived	  in	  
the	  nearby	  village,	  home	  to	  about	  forty	  people,	  and	  we	  were	  making	  our	  way	  there	  
across	  the	  hillsides,	  pounding	  footholds	  into	  the	  loose	  dirt	  to	  avoid	  a	  hundred	  foot	  slide	  
to	  the	  valley	  below.	  After	  getting	  better	  directions	  from	  two	  kids	  passing	  by,	  my	  friend	  
turned	  to	  me	  with	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  in	  his	  voice.	  “The	  man	  who	  made	  the	  hydro	  
generator	  lives	  just	  up	  there.	  His	  name	  is	  Rai,	  a	  caste	  known	  for	  being	  quick	  to	  violence	  
and	  very	  efficient	  at	  it.	  Let	  me	  do	  the	  talking.”	  
-­‐Author’s	  field	  journal	  
	  
Nepal’s	  central	  government-­‐operated	  utility	  cannot	  readily	  extend	  to	  the	  
country’s	  rural	  majority,	  most	  of	  whom	  are	  several	  mountain	  ranges-­‐removed	  from	  
the	  central	  grid	  (AEPC	  2013;	  REDP	  2014).	  Most	  of	  the	  country’s	  energy,	  whether	  
islanded	  or	  provided	  through	  the	  main	  grid,	  comes	  from	  hydroelectric	  generation,	  
much	  of	  it	  in	  the	  form	  of	  micro-­‐hydro	  facilities	  (REDP	  2014;	  Sarangi	  2014).	  Nepal	  is	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an	  extreme	  example	  –	  many	  developing	  countries	  are	  at	  least	  considering	  central	  
grid	  extension	  as	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  rural	  energy	  development	  (Harper	  2013)	  –	  but	  
in	  many	  ways	  Nepal	  is	  an	  ideal	  subject	  for	  this	  paper	  because	  DG	  is	  perhaps	  the	  only	  
feasible	  option.	  In	  addition,	  the	  government	  decided	  in	  2006	  that	  all	  electricity	  
service	  development	  was	  required	  to	  use	  renewable	  resources	  (AEPC	  2013).	  
Distributed	  renewable	  energy	  development	  is	  likely	  the	  country’s	  future.	  
Nepal	  is	  powered	  by	  roughly	  75%	  hydro,	  with	  the	  balance	  coming	  from	  solar	  
PV,	  imported	  electricity,	  and	  diesel	  generators	  (AEPC	  2013).	  Hydro	  generation	  
operates	  best	  during	  spring	  melt,	  early	  summer	  monsoon,	  and	  shortly	  after;	  in	  the	  
long	  run	  hydro	  is	  the	  more	  efficient	  generation	  method,	  with	  a	  levelized	  cost	  of	  
energy	  (LCOE,	  or	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  electricity	  over	  the	  predicted	  lifetime	  of	  the	  
project,	  accounting	  for	  interest,	  inflation,	  etc.)	  in	  Nepal	  roughly	  25%	  less	  than	  that	  of	  
solar	  (Sarangi	  2014).	  Otherwise	  the	  climate	  is	  fairly	  dry	  in	  the	  higher	  elevations,	  
leaving	  any	  hydro-­‐dependent	  electricity	  consumers,	  literally,	  high	  and	  dry.	  Given	  
Nepal’s	  renewable	  energy	  policy	  and	  inability	  to	  import	  expensive	  power	  from	  India	  
and	  China,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  historically	  vied	  for	  influence	  in	  Nepal’s	  economy,	  one	  
alternative	  is	  to	  augment	  hydroelectric	  generation	  with	  solar	  PV,	  which	  peaks	  when	  
hydro	  does	  not.	  Realizing	  this,	  Nepal	  has	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  solar	  development	  to	  
NGOs,	  aid	  organizations,	  and	  for-­‐profit	  companies	  seeking	  to	  provide	  a	  viable	  
solution	  to	  their	  energy	  needs	  (REDP	  2014).	  
Since	  1985	  The	  Nepal	  National	  Five-­‐Year	  Plans	  have	  encouraged	  the	  
expansion	  of	  RETs	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  gradually	  expanding	  that	  encouragement	  to	  
include	  alternative	  energy	  policies	  (1990),	  subsidies	  and	  subsidy	  delivery	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mechanisms	  (1995),	  and	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  alternative	  energy	  as	  a	  means	  towards	  
economic	  development	  (2000	  and	  2005)	  (AEPC	  2013).	  The	  Energy	  Policy	  of	  2006	  
took	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  alternative	  energy	  by	  expanding	  the	  rationale	  to	  include	  
reduced	  dependence	  on	  traditional	  (synonymous	  with	  “imported,”	  in	  Nepal’s	  case)	  
energy,	  environmental	  conservation,	  increased	  employment	  in	  the	  RET	  sector,	  
higher	  productivity,	  increased	  standard	  of	  living,	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  RETs	  with	  
social	  and	  economic	  activities	  (2013).	  The	  policies	  themselves	  reflect	  the	  holistic	  
approach	  by	  emphasizing	  environmentally	  friendly	  practices,	  enhanced	  local	  
capacity,	  focus	  on	  poverty	  and	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  involvement	  of	  both	  public	  and	  
private	  sectors	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals.	  In	  2013	  Nepal	  expanded	  financial	  incentives	  
to	  poor	  communities,	  women,	  and	  marginalized	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  gap	  
between	  rural	  and	  urban	  electricity	  supplies	  and	  rates.	  The	  expanded	  view	  of	  both	  
the	  importance	  of	  distributed	  generation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  positive	  impacts	  is	  
indicative	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment.	  
The	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  Alternative	  Energy	  Promotion	  Center	  (AEPC)	  
monitored	  and	  reported	  on	  the	  policy	  impacts;	  they	  are	  summarized	  as	  follows.	  The	  
2013	  outcomes	  from	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  renewable	  energy	  sector	  included	  an	  
additional	  14%	  of	  the	  population	  receiving	  electricity	  from	  RETs,	  an	  additional	  500	  
jobs	  added	  each	  year	  (totaling	  30,000	  jobs	  in	  the	  RE	  sector	  upon	  publication),	  more	  
than	  40%	  reduction	  in	  fuel	  wood	  consumption	  by	  more	  than	  700,000	  households,	  
and	  more	  than	  500	  small	  businesses	  opening	  in	  the	  RET	  sector	  (AEPC	  2013).	  
The	  micro-­‐hydro	  systems	  like	  the	  one	  mentioned	  in	  this	  section’s	  
introduction	  have	  long	  been	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  electrification	  in	  rural	  Nepal.	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Indeed,	  this	  would	  be	  expected	  given	  Nepal’s	  hydrological	  conditions	  and	  consistent	  
spring	  monsoon.	  If	  a	  single	  mountain	  spring	  that	  already	  supplies	  several	  villages	  
with	  irrigation	  water	  can	  also	  generate	  1	  kW	  through	  a	  homemade	  generator,	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  other	  un-­‐electrified	  communities	  are	  encouraging.	  But	  
electrification	  of	  many	  rural	  areas,	  however	  attractive	  and	  accessible	  micro-­‐hydro	  
seems,	  is	  far	  from	  secure.	  
The	  village	  of	  Kaduwa,	  down	  the	  hill	  from	  Rai’s	  village,	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  
Perched	  in	  the	  saddle	  of	  a	  mountain	  road	  leading	  to	  the	  famous	  Hindu	  and	  Buddhist	  
cave	  temple	  of	  Halesi	  Mahadev,	  Kaduwa	  is	  home	  to	  a	  secondary	  school,	  a	  diesel-­‐
powered	  grain	  mill,	  and	  a	  few	  dozen	  families	  of	  subsistence	  farmers.	  Diesel	  
generators,	  ubiquitous	  across	  the	  country,	  were	  chosen	  over	  hydro	  and	  serve	  a	  few	  
main	  businesses.	  More	  recently,	  the	  individual	  households	  have	  opted	  for	  the	  
subsidized	  solar	  home	  systems	  (SHS),	  stand-­‐alone	  DC	  solar	  systems	  that	  cost	  
relatively	  little	  and	  can	  power	  a	  few	  lights	  and	  a	  cell	  phone	  charger.	  Now	  just	  about	  
every	  house	  and	  business	  in	  the	  village	  has	  a	  SHS.	  
The	  SHSs,	  an	  attractive	  option	  since	  the	  price	  of	  solar	  started	  dropping,	  
became	  affordable	  to	  even	  poorer	  communities	  when	  the	  AEPC	  began	  subsidizing	  
the	  systems	  by	  a	  quarter	  or	  third	  of	  their	  value.	  Since	  then	  the	  systems	  have	  spread	  
across	  the	  country,	  providing	  low-­‐voltage	  DC	  generation	  and	  appliances	  faster	  than	  
any	  previous	  effort	  could	  have	  hoped	  to	  achieve.	  The	  challenge	  is	  that,	  while	  these	  
systems	  provide	  basic	  electricity	  services	  to	  those	  that	  might	  have	  otherwise	  waited	  
decades	  for	  electrification,	  they	  cannot	  provide	  much	  beyond	  basic	  lighting	  and	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charging.	  Those	  wishing	  to	  use	  computers,	  TVs,	  rice	  cookers,	  or	  other	  appliances,	  
many	  of	  which	  require	  AC	  power	  instead	  of	  DC,	  cannot	  do	  so.	  
Kaduwa,	  for	  example,	  has	  a	  growing	  demand	  for	  AC	  or	  high-­‐power	  
appliances,	  including	  a	  dairy	  chiller.	  Situated	  between	  two	  major	  dairy	  markets	  with	  
a	  limited	  local	  supply	  –	  Halesi	  Mahadev	  several	  hours	  up	  the	  mountain,	  and	  the	  busy	  
town	  on	  the	  Dhudh	  Kosi	  River	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  mountain	  –	  Kaduwa	  could	  
potentially	  increase	  its	  economic	  activity	  through	  its	  robust	  local	  dairy	  production	  if	  
it	  had	  the	  means	  to	  store	  milk	  and	  gee	  for	  transport.	  A	  chiller,	  however,	  requires	  
more	  power	  than	  a	  1	  kW	  DC	  hydro	  system	  or	  a	  few	  SHSs	  can	  provide.	  
An	  additional	  consideration,	  especially	  for	  those	  located	  along	  major	  roads,	  is	  
the	  possible	  extension	  of	  the	  national	  grid.	  Upon	  arrival,	  the	  grid	  would	  provide	  AC	  
power	  at	  a	  quality	  and	  voltage	  not	  compatible	  with	  smaller	  DC	  systems	  currently	  in	  
place.	  For	  consumers,	  this	  would	  require	  choosing	  between	  their	  limited	  home	  
systems,	  a	  complete	  conversion	  of	  their	  systems	  to	  accommodate	  grid	  power,	  or	  the	  
use	  of	  two	  different	  electrical	  systems	  in	  the	  same	  building,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  
investment	  in	  local	  energy	  generation	  would	  be	  rendered	  useless.	  The	  original	  
decision	  to	  invest	  in	  local	  energy	  or	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  grid	  therefore	  carries	  some	  risk	  
for	  those	  without	  sufficient	  means.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  much	  of	  rural	  Nepal	  –	  
communities	  must	  weigh	  the	  immediate	  investment	  in	  local	  energy	  generation	  
against	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  grid	  will	  arrive.	  The	  grid	  itself,	  however,	  is	  not	  quite	  
the	  deus	  ex	  machina	  it	  might	  seem	  to	  those	  awaiting	  its	  prophetic	  arrival,	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  Nepal’s	  urban	  centers.	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The	  greater	  Kathmandu	  area	  (including	  Baktapur,	  Lalitpur,	  and	  surrounding	  
areas)	  is	  entirely	  encompassed	  within	  the	  NEA	  grid	  and	  has	  challenges	  of	  its	  own,	  
the	  most	  notable	  of	  which	  is	  load	  shedding.	  Accepted	  as	  “business	  as	  usual”	  
throughout	  the	  developing	  world,	  load	  shedding	  involves	  shutting	  down	  sections	  of	  
the	  grid	  when	  generation	  cannot	  meet	  demand.	  Kathmandu,	  Nepal’s	  center	  of	  
commerce,	  industry,	  and	  government,	  experiences	  between	  5	  hours	  (monsoon	  
season)	  and	  14	  hours	  (dry	  season)	  of	  load	  shedding	  per	  day.	  To	  avoid	  the	  monetary	  
losses	  that	  frequent	  power	  loss	  can	  incur,	  homes	  and	  businesses	  often	  employ	  diesel	  
generators,	  rooftop	  solar,	  battery	  storage,	  or	  some	  combination	  thereof.	  
Using	  stand-­‐alone	  battery	  storage,	  while	  relatively	  affordable	  and	  reliable,	  is	  
merely	  an	  individual	  solution	  that	  causes	  a	  greater	  social	  disruption.	  If	  a	  home	  opts	  
to	  charge	  a	  battery	  bank	  while	  the	  power	  is	  on	  in	  conjunction	  with	  all	  of	  its	  
appliances,	  it	  simply	  increases	  the	  load	  on	  the	  grid,	  requiring	  longer	  or	  more	  
frequent	  load-­‐shedding	  periods	  for	  everyone.	  Diesel	  generators,	  as	  in	  rural	  areas,	  
are	  also	  reliable	  and	  relatively	  affordable	  for	  an	  office	  or	  apartment	  building,	  but	  are	  
subject	  to	  highly	  volatile	  fuel	  prices	  (Nepal	  does	  not	  have	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  proved	  
fossil	  fuel	  reserves)	  and	  are	  dangerous	  for	  indoor	  air	  quality	  in	  a	  city	  already	  known	  
for	  its	  high	  levels	  of	  air	  pollution.	  Here,	  as	  in	  Kaduwa,	  solar	  has	  found	  a	  niche	  to	  fill,	  
proliferating	  quickly	  as	  large	  arrays	  on	  hospitals	  that	  need	  to	  run	  freezers	  24/7,	  or	  
as	  small	  SHSs	  on	  homes	  and	  offices	  looking	  to	  maintain	  minimal	  electricity	  service	  
for	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life.	  
Over	  the	  past	  several	  years,	  especially	  the	  past	  three	  or	  four,	  a	  method	  of	  
using	  solar	  or	  hybrid	  micro-­‐grids	  (the	  prefix,	  sometimes	  used	  interchangeably	  with	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mini-­‐,	  nano-­‐	  and	  pico-­‐,	  does	  not	  have	  a	  universal	  definition;	  I	  will	  use	  “micro-­‐grids”	  
as	  a	  general	  term	  to	  refer	  to	  systems	  of	  any	  size	  not	  connected	  to	  the	  central	  grid)	  
has	  emerged	  in	  response	  to	  both	  rural	  and	  urban	  electrification	  challenges.	  Micro-­‐
grids,	  though	  somewhat	  unproven	  in	  Nepal,	  are	  being	  considered	  as	  one	  solution	  
with	  potential	  financial,	  logistical,	  and	  social	  advantages	  over	  their	  individualized	  
counterparts.	  The	  following	  case	  studies	  from	  Nepal	  illustrate	  the	  challenges	  of	  
adopting	  various	  electrification	  techniques,	  methods	  of	  overcoming	  these	  
challenges,	  and	  initiatives	  that	  are	  being	  taken	  on	  the	  village,	  city,	  and	  national	  
levels	  to	  drive	  electricity	  development.	  
4.2.1:	  Rural	  Nepal	  –	  Harkapur,	  Kaduwa,	  and	  Chyasmitar	  
The	  villages	  of	  Harkapur,	  Kaduwa,	  and	  Chyasmitar,	  located	  along	  the	  border	  
between	  the	  Okhaldhunga	  and	  Khotang	  districts	  in	  Eastern	  Nepal,	  all	  have	  
something	  in	  common:	  they	  are	  the	  first	  in	  their	  country	  to	  adopt	  solar	  micro-­‐grids.	  
Far	  from	  having	  the	  resources	  to	  fund	  and	  engineer	  such	  an	  initiative	  themselves,	  
they	  have	  collectively	  entered	  into	  a	  business	  partnership	  (called	  an	  SPV,	  discussed	  
in	  Chapter	  3.2.2)	  with	  the	  Kathmandu-­‐based	  solar	  company	  Gham	  Power	  (GP)	  and	  
the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  (ADB).	  Of	  the	  over	  150	  solar	  companies	  in	  Nepal,	  just	  
the	  few	  largest	  are	  considering	  breaking	  into	  micro-­‐grids	  and	  the	  largest,	  GP,	  began	  
its	  three	  village	  pilot	  projects	  in	  2013.	  
When	  GP	  put	  out	  a	  notice	  announcing	  their	  search	  for	  pilot	  candidates,	  the	  
regional	  development	  office	  of	  Khotang	  recommended	  several	  villages.	  GP	  narrowed	  
it	  to	  three	  (Harkapur,	  Kaduwa,	  and	  Chyasmitar,	  hereafter	  referred	  to	  collectively	  as	  
“Khotang”)	  based	  on	  each	  community’s	  level	  of	  interest,	  previous	  experience	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working	  with	  business	  or	  industry	  partners,	  and	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  One	  of	  the	  
primary	  questions	  GP	  is	  trying	  to	  answer	  during	  the	  development	  of	  these	  projects	  
is	  of	  how	  to	  gather	  and	  interpret	  the	  right	  information	  to	  gauge	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  
micro-­‐grid	  in	  a	  given	  village.	  After	  years	  of	  development	  and	  gradual,	  stuttered	  
progress,	  much	  of	  the	  information	  gathered	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  became	  irrelevant,	  
insufficient,	  or	  contested.	  GP’s	  primary	  project	  developer	  travelled	  seven	  times	  to	  
each	  village	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  year	  to	  hold	  community	  meetings,	  created	  and	  
analyzed	  several	  rounds	  of	  surveys,	  and	  maintained	  consistent	  phone	  contact	  with	  
village	  representatives	  to	  stay	  abreast	  of	  developments	  on	  both	  sides.	  Yet	  still,	  after	  
two	  years,	  miscommunication	  or	  missing	  information	  led	  to	  occasional	  doubt	  as	  to	  
whether	  the	  projects	  would	  be	  successful.	  
First	  among	  GP’s	  concerns	  and	  criteria	  for	  project	  success	  is	  a	  community’s	  
willingness	  to	  pay.	  More	  than	  just	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  (i.e.	  a	  for-­‐profit	  company’s	  
bottom	  line),	  willingness	  to	  pay	  represents	  a	  community’s	  literal	  and	  figurative	  buy-­‐
in	  to	  the	  project’s	  success.	  Development	  projects	  run	  by	  non-­‐profits	  or	  donor-­‐
funded	  NGOs	  typically	  have	  less	  concern	  for	  community	  buy-­‐in,	  aiming	  more	  for	  
rapid	  deployment	  to	  meet	  basic	  needs	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  But	  a	  for-­‐profit	  company	  like	  
GP	  and	  many	  others	  in	  the	  energy	  development	  world	  has	  a	  fundamental	  interest	  in	  
predictable	  and	  measurable	  investment	  by	  the	  customer.	  Though	  ADB	  is	  funding	  
GP’s	  Khotang	  pilot	  projects,	  it	  is	  continuously	  calculating	  the	  long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  
the	  micro-­‐grid	  model	  sans	  outside	  funding,	  analyzing	  whether	  GP	  could	  continue	  to	  
develop	  such	  projects	  on	  its	  own.	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Willingness	  to	  pay	  is	  a	  metric	  considered	  not	  just	  in	  itself	  (a	  sum	  or	  rate	  of	  
money	  that	  a	  household	  will	  commit	  for	  the	  service	  provided),	  but	  also	  in	  
comparison	  to	  other	  electricity	  options.	  In	  Khotang,	  the	  other	  main	  generation	  
options	  are	  diesel	  generators	  with	  moderate	  capital	  cost	  but	  high	  fuel	  and	  
maintenance	  costs,	  or	  SHSs	  with	  intermittent	  generation	  but	  moderate	  capital	  cost	  
and	  near-­‐zero	  upkeep.	  A	  10W	  SHS	  costs	  Rs	  8000	  (USD	  ~80;	  conversion	  as	  of	  2015	  
was	  roughly	  100	  Rs	  per	  1	  USD)	  in	  early	  2015,	  including	  the	  panel,	  battery	  (12V	  and	  
10Ah,	  providing	  120	  Wh	  of	  storage,	  ignoring	  inefficiencies	  and	  MDoD),	  three	  bulbs,	  
wires,	  charge	  controller	  (1A),	  and	  charger	  unit.	  The	  AEPC	  subsidizes	  these	  systems,	  
reducing	  the	  upfront	  cost	  by	  2500	  Rs	  (25	  USD)	  and	  therefore	  bringing	  it	  into	  the	  
range	  of	  affordability	  for	  many	  rural	  residents.	  Solar	  companies	  will	  sometimes	  take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  reduced	  awareness	  of	  the	  government	  subsidy	  among	  rural	  
households,	  secretly	  charging	  the	  full	  Rs	  8000,	  reporting	  only	  Rs	  5500	  of	  income,	  
and	  pocketing	  the	  extra	  “subsidized”	  Rs	  2500	  (GP	  2015).	  But	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  
comparison,	  and	  in	  fairness	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  companies	  that	  conduct	  fair	  
business,	  we	  can	  assume	  a	  Rs	  5500	  cost	  for	  a	  10W	  SHS.	  The	  AEPC	  offers	  subsidies	  
on	  a	  sliding	  scale	  as	  well,	  reducing	  a	  20W	  system	  by	  Rs	  6800,	  and	  a	  50+W	  system	  by	  
Rs	  7800	  (AEPC	  2015).	  The	  combination	  of	  subsidies	  and	  falling	  solar	  costs	  has	  
brought	  the	  price	  for	  a	  10W	  SHS	  down	  from	  Rs	  15,000	  in	  2011,	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  
in	  accessibility	  over	  a	  short	  time	  (Kathmandu	  Post	  2016).	  
In	  Kaduwa,	  the	  typical	  income	  pulled	  in	  by	  a	  farming	  household	  is	  between	  
Rs	  10,000	  and	  15,000	  a	  month	  (Kaduwa,	  2015).	  In	  a	  good	  month	  for	  a	  family	  raising	  
buffalo	  and	  farming,	  income	  could	  be	  as	  high	  as	  Rs	  20,000,	  and	  for	  those	  that	  own	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businesses	  or	  perform	  other	  jobs	  on	  the	  side,	  it	  can	  get	  as	  high	  as	  Rs	  40,000	  or	  
50,000	  (the	  wealthier	  few	  of	  the	  village).	  Even	  with	  other	  expenses	  such	  as	  food,	  
school	  fees,	  travel,	  etc.,	  a	  typical	  household	  could	  afford	  a	  SHS	  with	  a	  few	  months	  of	  
moderate	  savings.	  Thoughtful	  use	  and	  further	  saving	  would	  also	  allow	  the	  
household	  to	  afford	  a	  second	  system	  or	  replacement	  battery	  without	  undue	  
hardship.	  
Given	  the	  average	  household	  costs	  of	  each	  major	  electricity	  option	  in	  Nepal,	  
including	  the	  NEA	  grid	  ($0.10/kWh),	  hydro	  ($0.08/kWh),	  diesel	  ($0.40/kWh),	  and	  
SHS	  ($0.20/kWh	  -­‐	  $0.30/kWh),	  a	  solar	  micro-­‐grid	  would	  need	  to	  get	  its	  cost	  down	  
to	  roughly	  $0.20/kWh	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  on	  a	  purely	  financial	  basis	  (GP	  2015).	  It	  
is	  worth	  noting,	  though	  this	  price	  is	  an	  educated	  estimate	  more	  than	  a	  hard	  figure,	  
that	  each	  of	  these	  options	  is	  competitive	  for	  different	  reasons	  in	  different	  contexts.	  
Though	  more	  expensive	  overall,	  diesel	  would	  be	  the	  most	  attractive	  for	  a	  milling	  
business	  that	  doesn’t	  have	  access	  to	  hydro	  resources	  and	  needs	  higher	  voltage	  and	  
more	  reliable	  power	  than	  a	  SHS	  can	  provide.	  For	  a	  household	  on	  top	  of	  a	  mountain	  
ridge	  that	  just	  needs	  basic	  lighting	  and	  charging,	  a	  SHS	  is	  the	  best	  option.	  The	  
reasons	  that	  a	  micro-­‐grid	  does	  not	  need	  to	  beat	  NEA	  or	  hydro	  prices	  (or	  even	  diesel	  
and	  SHS	  prices,	  in	  some	  cases)	  are	  many,	  but	  the	  basic	  reason	  is	  one	  of	  quality.	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  SHSs,	  micro-­‐hydro	  (for	  the	  same	  
reasons	  as	  SHSs),	  and	  some	  diesel	  are	  all	  sub-­‐optimal	  for	  electricity	  development,	  
despite	  their	  accessibility.	  First,	  in	  their	  basic	  function,	  none	  produces	  the	  AC	  
current	  required	  by	  many	  desired	  appliances	  (many	  diesel	  generators	  do,	  but	  not	  
all).	  Second,	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  national	  grid,	  those	  systems	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	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work	  in	  conjunction	  with	  grid	  power,	  rendering	  them	  useless	  or,	  at	  best,	  secondary,	  
to	  be	  used	  only	  as	  backup	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  load	  shedding.	  Even	  if	  a	  household	  
wanted	  to	  retrofit	  their	  home	  systems	  to	  work	  with	  the	  grid,	  the	  upfront	  cost	  of	  
inverters	  (to	  switch	  DC	  to	  AC	  at	  grid	  frequency)	  and	  transformers	  (to	  step	  up	  the	  
voltages	  to	  grid	  requirements,	  such	  as	  from	  12V	  to	  220V	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  SHS	  
battery)	  could	  be	  crippling.	  For	  example,	  a	  central	  inverter	  (as	  opposed	  to	  micro-­‐
inverters	  installed	  on	  individual	  panels)	  can	  run	  around	  10%	  of	  total	  system	  cost,	  
and	  can	  run	  as	  cheap	  as	  about	  USD	  50	  per	  kW	  up	  to	  around	  USD	  1000	  per	  kW,	  
depending	  on	  the	  size,	  efficiency,	  company,	  etc.	  (ENF	  2016).	  Also	  the	  power	  
conversions	  through	  the	  aggregated	  system	  would	  drop	  overall	  efficiency	  enough	  to	  
be	  pointless	  (inverters	  and	  transformers	  both	  have	  low	  efficiencies	  –	  closer	  to	  85%	  
or	  90%	  -­‐	  relative	  to	  other	  system	  components).	  
The	  Khotang	  micro-­‐grid,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  iterations	  of	  its	  kind,	  
overcomes	  many	  of	  these	  problems	  through	  economy	  of	  scale	  and	  long-­‐term	  
planning.	  Rather	  than	  inverting	  and	  stepping	  up	  power	  from	  every	  individual	  
system,	  the	  micro-­‐grid	  centralizes	  its	  generation	  in	  a	  single	  array,	  inverts	  and	  stores	  
on-­‐site,	  and	  delivers	  ready-­‐to-­‐use,	  high-­‐voltage,	  AC	  power	  through	  a	  local	  
distribution	  network	  rated	  for	  the	  grid.	  Once	  community	  interest	  is	  gauged,	  GP	  
designs	  the	  system	  specs	  accordingly	  for	  a	  20-­‐40%	  growth	  margin,	  expecting	  later	  
buy-­‐in	  from	  late	  adopters.	  In	  addition,	  the	  system	  allows	  for	  simple	  scaling	  by	  
adding	  more	  modules	  and	  batteries	  as	  needed	  without	  much	  other	  additional	  
infrastructure.	  Each	  customer	  is	  required	  to	  install	  wires,	  outlets,	  and	  fixtures	  in	  
advance	  at	  her	  or	  his	  own	  expense	  at	  a	  cost	  comparable	  to	  installing	  a	  SHS,	  or	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around	  Rs	  6000	  (GP	  2015).	  After	  installation,	  the	  entire	  operation	  consists	  of	  
monitoring,	  payment,	  and	  maintenance.	  
4.2.1.1:	  Cost,	  Willingness	  to	  Pay,	  and	  Business	  Structure	  
As	  noted	  previously,	  a	  solar	  micro-­‐grid	  does	  not	  necessarily,	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐
case	  basis,	  need	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  methods	  in	  terms	  of	  cost.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  
that	  the	  relatively	  affordable	  SHS,	  with	  moderate	  upfront	  cost	  and	  near-­‐zero	  
upkeep,	  is	  the	  best	  option	  for	  one	  family,	  whereas	  another	  family	  may	  prefer	  the	  
higher	  cost	  associated	  with	  power	  to	  run	  TVs,	  rice	  cookers,	  or	  computers,	  and	  would	  
therefore	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  more	  per	  kWh.	  When	  gauging	  interest,	  a	  primary	  
consideration	  should	  be	  not	  only	  how	  many	  people	  are	  interested,	  but	  what	  
electricity	  needs	  they	  expect	  in	  the	  near	  future	  and	  how	  much	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  
pay	  to	  meet	  those	  needs.	  This	  information	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  allow	  the	  project	  designer	  
to	  maximize	  their	  profits,	  but	  to	  know	  whether	  payment	  can	  be	  expected	  and	  the	  
business	  is	  sustainable.	  
The	  Khotang	  pilot	  villages	  all	  saw	  high	  levels	  of	  commitment	  for	  the	  
proposed	  micro-­‐grids.	  In	  Kaduwa,	  100%	  of	  nearby	  residents	  and	  businesses	  agreed	  
to	  buy	  into	  the	  system,	  accounting	  for	  60%	  of	  the	  total	  village	  population.	  The	  
remaining	  40%,	  who	  live	  in	  a	  separate	  area	  too	  far	  away	  to	  be	  serviced	  by	  the	  
micro-­‐grid	  (the	  grid	  transmission	  maxes	  out	  at	  3	  km),	  announced	  their	  intention	  
early	  in	  the	  process	  to	  purchase	  a	  micro-­‐grid	  once	  the	  three	  pilot	  systems	  had	  been	  
completed.	  Harkapur	  and	  Chyasmitar	  both	  saw	  well	  over	  50%	  buy-­‐in,	  particularly	  
among	  businesses,	  with	  more	  residents	  committing	  once	  installation	  began	  (and	  
more	  expected	  as	  the	  systems	  have	  recently	  come	  online).	  As	  of	  March,	  2016,	  the	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participants	  numbered	  540	  people	  in	  83	  households,	  as	  well	  as	  25	  businesses	  
(Prasain	  2016).	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  pilot	  projects,	  experimental	  and	  iterative	  by	  definition,	  
are	  always	  more	  expensive	  than	  the	  successive	  generations,	  the	  micro-­‐grid	  projects	  
in	  Khotang	  are	  no	  small	  investment.	  A	  total	  of	  USD	  237,000	  is	  being	  invested	  by	  
multiple	  parties	  to	  install	  a	  total	  of	  about	  35	  kW	  to	  serve	  all	  83	  houses	  and	  25	  
businesses	  (Prasain	  2016)	  –	  4.8	  kW	  in	  Chyasmitar,	  21	  kW	  in	  Kaduwa,	  and	  9	  kW	  in	  
Harkapur	  –	  to	  meet	  customers’	  stated	  need	  for	  lighting	  and	  charging	  for	  everyone;	  
radios	  for	  many;	  and	  TVs,	  laptops,	  and	  rice	  cookers	  for	  a	  few	  (Khotang	  survey	  
results	  2015).	  And	  while	  GP’s	  investment	  will	  (should)	  be	  recouped	  via	  customer	  
payments,	  much	  of	  the	  seed	  funding	  is	  from	  outside	  sources.	  The	  ADB	  has	  
contributed	  USD	  100,000,	  and	  the	  Dutch	  DOEN	  Foundation	  has	  contributed	  USD	  
70,000.	  GP’s	  upfront	  investment	  was	  USD	  32,000,	  and	  the	  villages	  collectively	  have	  
paid	  USD	  35,000,	  partly	  as	  in-­‐kind	  contributions	  through	  physical	  labor	  and	  
materials	  for	  system	  infrastructure	  (GP	  2015).	  
By	  simple	  comparison,	  purchasing	  35	  kW	  of	  SHSs	  (assuming	  the	  subsidized	  
prices	  mentioned	  previously,	  also	  made	  possible	  partly	  through	  outside	  donor	  
funding)	  would	  cost	  just	  under	  USD	  200,000	  and	  would	  not	  provide	  the	  same	  
quality	  power	  as	  GP’s	  micro-­‐grids	  given	  their	  low	  voltage	  a	  DC	  limitation.	  
Considering	  the	  significant	  amount	  of	  money	  GP	  has	  spent	  on	  travel	  and	  information	  
gathering,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  skilled	  technical	  labor	  required	  for	  installation,	  the	  cost	  of	  
the	  Khotang	  micro-­‐grids	  is	  roughly	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  SHSs	  of	  equal	  generation	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capacity.	  Yet	  the	  viability	  of	  micro-­‐grids	  as	  a	  profitable	  business	  model	  –	  perhaps	  
the	  single	  most	  important	  driver	  for	  widespread	  adoption	  –	  is	  far	  from	  certain.	  
In	  order	  for	  GP	  to	  continue	  installing	  solar	  micro-­‐grids	  of	  this	  type,	  the	  
company	  would	  need	  a	  profit	  return	  high	  enough	  to	  seed	  subsequent	  projects	  
without	  direct	  outside,	  conditional	  funding	  like	  the	  ADB	  and	  DOEN	  funds	  for	  the	  
pilot	  projects.	  Such	  donor	  funding	  is	  project-­‐specific	  and	  must	  be	  requested	  each	  
time,	  leaving	  a	  for-­‐profit	  business	  without	  predictable,	  reliable	  funding	  and	  
therefore	  without	  the	  ability	  to	  move	  quickly	  and	  decisively	  on	  business	  
opportunities.	  In	  short,	  depending	  on	  donor	  funding	  can	  work	  for	  short-­‐term,	  
focused	  projects;	  but	  if	  the	  funding	  cannot	  be	  easily	  sustained,	  the	  market-­‐based	  
approach	  to	  development	  cannot	  operate.	  There	  are	  several	  ways	  to	  overcome	  this,	  
however,	  without	  waiting	  for	  prices	  to	  conveniently	  fall.	  
4.2.1.2:	  Enter	  the	  Government	  
Nepal’s	  energy	  subsidies	  through	  the	  AEPC,	  such	  as	  for	  SHSs	  and	  larger	  
rooftop	  systems,	  are	  largely	  funded	  through	  donor,	  or	  aid,	  money.	  These	  subsidies,	  
most	  of	  which	  simply	  reduce	  the	  price	  of	  a	  system	  on	  a	  sliding	  per-­‐kW	  scale,	  are	  
reliable	  enough	  that	  local	  businesses	  have	  sprung	  up	  around	  the	  country	  to	  
distribute	  solar	  systems,	  free	  to	  plan	  business	  investments	  several	  years	  into	  the	  
future.	  To	  date,	  no	  such	  subsidy	  or	  other	  continuous	  funding	  exists	  specifically	  for	  
micro-­‐grids.	  The	  ADB’s	  investment	  in	  GP	  (and	  others)	  is	  its	  own	  pilot	  project	  to	  test	  
the	  success	  of	  these	  systems	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  possible	  long-­‐term	  investment.	  
Should	  the	  Khotang	  projects	  prove	  successful	  (financially	  sustainable	  and	  relatively	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disruption-­‐free),	  continuous	  funding	  may	  well	  be	  ensured	  for	  the	  near	  future.	  Thus	  
GP’s	  success	  determines	  not	  only	  its	  own	  future	  in	  micro-­‐grids,	  but	  possibly	  Nepal’s.	  
The	  AEPC,	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  Nepali	  government	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  
has	  ultimate	  say	  in	  the	  direction	  energy	  development	  can	  take	  in	  the	  region.	  
Responsible	  for	  testing	  and	  approving	  technologies	  (importing	  unapproved	  tech	  
incurs	  a	  VAT,	  making	  tech	  approval	  a	  high	  priority	  for	  frontline	  industries	  and	  a	  
bargaining	  chip	  for	  the	  AEPC),	  it	  can	  prioritize	  technology	  choices	  and	  trade	  
relationships.	  It	  also	  designs	  and	  proposes	  the	  subsidies	  adopted	  for	  the	  industry.	  In	  
essence,	  the	  AEPC	  can	  decide	  if	  micro-­‐grids	  have	  a	  future	  in	  Nepal	  and,	  if	  so,	  which	  
kind(s)	  of	  micro-­‐grid	  will	  be	  pursued.	  While	  GP	  is	  pursuing	  high-­‐quality	  AC	  micro-­‐
grids,	  the	  AEPC	  (partnered	  with	  GP)	  is	  pursuing	  cheaper,	  DC	  micro-­‐grids	  in	  another	  
region,	  in	  which	  it	  has	  placed	  greater	  hope	  of	  success	  (AEPC	  2015).	  The	  timing,	  
reception,	  and	  publicity	  of	  each	  of	  these	  approaches,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  being	  
pursued	  by	  other	  companies,	  could	  determine	  how	  and	  where	  a	  future	  
investment/subsidy	  might	  apply.	  
The	  other	  piece	  of	  the	  Khotang	  project	  financial	  viability	  is	  on	  the	  demand	  
side.	  Whereas	  the	  AEPC	  and	  outside	  donors	  influence	  the	  long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  
maintaining	  a	  national	  business,	  essentially	  raising	  the	  “floor”	  of	  any	  ROI,	  the	  
willingness	  of	  individual	  communities	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  systems	  determines	  local	  
viability.	  This	  paper	  has	  already	  shown	  that,	  collectively,	  the	  upfront	  cost	  of	  a	  micro-­‐
grid	  can	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  aggregated	  cost	  of	  individual	  SHSs,	  but	  there	  are	  
additional	  costs	  to	  individual	  customers	  buying	  into	  a	  micro-­‐grid	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  
been	  counted.	  Aside	  from	  the	  USD	  35,000	  committed	  by	  the	  three	  villages,	  which	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was	  collected	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  direct	  payments	  and	  in-­‐kind	  manual	  labor	  and	  
materials,	  individual	  customers	  are	  responsible	  for	  wiring	  their	  homes	  and	  
businesses	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  system’s	  installation.	  This	  amounts	  to	  about	  Rs	  6,000	  
per	  household,	  or	  about	  a	  half	  of	  average	  family	  monthly	  income.	  This	  is	  a	  one-­‐time	  
investment	  that	  should	  be	  up	  to	  code	  upon	  the	  potential	  arrival	  of	  the	  national	  grid.	  
The	  long-­‐term	  expense,	  of	  course,	  is	  the	  electricity	  bill,	  charged	  to	  individual	  
accounts	  and	  paid	  in	  person	  (see	  Chapter	  2)	  to	  collectors	  in	  each	  village.	  GP	  and	  the	  
Khotang	  representatives	  agreed	  on	  a	  Rs	  90	  per	  kWh	  price	  for	  the	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  
customers,	  substantially	  higher	  than	  any	  other	  option,	  at	  least	  by	  direct	  price	  
comparison	  (above).	  Customers	  can	  also	  opt	  for	  a	  flat	  rate	  depending	  on	  what	  
maximum	  power	  they	  expect	  to	  use.	  Households	  pay	  Rs	  500	  or	  1000	  a	  month	  for	  
100	  and	  200	  W	  respectively	  (rates	  can	  go	  as	  low	  as	  Rs	  250	  a	  month	  for	  20	  W),	  and	  
businesses	  pay	  Rs	  2000	  and	  5000	  a	  month	  for	  1000	  and	  2000	  W	  respectively	  
(Kathmandu	  Post	  2016).	  This	  price	  choice	  arose	  through	  surveys	  and	  village	  
meetings	  with	  GP	  project	  designers	  who	  calculated	  actual	  usage	  and	  monthly	  costs.	  
While	  the	  per-­‐kWh	  price	  is	  high,	  actual	  usage	  is	  low	  given	  the	  small	  number	  and	  
high	  efficiency	  of	  appliances	  used	  by	  households	  and	  businesses.	  Even	  at	  Rs	  90	  per	  
kWh,	  a	  typical	  household	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  Rs	  100	  –	  300	  in	  a	  month.	  
Compared	  to	  Kathmandu	  customers,	  who	  pay	  much	  less	  per	  kWh	  (Rs	  10	  per	  kWh)	  
but	  tend	  to	  use	  more	  by	  leaving	  appliances	  on	  more	  often,	  rural	  customers	  on	  the	  GP	  
micro-­‐grid	  may	  not	  be	  paying	  substantially	  more	  for	  comparable	  electricity	  service.	  
To	  summarize,	  the	  success	  of	  GP’s	  solar	  AC	  micro-­‐grid	  and	  therefore	  its	  long-­‐
term	  viability	  as	  a	  profitable	  business	  depends	  on	  financial	  variables	  from	  both	  the	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supply	  and	  demand	  sides.	  Government	  policy	  on	  how	  and	  what	  to	  subsidize	  could	  
sway	  the	  energy	  market	  towards	  or	  away	  from	  high-­‐quality,	  community	  micro-­‐
grids.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  communities	  place	  importance	  on	  high-­‐quality,	  scalable	  
power	  systems	  to	  meet	  growing	  demand,	  or	  more	  accessible	  and	  individual	  systems	  
to	  meet	  just	  basic	  needs,	  holds	  similar	  sway.	  
At	  this	  point	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  micro-­‐grids	  have	  a	  part	  to	  play	  in	  rural	  
electricity	  development,	  and	  that	  for-­‐profit	  businesses	  can	  serve	  as	  vehicles	  for	  
implementation	  and	  innovation.	  The	  next	  question	  is:	  can	  collective	  community	  
resource	  management	  of	  electricity,	  as	  with	  other	  resources	  like	  water,	  forests,	  and	  
pasture,	  survive	  local	  challenges	  of	  theft,	  tampering,	  or	  corruption?	  
4.2.1.3:	  Payment	  and	  Demand-­‐Side	  Management	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  a	  micro-­‐grid	  falls	  victim	  to	  problems	  that	  national	  
grids	  and	  home-­‐based	  systems	  do	  not.	  Large	  grids,	  though	  subject	  to	  line	  “tapping,”	  
have	  the	  advantage	  of	  dedicated	  technical	  crews	  to	  address	  problems,	  substantial	  
financial	  resources,	  and	  centralized	  equipment.	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  
SHSs	  are	  individual	  in	  both	  supply	  and	  demand,	  leaving	  no	  reason	  for	  misuse	  or	  
theft	  (the	  exception,	  of	  course,	  is	  outright	  theft	  of	  the	  system	  by	  a	  neighbor,	  as	  I	  
experienced	  when	  someone	  removed	  my	  solar	  panel	  from	  my	  window	  in	  Luhunga,	  
perplexingly	  leaving	  behind	  the	  lamp	  it	  was	  charging).	  A	  community-­‐run	  micro-­‐grid	  
has	  none	  of	  these	  advantages,	  and	  designers	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  leaving	  the	  system	  open	  
to	  easy	  tampering,	  low	  ratepayer	  accountability,	  and	  overuse/misuse.	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  challenges	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  GP	  has	  opted	  for	  a	  relatively	  
expensive	  but	  sophisticated	  method	  of	  DSM	  and	  payment	  in	  Khotang.	  The	  payment	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system,	  especially,	  is	  simple	  both	  for	  customers	  and	  for	  GP.	  Customers	  opting	  out	  of	  
the	  flat	  rate	  payment	  option	  can	  pay	  in	  advance	  per	  kWh	  via	  a	  system	  similar	  to	  how	  
prepaid	  phones	  work,	  or	  how	  phone	  vouchers	  work	  in	  many	  developing	  countries.	  
Cash	  payment	  goes	  directly	  to	  a	  local	  vendor,	  who	  then	  updates	  the	  given	  
customer’s	  account	  according	  to	  how	  many	  kWh	  the	  customer	  has	  purchased.	  The	  
customer	  may	  then	  use	  power	  until	  that	  account	  has	  run	  out,	  at	  which	  point	  either	  
they	  can	  purchase	  more	  or	  their	  power	  will	  be	  temporarily	  shut	  off.	  In	  many	  cases	  
worldwide,	  this	  business	  is	  conducted	  via	  mobile	  phone	  (most	  mobile	  networks	  
have	  access	  to	  digital	  payment	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  famous	  M-­‐PESA	  in	  East	  Africa);	  
however,	  mobile	  network	  is	  not	  yet	  ubiquitous	  in	  Nepal	  and	  GP	  has	  opted	  for	  in-­‐
person	  payment	  in	  the	  meantime.	  
Each	  system	  in	  Khotang	  contains	  a	  wireless	  internet	  hub	  –	  a	  small	  but	  
necessary	  parasitic	  load	  on	  the	  system	  –	  that	  GP	  uses	  to	  communicate	  remotely	  with	  
the	  system	  for	  purposes	  of	  monitoring	  and	  receiving	  payment.	  Local	  system	  
operators/vendors	  collect	  payments	  from	  customers,	  then	  update	  each	  customer’s	  
account	  to	  GP’s	  database.	  The	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  monitoring	  of	  payment	  and	  usage	  allows	  
for	  quick	  response	  to	  inconsistencies,	  whether	  by	  mistake	  or	  intentional	  misuse.	  
The	  per-­‐kWh	  payment	  system	  allows	  customers	  to	  adjust	  their	  usage	  
according	  to	  their	  needs	  without	  paying	  for	  more	  than	  what	  they	  use	  or	  free-­‐loading	  
off	  of	  others’	  overpayments,	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  with	  flat	  monthly	  rates.	  If	  this	  was	  
the	  only	  form	  of	  demand-­‐side	  management,	  however,	  there	  would	  still	  be	  the	  
danger	  of	  over-­‐draw	  and	  brownouts.	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  a	  single	  customer	  could	  
plug	  in	  high-­‐power	  appliances	  and	  draw	  down	  the	  system’s	  storage	  too	  quickly	  to	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be	  recharged,	  browning	  out	  the	  system	  for	  everyone.	  Even	  if	  that	  customer	  paid	  for	  
the	  total	  amount	  of	  energy	  (kWh)	  she	  used,	  her	  abuse	  of	  the	  system	  by	  drawing	  too	  
much	  power	  (kW)	  at	  a	  given	  time	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  disadvantage	  fellow	  
customers	  and	  damage	  the	  system.	  High	  draw	  can	  damage	  wires	  through	  
overheating,	  and	  overdraw	  can	  both	  permanently	  reduce	  a	  battery’s	  storage	  
capacity	  and	  cause	  system-­‐wide	  voltage	  drops	  that	  can	  degrade	  individual	  
appliances.	  If	  GP	  designs	  a	  system	  based	  on	  information	  that	  most	  customers	  are	  
using	  LED	  bulbs	  and	  phone	  chargers	  (low	  power	  demand,	  on	  the	  order	  of	  10s	  of	  
Watts),	  and	  then	  someone	  plugs	  in	  a	  hair	  drier	  (high	  power	  demand,	  more	  than	  a	  
kW)	  unannounced,	  the	  entire	  grid	  could	  suffer.	  
To	  combat	  this,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  accurately	  track	  usage	  for	  payment	  records,	  GP	  
employs	  three-­‐phase	  AC	  (meaning	  grid-­‐compatible)	  power	  meters	  equipped	  with	  
current	  limiters	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	  The	  meters	  can	  communicate	  wirelessly	  with	  any	  
hub	  within	  range	  (hence	  the	  internet	  hub,	  and	  node	  points	  in	  case	  meters	  are	  spread	  
out)	  and	  can	  give	  real-­‐time	  information	  on	  power	  usage.	  Some	  meters,	  though	  not	  
those	  used	  by	  GP,	  can	  also	  accommodate	  scratch	  card	  vouchers	  and	  mobile	  
purchasing.	  The	  current	  limiter	  on	  each	  meter	  is	  preset	  by	  the	  system	  operator	  
based	  on	  the	  customer’s	  preference	  and	  expected	  usage,	  and	  can	  be	  adjusted	  in	  
person	  by	  the	  operator	  at	  any	  time.	  Each	  meter	  is	  locked	  in	  a	  secure	  box	  accessible	  
only	  by	  the	  operator,	  and	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  wireless	  internet	  goes	  down	  and	  the	  
meter	  can	  no	  longer	  communicate	  with	  the	  hub,	  the	  meter	  stops	  counting	  and	  the	  
customer	  gets	  “free”	  power.	  The	  financial	  burden	  of	  maintenance	  and	  reliability	  is	  
therefore	  on	  the	  operator	  and	  GP,	  and	  affects	  all	  stakeholders.	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Smart	  meters	  like	  these,	  however,	  are	  not	  cheap.	  Along	  with	  inverters	  and	  
batteries,	  meters	  make	  up	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  each	  micro-­‐grid.	  A	  
meter	  for	  an	  individual	  customer	  can	  be	  anywhere	  from	  USD	  30	  to	  200,	  including	  
license	  agreements	  required	  by	  U.S.	  or	  European	  companies	  (Chinese	  companies	  do	  
not	  require	  a	  licensing	  fee,	  and	  Chinese	  meters	  have	  been	  found	  as	  cheap	  as	  USD	  6).	  
While	  GP	  is	  using	  a	  suitable	  U.S.-­‐made	  meter,	  the	  company	  also	  employs	  an	  
electrical	  engineer	  whose	  full-­‐time	  job	  is	  inventing	  a	  similar	  meter	  using	  locally	  
sourced	  components.	  Other	  companies	  forego	  smart	  meters	  completely	  in	  favor	  of	  
over-­‐design	  and	  local	  accountability,	  to	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success,	  simply	  due	  to	  
cost.	  
Battery	  storage	  design	  and	  information	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  longevity	  of	  
the	  micro-­‐grid.	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  affordability	  and	  performance	  at	  high	  elevation,	  GP	  
uses	  lead-­‐acid	  battery	  banks,	  over-­‐designed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  
of	  over-­‐draw	  during	  low	  generation.	  Even	  in	  that	  instance,	  the	  system	  would	  have	  at	  
least	  an	  hour	  before	  batteries	  drop	  below	  50%,	  their	  recommended	  maximum	  
depth	  of	  discharge	  (MDoD).	  At	  that	  point	  the	  system	  would	  notify	  the	  operator	  of	  
imminent	  over-­‐draw,	  then	  the	  operator	  could	  access	  individual	  meters	  and	  shut	  
them	  down	  (load	  shedding)	  until	  the	  system	  recovers.	  The	  use	  of	  primary,	  
secondary,	  and	  tertiary	  grids	  have	  been	  proposed	  in	  other	  areas	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  
prioritization	  of	  load	  shedding	  (primary	  grids	  would	  include	  customers	  that	  cannot	  
be	  safely	  shut	  down,	  such	  as	  hospitals	  or	  dairies;	  tertiary	  customers	  would	  be	  those	  
with	  more	  luxury-­‐based	  demand),	  though	  GP	  has	  so	  far	  not	  considered	  such	  an	  
arrangement	  to	  be	  necessary.	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4.2.1.4:	  Long	  Term	  Plan	  
Despite	  GP’s	  deep	  and	  long-­‐term	  investment	  in	  the	  Khotang	  micro-­‐grids,	  its	  
goal	  is	  not	  ownership.	  Indeed,	  from	  a	  business	  perspective	  GP’s	  only	  goal	  is	  to	  
collect	  its	  predetermined	  profit	  and	  remove	  itself	  from	  the	  equation	  to	  pursue	  other	  
investments	  unencumbered,	  leaving	  behind	  a	  self-­‐sustaining,	  community-­‐driven	  
electricity	  service.	  To	  this	  end,	  GP	  has	  entered	  into	  a	  SPV	  arrangement	  with	  the	  ADB	  
and	  representatives	  from	  each	  village.	  An	  SPV	  essentially	  functions	  as	  a	  business	  
partnership	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  mutual	  interest	  and	  oversee	  the	  transition	  of	  
ownership.	  The	  SPV,	  called	  Halesi	  Solar	  Minigrid,	  maintains	  a	  five-­‐person	  council	  –	  
one	  representative	  from	  GP,	  one	  from	  each	  of	  the	  three	  villages,	  and	  one	  additional	  
representative	  from	  the	  SPV’s	  headquarters	  in	  Kaduwa.	  It	  technically	  owns	  the	  
systems	  in	  all	  three	  villages	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  each.	  Each	  
representative	  has	  a	  “share”	  in	  the	  business;	  degradation	  or	  loss	  of	  profit	  from	  any	  
one	  system	  harms	  the	  ROI	  for	  the	  entire	  SPV,	  encouraging	  collaboration.	  
GP	  will	  remain	  a	  part	  of	  the	  SPV	  for	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  of	  the	  system’s	  
operation,	  guaranteeing	  technical	  support,	  training	  local	  operators	  and	  technicians,	  
and	  providing	  expert	  advice	  for	  its	  own	  interest.	  During	  this	  time	  any	  extension	  or	  
changes	  to	  the	  micro-­‐grid,	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  SPV,	  would	  be	  implemented	  by	  GP.	  
Each	  year	  GP	  receives	  12%	  of	  profits	  from	  electricity	  sales,	  the	  portion	  expected	  to	  
allow	  GP	  to	  at	  least	  recoup	  its	  costs.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  ten	  years,	  GP	  will	  give	  up	  its	  share	  
in	  the	  SPV	  and	  transfer	  complete	  ownership	  to	  the	  three	  villages,	  which	  will	  then	  be	  
responsible	  for	  any	  changes	  or	  maintenance.	  Local	  operators	  will	  be	  in	  control	  of	  all	  
DSM,	  monitoring,	  and	  payment,	  and	  they	  may	  contract	  GP	  or	  another	  company	  for	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further	  grid	  expansion	  or	  repair.	  The	  SPV	  business	  model	  predicts	  that,	  by	  this	  
point,	  the	  system	  will	  have	  paid	  for	  itself	  and	  any	  additional	  income	  will	  be	  profit,	  
allowing	  for	  the	  replacement	  or	  addition	  of	  components	  from	  then	  on.	  
4.2.1.5:	  Stuck	  in	  the	  Middle:	  Challenges	  of	  Implementation	  
There	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  unenviable	  challenges	  facing	  anyone	  working	  in	  rural	  
development,	  or	  anyone	  questing	  for	  the	  silver	  bullet	  to	  sustainable	  energy	  
development;	  combining	  the	  two	  paints	  a	  complicated	  picture	  indeed.	  It	  is	  a	  football	  
(read:	  soccer)	  game	  in	  which	  each	  player	  is	  confident	  in	  her	  contribution	  to	  moving	  
the	  ball	  forward,	  and	  simultaneously	  confounded	  by	  the	  perception	  that	  her	  
teammates	  all	  seem	  to	  be	  playing	  defense.	  Frustrations	  abound,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  
successful	  projects,	  punctuated	  by	  lapses	  in	  communication	  and	  confidence.	  
Administrative	  blindness,	  malfunctioning	  tools,	  improbable	  weather,	  mistranslation,	  
planning	  mistakes,	  funding	  delays,	  cultural	  friction,	  and	  others	  are	  challenges	  that	  
every	  project	  of	  this	  kind	  faces,	  no	  matter	  how	  well	  conceived.	  Conflicting	  
perspectives	  are	  most	  noticeable	  by,	  and	  stressful	  for,	  the	  one	  in	  the	  middle.	  
In	  the	  last	  days	  of	  2014,	  GP	  sent	  a	  team	  of	  technicians	  and	  engineers	  to	  
Khotang	  for	  an	  estimated	  ten	  days.	  Their	  job,	  given	  the	  truck	  of	  supplies	  that	  would	  
follow	  them	  by	  a	  few	  hours,	  was	  to	  install	  the	  framing	  for	  all	  three	  solar	  arrays	  that	  
would	  serve	  the	  eventual	  micro-­‐grids.	  The	  villages	  had	  been	  notified	  and	  were	  
allegedly	  busy	  clearing	  land	  and	  finishing	  the	  structures	  that	  would	  house	  the	  
construction	  materials	  and,	  later,	  the	  inverters	  and	  battery	  banks.	  Aluminum	  
framing	  pieces,	  angle-­‐iron	  fence	  posts,	  rivets	  and	  rivet	  guns,	  a	  miter	  saw,	  a	  
generator,	  vice-­‐grips,	  and	  rolls	  of	  barbed	  wire	  arrived	  at	  the	  home	  of	  Harkapur’s	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SPV	  representative.	  His	  home/guest	  house	  was	  conveniently	  close	  to	  the	  array	  site	  
(a	  veritable	  rock	  field	  on	  a	  40-­‐degree	  incline	  above	  a	  cliff)	  and	  would	  also	  serve	  as	  
home	  to	  Harkapur’s	  backup	  diesel	  generator,	  a	  practical	  requirement	  for	  the	  
industry-­‐heavy	  river	  town.	  
The	  micro-­‐grid	  projects	  had	  been	  in	  development	  for	  over	  a	  year	  by	  this	  
point;	  the	  project	  manager	  had	  visited	  this	  area	  seven	  times	  to	  hold	  community	  
meetings,	  sometimes	  waiting	  days	  in	  a	  single	  village	  before	  the	  community	  actually	  
met.	  Since	  then,	  nothing	  had	  happened	  as	  far	  as	  the	  villages	  could	  tell,	  and	  the	  
framing	  installation	  was	  a	  sort	  of	  carrot	  to	  prove	  GP’s	  commitment	  and	  keep	  some	  
momentum	  among	  the	  villages’	  increasingly	  disgruntled	  customers.	  The	  GP	  team	  
received	  a	  friendly	  reception,	  but	  the	  Harkapur	  rep’s	  first	  order	  of	  business	  was	  to	  
relay	  complaints	  from	  some	  of	  the	  larger	  would-­‐be	  customers,	  particularly	  two	  
hotels	  in	  the	  area	  that	  had	  promised	  electricity	  to	  their	  guests.	  
In	  GP’s	  reality	  the	  framing	  installation	  was	  a	  risk.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  funding,	  
and	  with	  it	  the	  call	  for	  bids	  for	  solar	  panels,	  inverters,	  and	  batteries,	  was	  entirely	  the	  
ADB’s	  responsibility.	  The	  ADB	  had	  not	  announced	  the	  call	  for	  bids,	  after	  which	  
procurement	  would	  take	  an	  additional	  two	  months,	  leaving	  GP	  in	  the	  awkward	  
position	  of	  having	  to	  commit	  its	  own	  resources	  to	  placate	  the	  SPV	  without	  the	  
assurance	  that	  funding	  and	  materials	  would	  be	  forthcoming.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  
professional	  for	  GP	  to	  explain	  the	  ADB’s	  delay;	  as	  far	  as	  the	  villages	  were	  concerned	  
GP	  was	  the	  project	  developer	  and	  therefore	  responsible.	  The	  team	  in	  Khotang	  had	  
been	  told	  that	  the	  ADB	  would	  call	  for	  bids	  in	  the	  next	  several	  weeks,	  meaning	  that	  
final	  installation	  would	  happen	  by	  April;	  they	  passed	  this	  information	  on	  to	  the	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village	  representatives,	  who	  seemed	  annoyed	  by	  the	  delay	  but	  content	  to	  at	  least	  
have	  a	  schedule.	  The	  ADB	  did	  not	  put	  out	  the	  call	  for	  bids	  in	  the	  following	  weeks,	  or	  
even	  the	  following	  months:	  as	  of	  August	  2015	  there	  was	  still	  no	  word	  as	  to	  when	  
bidding	  would	  open.	  
4.2.1.6:	  Field	  Observations,	  Harkapur	  
Harkapur,	  the	  first	  in	  line	  for	  installation,	  is	  an	  obvious	  choice	  for	  a	  solar	  
micro-­‐grid.	  Situated	  on	  an	  ancient	  floodplain	  of	  the	  Sun	  Kosi	  River,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  
rivers	  from	  the	  Himalayas	  that	  flow	  through	  Nepal	  into	  India,	  it	  is	  home	  to	  several	  
thousand	  and	  a	  local	  hub	  of	  industry,	  agriculture,	  and	  transportation.	  A	  community	  
fishery	  hugs	  the	  East	  bank	  of	  the	  river	  where	  the	  region’s	  major	  road	  crosses	  a	  
bridge	  into	  the	  village,	  carrying	  dozens	  of	  buses	  and	  jeeps	  every	  day.	  A	  Secondary	  
school	  on	  the	  mountainside	  looks	  out	  over	  several	  hectares	  of	  homes,	  shops,	  hotels,	  
partitioned	  rice	  fields	  and	  grazing	  plots	  and,	  in	  the	  distance,	  a	  quarry.	  Every	  roof	  has	  
a	  small	  10	  or	  20	  W	  panel	  on	  a	  bamboo	  pole	  pointed	  roughly	  south.	  Though	  the	  
village	  already	  has	  a	  stable	  industry	  and	  a	  growing	  business	  scene,	  the	  construction	  
of	  a	  new	  road	  (courtesy	  of	  Japan)	  to	  its	  doorstep	  is	  expected	  to	  transform,	  albeit	  
slowly,	  a	  moderately	  poor	  village	  into	  a	  local	  economic	  center.	  The	  road	  will	  bring	  
more	  tourists,	  pilgrims	  (on	  the	  way	  to	  Halesi),	  industries,	  and	  businesses;	  and	  with	  
each	  of	  these	  will	  come	  the	  expectation	  of	  amenities	  such	  as	  light,	  TV,	  charging,	  and	  
more.	  
The	  village	  has	  clearly	  been	  careful	  in	  planning:	  zoning	  separates	  agriculture	  
areas,	  grazing,	  and	  buildings,	  which	  all	  sit	  together	  on	  the	  western	  end.	  An	  aqueduct	  
snakes	  from	  the	  hills	  to	  the	  north	  through	  long-­‐established	  earthen	  dykes,	  some	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sporting	  careful	  repairs,	  into	  the	  village	  and	  past	  rows	  of	  homes	  and	  businesses.	  
This	  water,	  continuous	  year-­‐round,	  can	  be	  tapped	  for	  irrigation	  or	  used	  to	  carry	  
away	  waste.	  It	  is	  not	  privately	  owned	  but,	  like	  the	  fishery	  and	  the	  grazing	  plots,	  is	  
managed	  collectively.	  
All	  of	  these	  factors	  –	  collective	  resource	  management,	  expected	  growth	  in	  
business	  and	  industry,	  increased	  demand	  for	  AC	  power,	  proximity	  to	  a	  major	  
transportation	  route	  along	  which	  the	  national	  grid	  will	  likely	  extend,	  a	  history	  of	  
large-­‐scale	  civil	  engineering	  projects	  (new	  bridge	  and	  road)	  –	  indicated	  to	  GP	  a	  high	  
likelihood	  of	  success	  for	  the	  micro-­‐grid.	  The	  high	  and	  expected	  increase	  in	  demand	  
meant	  high	  willingness	  to	  pay;	  likely	  grid	  access	  meant	  a	  demand	  for	  grid	  
compatibility;	  and	  a	  history	  of	  communal	  resource	  management	  and	  prior	  project	  
experience	  promised	  a	  customer	  base	  accustomed	  to	  collaborative	  projects.	  In	  
essence,	  the	  conditions	  for	  viability	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  place.	  
4.2.1.7:	  Field	  Observations,	  Kaduwa	  and	  Chyasmitar	  
With	  the	  nearest	  water	  source	  one	  km	  down	  the	  mountain,	  it	  was	  
immediately	  clear	  why	  Chyasmitar	  had	  bypassed	  hydro	  in	  favor	  of	  solar	  and,	  as	  in	  
Harkapur,	  small	  rooftop	  SHS	  panels	  were	  evident	  on	  just	  about	  every	  house	  and	  
business.	  The	  only	  business	  that	  was	  clearly	  in	  need	  of	  much	  power	  was	  the	  
stationery	  shop	  that,	  at	  the	  time,	  used	  a	  diesel	  generator	  to	  power	  a	  computer,	  
printer,	  copier,	  scanner,	  photo	  booth,	  and	  more.	  In	  contrast	  with	  Harkapur,	  
Chyasmitar’s	  decision	  to	  install	  a	  micro-­‐grid	  instead	  of	  more	  SHSs	  was	  less	  obvious	  
and	  may	  explain	  the	  lower	  participation	  rate	  and	  smaller	  array	  of	  only	  4.8	  kW.	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Local	  artisans	  –	  carpenters	  and	  builders	  –	  had	  finished	  the	  requisite	  inverter	  
and	  battery	  house	  mere	  hours	  before	  the	  GP	  team	  arrived.	  GP	  had	  left	  Kaduwa	  and	  
Chyasmitar	  to	  their	  own	  devices	  to	  site	  and	  build	  (or	  retrofit)	  the	  buildings,	  a	  simple	  
enough	  requirement	  for	  in-­‐kind	  services	  that	  ended	  up	  having	  unexpected	  positive	  
outcomes.	  
This	  area	  of	  Khotang	  has,	  as	  do	  many	  other	  rural	  areas,	  what	  can	  only	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  mafia.	  Self-­‐appointed	  and	  largely	  unchecked	  by	  law	  enforcement,	  the	  
mafia	  functions	  as	  a	  mix	  between	  labor	  union	  and	  brute	  squad,	  demanding	  
employment	  for	  its	  members	  and	  threatening	  or	  attacking	  non-­‐members	  that	  are	  
employed	  instead.	  The	  type	  of	  labor	  is	  generally	  manual	  –	  moving	  rocks,	  digging	  
trenches,	  building	  shoring	  around	  the	  mountain	  roads	  –	  and	  the	  type	  of	  employer	  is	  
irrelevant	  to	  the	  mafia’s	  conditions.	  Protected	  laborers	  pay	  dues	  to	  the	  don	  (local	  
title)	  and	  he,	  in	  turn,	  ensures	  that	  any	  relevant	  work	  goes	  to	  them.	  If	  a	  local	  resident	  
hires	  laborers	  to	  carry	  stones	  for	  a	  new	  shop,	  mafia	  members	  get	  the	  work;	  if	  the	  
government	  office	  of	  civil	  engineering	  builds	  a	  new	  road,	  mafia	  members	  get	  the	  
(unskilled)	  work.	  
The	  nature	  of	  GP’s	  installation	  was	  such	  that	  the	  mafia	  was	  unconcerned	  and,	  
except	  for	  a	  near	  constant	  presence	  and	  stern	  looks,	  the	  mafia	  largely	  left	  the	  GP	  
team	  alone.	  The	  civil	  engineer	  stationed	  in	  Kaduwa	  for	  the	  government	  road	  project	  
was	  not	  so	  lucky;	  he	  was	  expected	  to	  entertain	  the	  local	  don,	  buy	  him	  and	  his	  posse	  
drinks,	  and	  bend	  to	  their	  demands	  regarding	  personnel.	  The	  building	  and	  retrofit	  
work	  done	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  micro-­‐grids	  was	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  mafia’s	  
influence.	  Had	  GP	  been	  directly	  involved	  rather	  than	  letting	  the	  village	  perform	  its	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own	  construction,	  the	  use	  of	  outside	  technicians	  would	  likely	  have	  met	  resistance	  
and,	  in	  the	  worst	  case,	  doomed	  the	  project	  and	  endangered	  both	  GP	  employees	  and	  
local	  workers.	  
Company	  communication	  was	  mutually	  nuanced;	  the	  technicians	  reported	  
progress	  that	  was	  far	  from	  certain,	  and	  the	  GP	  home	  office	  told	  the	  team	  of	  
imminent	  ADB	  and	  GP	  visits	  to	  the	  work	  site	  that	  never	  took	  place.	  The	  same	  
subtleties	  existed	  between	  the	  village	  and	  the	  GP	  team:	  structures	  reported	  finished	  
were	  merely	  in	  the	  works;	  payment	  and	  services	  reported	  rendered	  were	  simply	  
expected,	  and	  so	  on.	  While	  in	  the	  West	  this	  sort	  of	  exchange	  would	  be	  worthy	  of	  
reprimand	  or	  even	  cancellation	  of	  the	  project	  itself,	  here	  it	  was	  considered	  business	  
as	  usual.	  The	  slight	  dishonesty	  was	  more	  a	  declaration	  of	  intent	  than	  an	  outright	  lie.	  
GP	  was	  not	  actually	  planning	  to	  bring	  ADB	  officials	  to	  the	  site,	  but	  the	  team	  got	  the	  
message	  that	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  work	  quickly	  and	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  
publicity-­‐worthy	  quality.	  Kaduwa	  had	  not	  finished	  retrofitting	  the	  school	  office	  for	  
the	  solar	  components,	  but	  the	  team	  understood	  that	  the	  village	  was	  committing	  and	  
the	  work	  would	  be	  done	  soon.	  GP	  staff,	  all	  Nepali,	  speak	  this	  language	  and	  have	  no	  
trouble	  navigating	  local	  business	  practices.	  The	  communication	  does	  cause	  delays	  –	  
exaggerated	  progress	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  street	  and	  each	  party	  assumes	  a	  grain-­‐of-­‐salt	  
buffer	  to	  optimize	  their	  own	  use	  of	  time	  –	  but	  the	  delays	  are	  predictable	  and	  even	  
normal,	  after	  a	  fashion.	  
The	  challenge	  for	  GP	  is	  to	  speak	  both	  languages	  –	  that	  of	  their	  clients	  in	  rural	  
Nepal,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  ADB	  and	  the	  international,	  westernized	  world	  of	  business.	  As	  
Americans	  and	  American	  companies	  have	  grown	  to	  dominate	  international	  business	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and	  even	  the	  global	  development	  project,	  so	  the	  world	  has	  learned	  to	  adopt	  
American	  business	  practices	  and	  ethics.	  Punctuality,	  regular	  reporting,	  extreme	  
specialization,	  and	  regimented	  time	  management	  are	  expectations	  of	  anyone	  
working	  within	  this	  realm.	  Businesses	  or	  organizations	  that	  operate	  differently,	  
perhaps	  with	  more	  locally	  appropriate	  expectations,	  may	  be	  decried	  as	  lazy	  or	  
dishonest	  by	  partner	  Western	  organizations.	  Local	  institutions,	  in	  turn,	  accuse	  
Western	  organizations	  of	  being	  pushy,	  impersonal,	  or	  any	  other	  term	  associated	  
with	  a	  neo-­‐colonialist	  attitude.	  
When	  operating	  as	  GP	  does	  in	  between	  these	  two	  cultures,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  
room	  for	  mutual	  growth,	  but	  also	  mutual	  disappointment.	  GP’s	  donors	  and	  
occasional	  foreign	  consultants	  can	  put	  unexpected	  and	  perhaps	  misunderstood	  
pressure	  on	  staff	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  more	  American	  style,	  while	  the	  villages	  can	  put	  
equal	  pressure	  on	  the	  company	  to	  relax	  that	  style	  and	  conform	  to	  local	  expectations.	  
When	  the	  company	  assumes	  the	  American	  business	  model,	  the	  villages	  may	  feel	  
disrespected;	  when	  the	  company	  assumes	  its	  local	  (and	  natural)	  disposition,	  donors	  
and	  international	  business	  partners	  may	  feel	  that	  it	  has	  become	  unreliable.	  Staff	  are	  
therefore	  driven,	  both	  individually	  and	  as	  a	  company,	  to	  walk	  a	  fine	  line,	  one	  that	  
can	  be	  seen	  especially	  when	  all	  levels	  of	  business	  are	  in	  play.	  
While	  the	  technicians	  were	  in	  the	  field	  and	  company	  administrators	  were	  
waiting	  on	  ADB	  funding,	  there	  was	  a	  continuous	  line	  of	  communication,	  translated	  
and	  retranslated	  between	  each	  level,	  keeping	  the	  ADB	  informed	  of	  progress	  on	  the	  
ground	  and	  the	  customers	  informed	  of	  progress	  at	  the	  top.	  It	  was	  precarious,	  and	  
the	  juggling	  act	  clearly	  fatigued	  everyone	  but,	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  worked.	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One	  of	  the	  more	  effective	  and	  widely	  applicable	  strategies	  that	  GP	  employed	  
was	  another	  carrot:	  in	  the	  months	  after	  the	  framing	  installation,	  and	  without	  any	  
date	  by	  which	  to	  expect	  the	  ADB	  to	  purchase	  the	  other	  materials,	  GP	  installed	  small	  
solar	  arrays	  of	  their	  own	  in	  each	  village.	  Each	  consisted	  of	  only	  a	  few	  panels	  and	  
batteries,	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  full	  system,	  at	  the	  company’s	  own	  expense.	  The	  idea	  was	  
two-­‐fold:	  the	  systems	  would	  raise	  the	  confidence	  of	  customers	  that	  GP	  was	  serious	  
about	  finishing	  the	  project,	  even	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  donate	  the	  materials	  itself;	  and	  
each	  array	  would	  provide	  a	  specific	  service	  in	  each	  community.	  
Power	  in	  Harkapur	  was	  designated	  for	  the	  hotels	  that	  had	  been	  impatient	  
earlier	  and	  had	  been	  contributing	  most	  to	  the	  community’s	  grief	  with	  GP.	  Kaduwa’s	  
system	  powered	  a	  small	  movie	  theater	  that	  charged	  a	  tiny	  fee	  for	  frequent	  movie	  
screenings	  in	  the	  old	  school.	  Chyasmitar’s	  system	  was	  being	  designated	  for	  a	  
stationery	  shop.	  The	  temporary	  systems	  had	  the	  intended	  effect:	  customer	  
complaints	  decreased	  and	  the	  full	  systems	  were	  purchased	  and	  installed	  in	  the	  fall	  
of	  2015,	  about	  two	  years	  after	  the	  projects	  were	  first	  proposed.	  
4.2.2:	  Urban	  Nepal:	  Kathmandu	  
One	  evening,	  while	  out	  with	  a	  foreign	  business	  partner	  at	  one	  of	  Kathmandu’s	  
Newari	  establishments,	  our	  plate	  of	  potato	  curry	  and	  beaten	  rice	  was	  suddenly	  and	  
unceremoniously	  plunged	  into	  quiet	  darkness.	  Our	  now	  invisible	  waiter	  carried	  on	  
listing	  the	  drink	  options,	  apparently	  unconcerned	  that	  eternal	  darkness	  had	  descended	  
upon	  us.	  Of	  course	  nothing	  at	  all	  was	  the	  matter;	  the	  restaurant,	  like	  practically	  every	  
building	  in	  Kathmandu,	  was	  simply	  taking	  its	  turn	  in	  the	  never-­‐ending	  cycle	  of	  load	  
shedding.	  And,	  like	  many,	  their	  backup	  power	  system	  was	  taking	  its	  time	  deciding	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whether	  to	  turn	  on,	  or	  to	  let	  us	  dwell	  in	  darkness	  a	  while	  longer,	  pondering	  the	  futility	  
of	  the	  national	  power	  grid.	  After	  the	  lights	  did	  finally	  blink	  back	  into	  existence	  to	  the	  
hum	  of	  an	  outdoor	  generator,	  they	  blinked	  out	  again.	  Someone	  had	  forgotten	  to	  turn	  
off	  the	  sound	  system,	  which	  had	  been	  gracing	  us	  with	  Billy	  Joel’s	  “Uptown	  Girl,”	  and	  the	  
generator	  couldn’t	  quite	  handle	  the	  demand.	  
-­‐Nepal	  Energy	  Development	  Council,	  by	  author,	  Jan	  2015	  
	  
Kathmandu,	  Nepal’s	  commercial	  hub,	  is	  subject	  to	  between	  5	  and	  14	  hours	  of	  
load	  shedding	  a	  day,	  with	  the	  annual	  average	  shifting	  towards	  the	  upper	  end	  of	  that	  
range	  as	  demand	  continues	  to	  increase	  without	  much	  new	  generation.	  Though	  there	  
remain	  some	  untapped	  hydroelectric	  resources,	  particularly	  in	  the	  western	  region	  
left	  undeveloped	  during	  the	  Maoist	  rebellion,	  Nepal	  lacks	  the	  financial	  capital	  to	  
harness	  it	  without	  outside	  investment.	  India,	  desperate	  for	  affordable	  energy	  
resources	  and	  increasingly	  under	  global	  scrutiny	  for	  climate	  mitigation,	  has	  long	  
eyed	  Nepal’s	  rivers.	  In	  recent	  years	  agreements	  have	  been	  all	  but	  signed	  to	  allow	  
Indian	  companies	  to	  fund	  and	  build	  the	  dams,	  then	  receive	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  
power	  generation	  at	  a	  price	  lower	  even	  than	  what	  Nepali	  pay	  on	  their	  electricity	  
bills.	  Opponents	  consider	  the	  deal	  to	  be	  legal	  theft	  of	  Nepal’s	  energy	  future	  and	  a	  
desperate	  sale	  that	  benefits	  India	  far	  more	  than	  Nepal,	  while	  proponents	  note	  that	  
the	  resources	  would	  be	  underutilized	  otherwise.	  And	  so	  the	  NEA	  grid	  inches	  along,	  a	  
MW	  at	  a	  time,	  unable	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  demand.	  
Residents’	  responses	  to	  the	  resulting	  load	  shedding,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  
range	  from	  unenthusiastic	  acceptance	  to	  proactive	  gap	  filling.	  SHSs	  have	  become	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popular	  despite	  the	  smog	  and	  heavy	  particulate	  concentration,	  as	  have	  battery	  
systems	  and	  various	  combinations	  of	  the	  two.	  Before	  the	  recent	  drop	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  
solar	  that	  made	  it	  competitive,	  many	  preferred	  diesel	  generators	  on	  everything	  from	  
a	  household	  scale	  to	  a	  commercial	  park	  scale.	  Large	  compounds	  like	  the	  US	  Embassy	  
and	  UN	  offices	  employ	  large	  backup	  diesel	  generators	  specifically	  for	  load	  shedding	  
hours	  (a	  blackout	  would	  mean	  a	  loss	  of	  security	  and	  communication),	  as	  do	  large	  or	  
international	  businesses	  that	  cannot	  afford	  to	  lose	  power	  even	  briefly.	  
As	  of	  2014	  Nepal	  had	  about	  600	  MW	  of	  diesel	  capacity,	  almost	  entirely	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  non-­‐utility-­‐scale	  generators,	  with	  about	  240	  MW	  of	  this	  designated	  for	  load	  
shedding	  response	  specifically	  (UNDP	  2015).	  The	  remainder	  is	  mostly	  rural,	  off-­‐grid	  
generation.	  Assuming	  optimal	  generator	  operation	  and	  an	  average	  of	  10	  hours	  per	  
day	  of	  load	  shedding,	  this	  240	  MW	  capacity	  translates	  to	  just	  under	  600,000	  mt	  of	  
CO2e	  per	  year,	  or	  more	  than	  all	  of	  the	  cars	  in	  Nepal	  combined.	  The	  cost	  also	  adds	  up:	  
at	  an	  average	  of	  30	  Rs/kWh	  diesel,	  though	  reliable	  and	  consistent,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  
expensive	  generation	  options.	  A	  large	  commercial	  enterprise	  filling	  10	  hours	  of	  load	  
shedding	  a	  day	  (timing	  is	  everything,	  and	  load	  shedding	  schedules	  change	  from	  
place	  to	  place)	  could	  meet	  upwards	  of	  200	  kWh	  of	  daily	  internal	  demand	  with	  
diesel.	  Over	  25	  years,	  or	  the	  average	  lifetime	  of	  a	  solar	  panel,	  this	  would	  cost	  the	  
business	  just	  under	  USD	  550,000.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  a	  reasonable	  price	  for	  a	  large	  
business	  to	  pay	  for	  reliable	  electricity	  over	  25	  years,	  it	  looks	  far	  less	  attractive	  when	  
compared	  to	  zero	  load	  shedding	  or	  even	  solar.	  
Electricity	  on	  the	  NEA	  grid	  costs	  10	  Rs/kWh;	  consistent	  power	  without	  load	  
shedding	  would	  cut	  the	  diesel	  cost	  above	  by	  two	  thirds,	  saving	  the	  hypothetical	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business	  enough	  money	  for	  half	  a	  dozen	  enviable	  salaries.	  Assuming	  that	  Nepal	  gets	  
an	  average	  of	  5	  sun-­‐hours	  per	  day	  (IEA	  2014),	  small	  DC	  solar	  systems	  (SHS)	  are	  
comparable	  at	  less	  than	  12	  Rs/kWh,	  as	  are	  prefabricated	  AC	  systems	  using	  12	  V	  
batteries,	  made	  cheaper	  by	  scale	  (Author’s	  notes	  2015).	  For	  a	  home	  or	  business	  that	  
is	  just	  looking	  to	  run	  basic	  appliances,	  solar	  is	  clearly	  the	  better	  option	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
load	  shedding.	  (It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  analysis	  ignores	  inflation,	  though	  its	  
inclusion	  would	  make	  solar	  even	  more	  attractive	  due	  to	  diesel’s	  ongoing	  fuel	  costs.)	  
An	  Indian	  solar	  company,	  Mera	  Gao	  Power	  (MGP,	  discussed	  in	  Section	  4.3),	  
installed	  a	  solar	  micro-­‐grid	  in	  downtown	  Kathmandu	  to	  test	  the	  feasibility	  of	  
meeting	  load	  shedding	  with	  low-­‐cost,	  densely	  distributed	  solar.	  The	  system	  uses	  
cheaper	  distribution	  wires	  (aluminum	  instead	  of	  copper)	  to	  reach	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
customers	  within	  a	  small	  radius	  –	  several	  apartment	  buildings	  wide.	  Panels	  on	  the	  
roof	  provide	  DC	  power	  to	  individual	  households,	  which	  pay	  a	  flat	  rate	  for	  basic	  
service.	  Individual	  customers	  would	  not	  have	  had	  access	  to	  prime	  solar	  panel	  real	  
estate,	  nor	  the	  funds	  to	  purchase	  a	  large	  system	  themselves;	  with	  MGP’s	  DC	  micro-­‐
grid	  they	  can	  pool	  their	  resources	  and	  pay	  off	  the	  system	  over	  time,	  avoiding	  the	  
cost	  of	  diesel	  and	  logistical	  problems	  of	  a	  SHS	  on	  the	  ground	  level	  of	  a	  downtown	  
apartment	  complex.	  
When	  considering	  the	  need	  for	  grid-­‐quality	  power,	  however,	  small	  diesel	  
generators	  and	  low-­‐voltage	  solar	  systems	  are	  insufficient	  (Nepal’s	  grid	  delivers	  at	  
220	  V),	  and	  larger	  consumers	  must	  turn	  to	  the	  high-­‐voltage	  alternatives.	  These	  
include	  the	  aforementioned	  large	  diesel	  generators	  and,	  more	  recently,	  solar	  micro-­‐
grids.	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4.2.3:	  Urban	  Micro-­‐Grids	  Example:	  UNICEF	  
The	  UNICEF	  (United	  Nations	  International	  Children’s	  Emergency	  Fund)	  office	  
in	  Kathmandu	  became	  Gham	  Power’s	  first	  Business	  Micro-­‐Grid	  project,	  or	  BMG.	  
Designed	  for	  the	  expressed	  purpose	  of	  combatting	  the	  effects	  of	  load	  shedding	  and	  
reducing	  dependence	  on	  diesel,	  the	  BMG	  does	  what	  its	  smaller	  counterparts	  cannot:	  
it	  delivers	  grid-­‐quality	  power	  from	  a	  solar	  array	  with	  several	  days	  (depending	  on	  
the	  customer’s	  requirements)	  of	  battery	  backup.	  
GP’s	  original	  intent	  with	  UNICEF’s	  42	  kW	  system	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  office’s	  
diesel	  consumption	  by	  at	  least	  50%,	  a	  direct	  replacement	  for	  running	  the	  250	  kVA	  
diesel	  generator.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  installation,	  UNICEF	  was	  using	  the	  generator	  to	  run,	  
on	  average,	  30	  kW	  of	  equipment	  during	  the	  winter,	  peaking	  a	  little	  higher	  in	  
summer	  to	  run	  air	  conditioning	  units.	  Even	  in	  summer	  the	  generator	  was	  heavily	  
over-­‐designed,	  generating	  dramatically	  less	  than	  its	  optimal	  output.	  Under-­‐
generation,	  as	  with	  over-­‐generation,	  can	  be	  damaging	  over	  time.	  Like	  with	  car	  
engines,	  running	  the	  generator	  at	  lower	  RPMs	  than	  it	  was	  designed	  for	  strains	  the	  
efficiency	  and	  uses	  more	  fuel	  than	  a	  smaller	  generator	  with	  the	  same	  output.	  GP’s	  
design	  called	  for	  a	  complete	  overhaul.	  All	  systems	  would	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  solar	  
array,	  which	  would	  cover	  everything	  during	  load	  shedding,	  and	  a	  small	  diesel	  
generator	  would	  serve	  as	  backup	  for	  times	  of	  peak	  demand.	  The	  result	  would	  have	  
been	  a	  90%	  reduction	  in	  diesel	  use	  and	  a	  20%	  overall	  reduction	  in	  energy	  costs,	  
even	  with	  solar	  payments.	  
What	  should	  have	  been	  a	  win-­‐win	  for	  UNICEF	  fell	  short	  when	  the	  office	  
decided	  to	  only	  connect	  the	  main	  appliances,	  such	  as	  refrigerators	  and	  computers,	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to	  the	  solar,	  which	  account	  for	  just	  20	  kW.	  The	  remaining	  22	  kW	  of	  solar	  were	  left	  
unused,	  and	  the	  over-­‐sized	  diesel	  generator	  continued	  to	  run	  at	  sub-­‐optimal	  output	  
during	  load	  shedding,	  further	  shortening	  its	  life	  and	  negating	  the	  energy	  savings	  
that	  would	  have	  paid	  off	  the	  solar	  micro-­‐grid.	  Fortunately,	  the	  office	  is	  able	  to	  switch	  
its	  other	  systems	  onto	  the	  BMG	  with	  relative	  ease	  should	  it	  decide	  to	  do	  so.	  
In	  UNICEF’s	  case,	  the	  as-­‐designed	  90%	  fuel	  reduction	  and	  20%	  overall	  cost	  
reduction	  was	  a	  product	  of	  load	  shedding	  scheduling	  and	  the	  office’s	  time-­‐of-­‐use	  
patterns.	  Other	  offices	  with	  other	  outage	  schedules	  would	  fair	  differently,	  but	  GP	  
reported	  that	  it	  could	  reliably	  provide	  a	  50%	  fuel	  reduction	  for	  any	  BMG,	  which	  
would	  still	  be	  enough	  to	  pay	  off	  the	  (proprietary)	  cost	  of	  the	  system.	  As	  of	  February	  
2015,	  GP	  was	  pursuing	  several	  similar	  contracts	  with	  little	  competition.	  The	  most	  
common	  complication	  involved	  customers’	  misunderstanding	  of	  GP’s	  financial	  
models,	  leading	  to	  debates	  about	  the	  appropriate	  estimates	  of	  inflation	  and	  interest	  
rate	  during	  payback.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  BMG	  and	  its	  benefits,	  however,	  was	  
generally	  accepted.	  
The	  comparison	  between	  diesel	  and	  solar	  micro-­‐grid	  backup	  is	  not	  always	  
simple	  to	  communicate	  to	  customers	  because	  they	  operate	  under	  different	  sets	  of	  
rules.	  Diesel	  is	  reliable	  and	  well	  understood,	  but	  has	  a	  high	  upfront	  cost	  and	  
requires	  ongoing	  fuel	  costs	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  price	  fluctuations	  on	  the	  international	  
market.	  Solar	  is	  intermittent	  and	  therefore	  requires	  a	  higher	  upfront	  cost	  to	  cover	  
the	  necessary	  redundancy.	  However,	  with	  no	  fuel	  costs	  and	  minimal	  maintenance	  
costs	  (most	  of	  which	  are	  covered	  by	  warranty),	  solar	  lends	  itself	  to	  financing	  
mechanisms	  that	  make	  use	  of	  savings	  to	  pay	  itself	  off.	  With	  the	  right	  tools,	  a	  solar	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customer	  could	  see	  zero	  additional	  cost	  and,	  upon	  repayment,	  net	  savings.	  Agreeing	  
on	  payback	  schemes	  and	  helping	  customers	  understand	  the	  financial	  mechanisms	  
are	  the	  current	  challenges	  for	  solar	  companies	  now	  that	  the	  technology	  is	  
approaching	  grid	  parity	  with	  other	  generation	  types.	  Tipping	  the	  solar	  market	  
beyond	  this	  confidence	  barrier,	  combined	  with	  the	  growing	  utility	  of	  SHSs,	  may	  see	  
the	  end	  to	  diesel.	  
4.3:	  Rural	  India:	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  
The	  two-­‐kilometre	  drive	  on	  a	  kuchcha	  road	  lined	  with	  sugarcane	  crops	  to	  
Hasnapur	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  at	  night	  leaves	  you	  with	  an	  eerie	  feeling.	  The	  road	  is	  dark,	  
but	  as	  the	  village	  approaches,	  you	  can	  spot	  tiny	  dots	  of	  light	  emanating	  from	  thatch-­‐
roofed	  huts.	  The	  government	  has	  not	  brought	  electricity	  to	  the	  village	  in	  Sitapur	  
district	  —	  but	  there	  is	  light.	  
-­‐The	  Telegraph,	  India,	  2014	  
	  
Just	  across	  Nepal’s	  southern	  border	  is	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  one	  of	  India’s	  more	  
impoverished	  states.	  The	  population	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  80%	  of	  which	  is	  rural	  and	  
38%	  of	  which	  lives	  in	  poverty	  (compared	  to	  India’s	  ~30%),	  is	  partially	  organized	  
into	  over	  200	  hamlets	  (UPID	  2011).	  The	  hamlets	  themselves	  are	  densely	  
concentrated	  around	  commercial	  centers,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  un-­‐electrified.	  Though	  
electricity	  generation	  on	  the	  national	  utility	  is	  increasing,	  Uttar	  Pradesh’s	  annual	  
electrification	  rate	  is	  actually	  decreasing	  (-­‐2.5%)	  as	  population	  growth	  (20%	  
decennial)	  outstrips	  generation	  growth	  (UNESCO).	  In	  2014,	  Uttar	  Pradesh’s	  off-­‐grid	  
residents	  account	  for	  2%	  of	  the	  global	  population.	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The	  national	  grid	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  pulls	  from	  a	  mix	  of	  generation	  types	  –	  
primarily	  coal,	  followed	  by	  wind	  and	  gas,	  then	  solar	  and	  biomass.	  In	  addition,	  a	  
combination	  of	  small	  solar	  systems,	  biomass	  gasifiers,	  small	  hydro,	  and	  various	  
other	  methods	  serves	  to	  electrify	  some	  rural	  homes	  and	  businesses,	  though	  many	  go	  
without.	  The	  dense	  hamlets	  lend	  themselves	  to	  a	  solar	  micro-­‐grid,	  though	  one	  that	  is	  
different	  from	  that	  employed	  by	  Gham	  Power	  to	  the	  north.	  Where	  real	  estate	  is	  
valuable,	  finances	  are	  limited,	  needs	  are	  minimal,	  and	  distribution	  is	  concentrated,	  a	  
cheap	  DC	  micro-­‐grid	  can	  serve	  the	  majority	  of	  demand	  at	  an	  acceptable	  cost.	  
In	  2011	  a	  company	  called	  Mera	  Gao	  Power	  (MGP),	  meaning	  “My	  Village	  
Power,”	  adapted	  an	  electrification	  model	  from	  West	  Africa	  to	  the	  hamlets	  in	  Uttar	  
Pradesh.	  For	  USD	  900	  MGP	  technicians	  can	  install,	  in	  about	  a	  day,	  a	  system	  for	  an	  
entire	  hamlet.	  Each	  customer	  buying	  into	  the	  micro-­‐grid	  pays	  a	  INR	  200	  (USD	  3)	  
installation	  charge,	  then	  INR	  100	  per	  week	  for	  continuous	  power.	  For	  every	  three	  
micro-­‐grids,	  each	  of	  which	  usually	  has	  a	  maximum	  radius	  of	  90m,	  MGP	  builds	  and	  
staffs	  a	  “brick	  and	  mortar”	  office	  to	  provide	  technical	  support	  and	  collect	  payment.	  
At	  first	  glance,	  MGP	  and	  GP	  appear	  to	  have	  similar	  situations:	  they	  are	  both	  
trying	  to	  provide	  affordable	  and	  appropriate	  power	  via	  solar	  micro-­‐grids	  where	  the	  
national	  grid	  or	  other	  electrification	  methods	  are	  inaccessible.	  But	  a	  closer	  look	  
reveals	  divergent	  philosophies	  suited	  to	  contrasting	  environments,	  both	  financially	  
and	  culturally.	  Payment	  mechanisms,	  demand-­‐side	  management,	  and	  technology	  all	  
differ,	  providing	  a	  contrast	  that	  illustrates	  the	  importance	  of	  site-­‐specific	  project	  
design.	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4.3.1:	  Uttar	  Pradesh:	  Technology	  Preference	  
The	  density	  and	  high	  level	  of	  poverty	  in	  the	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  hamlets	  present	  
challenges	  and	  opportunities	  that	  Khotang	  does	  not.	  First	  among	  these	  is	  the	  need	  
and	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  The	  hamlets	  had	  depended	  on	  kerosene	  lamps	  for	  light,	  and	  
mobile	  phone	  charging	  was	  typically	  a	  local	  business	  venture	  in	  which	  one	  person	  
would	  own	  a	  battery	  bank,	  diesel	  generator,	  or	  SHS,	  and	  would	  charge	  customers	  
accordingly.	  The	  majority	  of	  customers	  in	  each	  community	  (~85%)	  required	  that	  a	  
solar	  micro-­‐grid	  would	  provide	  similar	  services	  (MGP	  2015),	  but	  also	  expected	  to	  
pay	  an	  equivalent	  amount	  or	  less.	  MGP	  had	  to	  design	  a	  system	  that	  provided	  basic	  
services	  but	  also	  competed	  with	  alternative	  prices.	  Following	  GP’s	  example	  of	  using	  
only	  high-­‐end,	  grid-­‐quality	  materials	  was	  not	  an	  option.	  
The	  solution	  presented	  itself	  via	  the	  hamlets’	  densities.	  Centralized	  
generation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  SHSs	  or	  kerosene,	  relies	  on	  minimizing	  loss	  along	  its	  
distribution	  network	  in	  order	  to	  affordably	  meet	  demand.	  GP	  uses	  high	  quality	  
copper	  wires	  for	  distribution,	  limiting	  line	  loss	  (power	  falls	  off	  linearly	  with	  the	  
length	  of	  the	  wire)	  along	  its	  wide	  networks	  that	  cover	  several	  square	  kilometers.	  
MGP,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  decided	  from	  the	  beginning	  to	  ignore	  grid	  
requirements	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  materials	  to	  meet	  the	  specific	  local	  need.	  
Instead	  of	  copper,	  they	  use	  aluminum,	  which	  has	  a	  higher	  resistance	  that	  becomes	  
non-­‐negligible	  only	  over	  long	  distances.	  By	  limiting	  each	  micro-­‐grid	  distribution	  
radius	  to	  the	  length	  of	  a	  spool	  of	  aluminum	  wire	  (90	  m),	  MGP	  was	  able	  to	  cut	  30–
40%	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  distribution	  for	  only	  a	  1–2%	  line	  loss.	  With	  this	  method,	  the	  
challenge	  of	  distribution,	  in	  hamlets	  or	  even	  urban	  centers	  (see	  4.2.2),	  becomes	  less	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one	  of	  expensive	  resource	  conservation	  (optimizing	  networks)	  and	  more	  one	  of	  
sphere	  packing.	  
MGP	  also	  opted	  to	  implement	  monthly	  payments	  in	  conjunction	  with	  
appliance	  management,	  rather	  than	  GP’s	  method	  of	  metering	  and	  limiting	  the	  
otherwise	  free	  use	  of	  appliances.	  Customers	  pay	  a	  monthly	  rate	  comparable	  to	  or	  
less	  than	  what	  they	  would	  pay	  for	  kerosene	  and	  other	  services,	  and	  in	  return	  they	  
can	  use	  their	  lights	  and	  chargers	  whenever	  necessary.	  As	  a	  result,	  no	  meters	  (which	  
are	  expensive)	  or	  limiters	  (which	  can	  be	  tampered	  with)	  are	  required,	  dramatically	  
reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  system.	  Customers	  pay	  directly	  to	  a	  MGP	  collector,	  a	  trained	  
local	  resident	  who	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  shut	  off	  their	  service	  upon	  non-­‐payment.	  But	  
the	  simplicity	  comes	  with	  its	  own	  challenges.	  
The	  benefits	  of	  metering	  are	  two-­‐fold:	  the	  grid	  operator	  (micro-­‐utility)	  can	  
use	  individual	  consumption	  information	  to	  optimize	  service	  and	  plan	  for	  future	  
growth;	  it	  can	  also	  track	  misuse	  and	  maintain	  payment	  accountability.	  When	  grid	  
oversight	  is	  done	  remotely	  and	  there	  is	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  misuse	  or	  non-­‐payment,	  
it	  can	  be	  worth	  the	  cost	  to	  install	  meters	  and	  limiters.	  But	  where	  operation	  is	  done	  
locally	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  misuse	  or	  non-­‐payment	  is	  deemed	  acceptable,	  the	  added	  cost	  
of	  meters	  and	  limiters	  may	  not	  be	  worthwhile	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  Until	  recently,	  MGP	  
opted	  for	  the	  latter,	  relying	  on	  mutual	  trust	  afforded	  to/by	  locally	  employed	  
technicians	  and	  collectors.	  In	  the	  past	  year	  it	  was	  able	  to	  develop	  in	  house	  its	  own	  
low-­‐cost	  prepaid	  meter,	  which	  it	  plans	  to	  roll	  out	  in	  the	  coming	  months	  (MGP	  2016).	  
The	  addition	  could	  have	  a	  dramatic	  impact	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  track	  misuse,	  and	  will	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help	  if	  MGP	  decides	  to	  scale	  up	  its	  service	  and	  monitor	  higher	  and	  more	  varied	  
levels	  of	  consumption.	  
4.3.2:	  Uttar	  Pradesh:	  Real	  Prices	  
The	  choice	  of	  technology	  also	  depends	  simply	  on	  what	  materials	  can	  be	  
imported	  to	  the	  sites	  reliably	  and	  affordably.	  Much	  of	  the	  western	  world	  can	  rely	  on	  
established	  trade	  agreements	  and	  tariffs,	  consistent	  and	  regulated	  customs	  laws,	  
and	  so	  on.	  Even	  Nepal,	  which	  trades	  readily	  with	  both	  China	  and	  India	  and	  has	  
limited	  regional	  import	  laws,	  can	  predict	  and	  rely	  on	  international	  prices.	  For	  
example,	  a	  150	  Ah	  battery	  produced	  in	  China	  and	  approved	  by	  Nepal’s	  AEPC	  will	  
cost	  about	  Rs	  26,000.	  This	  price	  includes	  a	  10%	  hike	  above	  the	  price	  in	  India,	  plus	  a	  
6%	  import	  tax.	  
The	  same	  battery	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  which	  should	  cost	  only	  Rs	  23,000,	  could	  
still	  be	  even	  more	  expensive	  than	  the	  same	  battery	  in	  Nepal.	  This	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  
to	  the	  somewhat	  convoluted	  interstate	  taxes	  on	  goods	  that	  have	  been	  imported	  to	  
India,	  and	  bribes	  expected	  by	  officials	  processing	  large	  orders	  across	  state	  borders.	  
Indian	  states	  that	  are	  not	  home	  to	  international	  trade	  hubs	  or	  major	  production	  
centers	  end	  up	  paying	  more,	  in	  some	  cases,	  for	  products	  than	  other	  countries	  do.	  
Take	  another	  example	  from	  one	  of	  MGP’s	  co-­‐founders:	  from	  early	  in	  its	  life,	  
the	  company	  has	  preferred	  local	  sourcing,	  for	  reasons	  of	  both	  cost	  and	  
sustainability.	  They	  had	  been	  purchasing	  LED	  bulbs	  from	  China	  at	  INR	  60	  per	  bulb,	  
and	  then	  paying	  an	  extra	  INR	  40	  per	  bulb	  in	  national	  and	  state	  taxes	  just	  to	  get	  them	  
across	  national	  and	  state	  borders.	  The	  same	  bulb,	  produced	  in	  India,	  cost	  INR	  40	  per	  
bulb,	  and	  MGP	  had	  to	  pay	  just	  INR	  1	  per	  bulb	  to	  transport	  it,	  cutting	  the	  price	  by	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almost	  60%.	  MGP’s	  situation	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  is	  not	  entirely	  unique	  –	  in	  fact	  it	  
represents	  the	  norm	  in	  several	  key	  ways.	  
First,	  its	  place	  as	  a	  non-­‐industrial,	  mostly	  rural	  state	  creates	  dependence	  on	  
processed	  materials	  and	  components	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country	  or	  world,	  and	  it	  
is	  therefore	  subject	  to	  tariffs,	  commerce	  laws,	  and	  corruption	  within	  the	  port	  
authority	  or	  local	  equivalent.	  Those	  working	  in	  international	  development	  will	  
recognize	  this	  frustration	  –	  among	  ex-­‐pats	  and	  international	  NGOs,	  the	  concept	  of	  
receiving	  large	  shipments	  through	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  in	  Tanzania	  without	  delays	  or	  
bribes	  has	  the	  status	  of	  a	  joke.	  This	  unpredictability	  factor	  in	  component	  sourcing	  
can	  contribute	  to	  the	  abandonment	  of	  development	  projects	  such	  as	  MGP’s	  and	  GP’s	  
micro-­‐grids.	  Accountability	  and	  consistent,	  transparent	  policy	  in	  this	  realm	  can	  go	  a	  
long	  way	  to	  ensuring	  rapid	  iteration	  and	  development	  in	  the	  energy	  sector,	  among	  
others.	  
Second,	  for-­‐profit	  companies	  like	  MGP	  can	  survive	  only	  by	  adapting	  quickly	  
and	  frequently	  to	  changing	  economic	  and	  technological	  environments.	  Since	  
beginning	  this	  research	  in	  2014,	  the	  price	  of	  solar	  has	  dropped	  significantly	  
worldwide	  (EIA	  2015),	  including	  the	  cost	  of	  batteries,	  panels,	  inverters,	  etc.	  (Gifford	  
2015).	  In	  addition,	  the	  relative	  shares	  of	  the	  solar	  markets	  held	  by	  various	  countries	  
change	  –	  companies	  in	  China,	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  Germany	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  major	  
players	  and,	  from	  year	  to	  year,	  one	  or	  another	  might	  present	  the	  greatest	  bargain	  to	  
customers	  like	  GP	  or	  MGP.	  In	  places	  like	  Khotang	  and	  the	  hamlets	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  
the	  low	  ability	  to	  pay	  and	  tough	  competition	  with	  other	  electrification	  methods	  
requires	  that	  companies	  in	  any	  specialty	  walk	  a	  fine	  line	  and	  maintain	  only	  a	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minimal	  profit	  margin.	  Failure	  to	  maintain	  that	  balance	  by	  adopting	  appropriate	  
technology,	  financing,	  or	  scale	  can	  result	  in	  long-­‐term	  loss	  of	  profit	  and	  an	  end	  to	  
investment.	  
4.3.3:	  Uttar	  Pradesh:	  Fighting	  for	  Viability	  
For	  the	  first	  years	  of	  operation,	  MGP’s	  model	  was	  heralded	  as	  a	  success	  of	  
appropriate	  clean	  energy	  development,	  and	  the	  company	  grew	  dramatically	  as	  
demand	  increased	  across	  Uttar	  Pradesh.	  More	  recently,	  frequent	  issues	  with	  local	  
collectors,	  the	  falling	  price	  of	  meters,	  changing	  demand,	  and	  external	  pressures	  are	  
forcing	  MGP	  to	  rethink	  its	  model.	  As	  with	  all	  of	  the	  systems	  discussed	  in	  these	  case	  
studies,	  the	  pervasive	  question	  remains:	  is	  this	  model	  the	  answer	  to	  energy	  
development,	  or	  is	  it	  merely	  the	  first	  of	  many	  steps	  in	  a	  rapid	  progression?	  
MGP	  is	  no	  stranger	  to	  iteration:	  they	  experimented	  quantitatively	  with	  
different	  types	  of	  distribution	  systems	  and	  considered	  the	  relative	  benefits	  of	  AC	  
versus	  DC,	  limiting	  current	  versus	  limiting	  appliances,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  one	  aspect	  of	  
their	  projects	  has	  remained	  constant:	  customers	  pay	  a	  flat	  rate	  that	  is	  collected	  in	  
person	  by	  a	  local	  staff	  member.	  While	  this	  was	  done	  to	  reduce	  costs	  and	  avoid	  the	  
perception	  of	  MGP’s	  “otherness,”	  the	  result	  has	  been	  mixed.	  Employing	  local	  
collectors	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  using	  established,	  trusting	  relationships	  to	  maintain	  
the	  financial	  viability	  of	  a	  common	  resource.	  The	  downside	  is	  that	  those	  
relationships	  can	  lead	  to	  lower	  accountability	  among	  customers,	  whether	  in	  the	  
innocent	  form	  of	  leniency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  sympathetic	  collector,	  or	  the	  more	  
egregious	  form	  of	  nepotism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  corrupt	  collector.	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The	  company	  started	  to	  see	  losses	  that,	  though	  minor,	  belied	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
increased	  losses	  as	  the	  scale	  of	  MGP’s	  operation	  increased.	  Though	  the	  majority	  of	  
customers	  pay	  on	  time	  and	  without	  complication,	  enough	  losses	  from	  non-­‐payment	  
reduce	  the	  company’s	  flexibility,	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  them	  to	  scale	  up,	  adopt	  newer	  
technologies,	  implement	  pilot	  projects,	  or	  otherwise	  improve	  their	  operation.	  As	  of	  
2015,	  MGP	  was	  exploring	  meter	  options,	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  device	  that	  would	  
accurately	  track	  individual	  usage	  that	  MGP	  could	  use	  to	  predict	  profits,	  track	  misuse,	  
or	  identify	  truant	  customers.	  Most	  of	  the	  meters	  they	  had	  found	  would	  have	  
increased	  the	  cost	  of	  each	  system	  beyond	  their	  means,	  though	  a	  few	  meters	  out	  of	  
China	  seemed,	  at	  first	  glance,	  to	  be	  promising.	  
Demand	  was	  also	  in	  flux,	  as	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  in	  newly	  electrified	  areas.	  Roughly	  
15%	  of	  MGP’s	  customer	  base	  wanted	  higher	  quality	  power	  to	  run	  bigger	  appliances	  
such	  as	  TVs,	  computers,	  and	  refrigerators.	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  appliances	  require	  
significantly	  greater	  generation	  in	  most	  cases,	  but	  some	  require	  AC	  rather	  than	  DC	  
power.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  price	  increase	  for	  customers	  would	  not	  be	  linear	  with	  the	  
cost	  increase	  of	  these	  additions;	  it	  instead	  increases	  stepwise.	  The	  cost	  of	  MGP’s	  DC	  
system	  was	  kept	  just	  within	  the	  margin	  of	  viability,	  but	  the	  addition	  of	  even	  an	  
inverter,	  or	  higher	  gauge	  wires,	  would	  increase	  the	  cost	  well	  beyond	  feasibility	  even	  
with	  the	  increased	  payment	  from	  the	  higher-­‐paying	  15%.	  Therefore	  MGP	  has	  not	  
been	  able	  to	  get	  any	  other	  system	  design	  to	  pencil	  out,	  and	  has	  instead	  continued	  to	  
provide	  the	  minimal	  service	  demanded	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  customers	  at	  the	  rate	  
they	  are	  willing	  to	  pay.	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Several	  factors	  are	  changing	  this	  equation,	  however.	  The	  cost	  and	  power	  
consumption	  of	  many	  appliances,	  especially	  TVs,	  has	  come	  down	  in	  recent	  years,	  to	  
the	  point	  that	  a	  5.5	  W	  TV	  was	  on	  the	  market	  in	  India	  where,	  a	  few	  years	  before,	  a	  TV	  
below	  50	  W	  was	  almost	  unheard	  of.	  In	  addition,	  the	  several-­‐year	  presence	  of	  basic	  
electricity	  has	  led	  to	  a	  gradual	  but	  positive	  change	  in	  average	  income,	  creating	  more	  
buying	  power	  and	  increasing	  demand	  for	  electricity	  that	  cannot	  be	  met	  with	  the	  
current	  micro-­‐grid.	  The	  15%	  “high	  demand”	  minority	  is	  therefore	  expected	  to	  grow	  
following	  a	  rough	  S-­‐curve	  –	  slow	  initial	  growth	  followed	  by	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  an	  
electrified	  local	  “middle	  class”	  and,	  finally,	  a	  declining	  growth	  rate	  as	  a	  given	  hamlet	  
approaches	  saturation.	  Many	  customers,	  having	  been	  exposed	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  
MGP,	  expect	  the	  company	  to	  provide	  that	  service,	  thus	  requiring	  MGP	  to	  either	  
gradually	  adapt	  their	  current	  grids,	  or	  redesign	  the	  micro-­‐grids	  entirely	  to	  be	  
scalable.	  In	  essence,	  what	  the	  hamlets	  can	  currently	  afford	  is	  something	  akin	  to	  
MGP’s	  micro-­‐grids,	  but	  what	  they	  expect	  in	  the	  not-­‐so-­‐distant	  future	  is	  something	  
more	  akin	  to	  GP’s	  Khotang	  micro-­‐grids.	  
4.3.4:	  Uttar	  Pradesh:	  Conflicts	  of	  Interest	  
A	  third	  factor	  challenges	  MGP’s	  established	  model	  from	  the	  outside:	  other,	  
not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organizations	  also	  aim	  to	  drive	  electricity	  development	  in	  the	  area,	  
sometimes	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  local	  efforts.	  To	  understand	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  issue,	  
consider	  the	  following	  analogy.	  
You	  live	  in	  a	  town	  that	  is	  working	  to	  make	  electric	  cars	  affordable	  for	  its	  
residents.	  It	  is	  a	  poor	  town,	  and	  the	  cars	  you	  are	  collectively	  able	  to	  purchase	  are	  
functional	  and	  meet	  your	  needs,	  but	  are	  not	  the	  high-­‐end.	  Still,	  residents	  are	  largely	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satisfied	  by	  the	  effort,	  and	  increasingly	  more	  are	  purchasing	  one	  of	  these	  cars.	  One	  
day,	  a	  wealthy	  philanthropist	  comes	  to	  town	  and	  donates	  a	  single	  Tesla	  Model	  S	  to	  
one	  of	  your	  neighbors.	  There	  are	  no	  other	  donations	  and,	  once	  the	  wealthy	  
philanthropist	  leaves,	  fully	  believing	  that	  she	  has	  done	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  your	  town	  
and	  the	  world,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  she	  will	  ever	  return.	  
Without	  attributing	  any	  particular	  characteristics	  to	  the	  residents	  of	  this	  
imaginary	  town,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  picture	  the	  fallout	  of	  the	  philanthropist’s	  actions.	  The	  
town’s	  collective	  efforts	  would	  be	  undermined	  by	  newer,	  unrealistic	  expectations,	  
and	  residents	  could	  either	  lose	  faith	  in	  the	  town’s	  initiative	  or	  turn	  on	  the	  project	  
designers	  altogether.	  What	  had	  been	  a	  locally	  driven	  and	  appropriate	  first	  step	  
towards	  greater	  local	  sustainability	  would	  be	  entirely	  wiped	  out,	  or	  at	  least	  
weakened.	  The	  philanthropist’s	  action,	  which	  seemed	  like	  a	  net	  positive	  for	  the	  
community,	  would	  end	  up	  being	  a	  net	  negative.	  
In	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  well	  within	  MGP’s	  operating	  “territory”	  (referring	  more	  to	  
an	  area	  of	  influence	  than	  an	  economic	  monopoly,	  though	  MGP	  is	  the	  largest	  
employer	  in	  the	  region),	  an	  outside	  project	  developer	  has	  installed	  a	  single,	  high-­‐
quality,	  donor-­‐funded	  micro-­‐grid	  that	  provides	  24/7	  AC	  power.	  The	  project	  
required	  minimal	  local	  buy-­‐in	  yet	  provides	  maximum	  service,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  
nearby	  customers	  paying	  for	  MGP’s	  limited	  services.	  The	  donor	  funding	  came	  from	  
CSR	  (Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility)	  money,	  or	  money	  that	  large	  corporations	  and	  
businesses	  are	  legally	  mandated	  to	  invest	  in	  community	  development.	  While	  this	  
funding	  is	  sustainable	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  its	  use	  for	  rural	  micro-­‐grids	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  
is	  uncertain.	  CSR	  money	  often	  goes	  towards	  highly	  visible	  flagship	  projects	  rather	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than	  towards	  iterating	  successful	  projects	  over	  a	  large	  area.	  Therefore	  MGP’s	  
customers,	  though	  aware	  of	  the	  high	  quality	  system	  nearby,	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  receive	  
anything	  similar.	  
Instead,	  customers	  will	  look	  to	  MGP	  to	  match	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  island	  AC	  
micro-­‐grid,	  and	  to	  do	  it	  for	  the	  same	  cost	  to	  ratepayers,	  an	  impossible	  order.	  Though	  
MGP	  got	  its	  start	  with	  the	  help	  of	  outside	  investment,	  its	  current	  business	  model	  is	  
now	  sustained	  by	  its	  electricity	  rates	  rather	  than	  donor	  funds	  and,	  as	  discussed	  
previously,	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  scaling	  up	  its	  systems	  does	  not	  pencil	  out.	  
The	  new	  donor-­‐funded	  micro-­‐grid	  has	  increased	  local	  expectations	  without	  
increasing	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  leaving	  MGP	  with	  a	  dissatisfied	  customer	  base	  and	  the	  
risk	  of	  revolt	  in	  the	  form	  of	  withheld	  payments	  (“My	  neighbor	  pays	  half	  of	  what	  I	  
pay	  and	  receives	  superior	  service	  –	  why	  should	  I	  continue	  paying	  you?”)	  or	  stagnant	  
growth.	  
Businesses	  in	  general	  are	  no	  strangers	  to	  these	  type	  of	  challenges	  –	  
unbalanced	  competition,	  changing	  demand,	  fluctuations	  in	  source	  material	  market	  –	  
and	  a	  smart	  business	  manager	  or	  project	  developer	  keeps	  a	  close	  eye	  on	  each	  factor	  
and	  adapts	  when	  necessary.	  At	  some	  point	  the	  financial	  situation	  will	  be	  right	  for	  
MGP	  to	  transition	  to	  expanded	  service	  to	  meet	  higher	  individual	  demand;	  
willingness	  to	  pay	  will	  increase,	  and	  component	  costs	  will	  decrease,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  
inverters,	  high-­‐gauge	  wires,	  and	  meters	  are	  affordable	  given	  the	  expected	  buy-­‐in.	  
4.3.5:	  Rural	  Nepal	  and	  Rural	  India:	  The	  Terai	  
Directly	  North	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  across	  the	  border,	  is	  Nepal’s	  Terai	  region.	  
The	  southernmost	  of	  three	  geographical	  regions	  –	  the	  hill	  and	  then	  Himal	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(mountain)	  regions	  follow	  to	  the	  north	  –	  the	  Terai	  is	  the	  most	  similar	  to	  Uttar	  
Pradesh.	  Its	  low-­‐lying,	  humid	  plains	  support	  Nepal’s	  agricultural	  base,	  and	  much	  of	  
the	  population	  is	  densely	  concentrated	  in	  hamlets	  and	  serf-­‐like	  villages	  around	  large	  
agricultural	  estates.	  The	  population	  here	  has	  some	  of	  Nepal’s	  greatest	  income	  
inequality,	  with	  estate	  managers	  at	  the	  top	  and	  serf-­‐like	  laborers	  at	  the	  bottom.	  The	  
electricity	  situation	  is	  no	  less	  segregated;	  the	  national	  grid	  follows	  major	  
thoroughfares,	  reaching	  estate	  homes	  but	  not	  the	  laborers’	  villages.	  In	  one	  case	  
relayed	  by	  one	  of	  GP’s	  engineers,	  the	  grid	  serves	  an	  estate	  house,	  but	  the	  estate	  
owner	  refuses	  to	  extend	  the	  distribution	  lines	  across	  his	  property	  to	  his	  employees’	  
village	  barely	  a	  hundred	  meters	  away	  (GP	  2015).	  
In	  2014	  Nepal’s	  AEPC	  approached	  MGP	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  as	  well	  as	  GP	  in	  
Kathmandu,	  about	  exploring	  micro-­‐grid	  options	  for	  these	  communities.	  In	  2015,	  a	  
small	  MGP	  team	  visited	  Nepal	  to	  meet	  with	  GP	  and	  tour	  the	  Terai.	  The	  initial	  
assumption	  was	  that,	  given	  the	  relative	  poverty	  and	  high	  density	  of	  the	  Terai	  
villages,	  MGP’s	  micro-­‐grid	  model	  was	  more	  appropriate	  than	  GP’s.	  But	  when	  the	  
team	  returned	  to	  Kathmandu	  from	  their	  visit,	  the	  consensus	  was	  that	  neither	  would	  
be	  optimal.	  One	  GP	  engineer,	  after	  visiting	  a	  proposed	  Terai	  village	  several	  weeks	  
earlier	  (he	  had	  intended	  to	  visit	  all	  five	  AEPC	  proposed	  sites,	  but	  a	  national	  strike	  
stranded	  him	  in	  one	  village	  for	  a	  week	  instead),	  confessed	  that	  he	  had	  not	  even	  felt	  
comfortable	  asking	  villagers	  about	  their	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  so	  obvious	  was	  their	  
poverty.	  
The	  villages	  could	  not	  afford	  GP’s	  grid-­‐quality	  micro-­‐grid,	  but	  they	  also	  were	  
not	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  MGP’s	  cheaper	  yet	  limited	  services.	  Residents	  had	  long	  been	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exposed	  to	  high	  quality	  electricity	  service	  while	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  NEA	  grid	  
and	  wealthy	  employers,	  and	  they	  were	  not	  keen	  to	  settle	  for	  basic	  lighting	  and	  
phone	  charging.	  In	  addition,	  the	  AEPC	  had	  already	  promoted	  SHSs	  in	  the	  area,	  and	  
residents	  could	  get	  similar	  service	  through	  those	  systems	  without	  the	  hassle	  of	  
collectively	  managing	  a	  community	  micro-­‐grid.	  
The	  Terai	  represents	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  national	  grid	  expansion	  may	  be	  the	  
best	  option	  for	  electrifying	  otherwise	  rural	  areas.	  The	  geography	  of	  the	  region	  does	  
not	  present	  a	  physical	  challenge	  to	  expanding	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  lines,	  
unlike	  in	  the	  hill	  and	  Himal	  regions,	  and	  the	  higher	  population	  density	  ensures	  the	  
NEA	  a	  more	  robust	  ROI.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  opportunity	  for	  mid-­‐scale	  generation	  in	  the	  
region;	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  hydro	  expansion	  in	  the	  hill	  region,	  biomass	  from	  
agricultural	  waste	  could	  be	  used	  in	  gasifiers	  or	  thermal	  power	  plants	  to	  generate	  
locally.	  Micro-­‐grids	  still	  may	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  Terai	  where	  the	  NEA	  grid	  is	  
still	  absent	  and	  communities	  could	  either	  afford	  a	  GP-­‐style	  system	  or	  benefit	  from	  a	  
MGP-­‐style	  system.	  
4.4:	  Tanzania	  
In	  the	  last	  40	  years	  Tanzania	  has	  experienced	  severe	  and	  recurring	  
droughts	  with	  devastating	  effects	  to	  agriculture,	  water	  and	  energy	  sectors.	  
Currently	  more	  than	  70%	  of	  all	  natural	  disasters	  in	  Tanzania	  are	  climate	  change	  
related	  and	  are	  linked	  to	  recurrent	  droughts	  and	  floods.	  …An	  initial	  estimate	  of	  
immediate	  and	  start-­‐up	  financing	  needs	  for	  enhancing	  adaptive	  capacity	  is	  about	  
USD	  150	  million.	  In	  addition,	  about	  USD	  500	  million	  per	  year	  is	  needed	  to	  address	  
climate	  change	  adaptation	  and	  building	  resilience	  up	  to	  2020,	  increasing	  up	  to	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USD	  1	  billion	  per	  year	  by	  2030.	  These	  costs	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  further	  depending	  
on	  global	  mitigation	  efforts.	  Estimated	  costs	  are	  up	  to	  USD	  60	  billion	  by	  2030	  in	  
mitigation	  investments	  in	  Tanzania.	  
-­‐Tanzania	  INDC,	  submitted	  to	  UNFCCC	  2015	  
	  
Tanzania	  submitted	  its	  INDC	  (Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contribution)	  
in	  advance	  of	  the	  Paris	  COP21	  climate	  negotiations,	  at	  once	  predicting	  the	  effects	  of	  
unmitigated	  climate	  change,	  quantifying	  its	  own	  negligible	  contribution	  to	  carbon	  
pollution,	  and	  estimating	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  adapting	  to	  and	  mitigating	  the	  effects.	  
To	  give	  some	  context,	  Tanzania’s	  GDP	  is	  USD	  50	  billion	  which,	  per	  capita,	  falls	  
roughly	  between	  Nepal	  (lower)	  and	  India	  (higher)	  (IMF	  2015).	  The	  country	  could	  
not	  fund	  its	  own	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation	  efforts	  without	  dismantling	  its	  economy.	  
The	  INDC	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  “every	  annual	  event	  has	  economic	  costs	  in	  excess	  
of	  1%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  occurs	  frequently,	  reducing	  long-­‐term	  growth	  and	  affecting	  
millions	  of	  people	  and	  their	  livelihoods”	  (2015).	  In	  a	  country	  where	  over	  75%	  of	  the	  
population	  is	  engaged	  in	  agriculture	  in	  some	  capacity	  (Feed	  the	  Future	  2016),	  and	  
about	  37%	  of	  installed	  electricity	  capacity	  is	  hydroelectric,	  more	  frequent	  and	  
intense	  droughts	  and	  floods	  are	  more	  than	  just	  a	  newsworthy	  nuisance.	  
But	  Tanzania’s	  direct	  climate	  challenges,	  along	  with	  its	  neighbors’,	  are	  just	  
the	  most	  recent	  manifestation	  of	  decades	  of	  misguided	  development	  efforts	  by	  the	  
West	  following	  centuries	  of	  exploitation.	  Energy	  developers	  naturally	  operate	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  economic	  crisis,	  and	  therefore	  the	  country’s	  
development	  history.	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Though	  it	  gained	  independence	  as	  Tanganyika	  in	  1961,	  Tanzania’s	  period	  of	  
self-­‐determination	  was	  brief	  and,	  in	  many	  respects,	  has	  yet	  to	  begin.	  With	  a	  difficult	  
economic	  starting	  point	  and	  the	  fallout	  of	  Nyerere’s	  socialist	  policies,	  Tanzania	  has	  
been	  a	  recipient	  of	  foreign	  aid	  for	  decades,	  a	  fact	  that	  by	  Western	  expectations	  
should	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  well	  on	  its	  way	  to	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  But	  with	  aid	  comes	  
demands,	  and	  the	  West,	  particularly	  the	  U.S.,	  has	  required	  numerous	  “structural	  
adjustments”	  from	  the	  Tanzanian	  government,	  often	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  
government’s	  own	  initiatives.	  Even	  aid	  money	  itself	  is	  not	  completely	  in	  the	  
recipient’s	  hands:	  the	  U.S.	  requires	  that	  roughly	  three	  quarters	  of	  money	  sent	  
abroad	  be	  circulated	  back	  into	  the	  U.S.	  economy,	  more	  than	  double	  the	  rate	  of	  next	  
highest	  required	  percentage	  (Canada’s).	  
A	  recent	  iteration	  of	  this	  was	  the	  Africa	  Trade	  Bill,	  which	  passed	  the	  U.S.	  
Congress	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  “liberalize	  trade	  and	  investment	  flows	  between	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  Africa”	  (Easterly	  2006,	  217).	  Despite	  its	  many	  good	  intentions	  and	  
provisions,	  the	  bill	  contained	  a	  few	  quid	  pro	  quos,	  as	  Easterly	  goes	  on	  to	  explain:	  
	  
...	   it	   comes	   with	   the	   usual	   conditions:	   reducing	   social	   spending,	  
corporate	   taxes	   and	   agricultural	   subsidies,	   opening	   all	   sectors	   to	   foreign	  
investment,	  emphasizing	  export	  crops	  over	  local	  production	  of	  staple	  foods,	  
and	  privatization	  of	  public	  assets.	  Many	  African	  countries	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  
join	  the	  WTO,	  but	  this	  bill	  requires	  participating	  countries	  to	  join.	  It	  does	  not	  
incorporate	   policies	   requested	   by	   the	   Africans:	   debt	   relief,	   sovereignty	   in	  
determining	   economic	   and	   social	   policies,	   and	   financial	   compensation	   for	  
historic	  exploitation	  of	  Africa	  (2006).	  
	   112	  
	  
Tanzania’s	  energy	  development,	  as	  well,	  is	  guided	  by	  similar	  stipulations,	  
sometimes	  in	  ways	  that	  favor	  Western	  infrastructure	  firms	  and	  energy	  markets	  over	  
local	  resources.	  Though	  this	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  appropriate	  energy	  development,	  
it	  may	  also	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  small-­‐scale,	  market-­‐driven	  projects	  to	  fill	  the	  
mitigation	  gap	  that	  the	  government	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  address	  itself.	  
Given	  its	  currently	  negligible	  contribution	  to	  climate	  change	  –	  0.2	  mtCO2e	  
per	  capita,	  compared	  to	  17.0	  mtCO2e	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (World	  Bank	  2015)	  –	  as	  
well	  as	  its	  low	  resilience	  to	  climate	  effects,	  Tanzania’s	  government	  could	  be	  forced	  
to	  lean	  more	  towards	  funding	  adaptation	  measures	  than	  mitigation.	  Relieving	  
drought-­‐stricken	  areas	  and	  shoring	  up	  its	  energy	  supply	  with	  more	  climate-­‐
independent	  sources	  will	  have	  to	  take	  precedence	  over	  updating	  its	  grid	  or	  
exploring	  expensive	  pilot	  energy	  projects.	  But,	  as	  in	  dozens	  of	  countries	  facing	  
similar	  prospects,	  Tanzania’s	  minefield	  of	  challenges	  does	  conceal	  a	  delicate	  but	  
very	  real	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  sustainable	  energy	  development,	  even	  in	  rural	  
areas.	  
The	  national	  grid	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  undergo	  major	  reform	  any	  time	  soon:	  just	  
under	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  country	  –	  18.4%	  overall,	  closer	  to	  14%	  in	  rural	  areas	  –	  was	  
electrified	  as	  of	  2014,	  mostly	  by	  Tanzania’s	  parastatal	  utility	  TANESCO	  (Tanzanian	  
Electric	  Supply	  Company	  Limited,	  under	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Minerals).	  The	  
utility’s	  15%	  annual	  growth	  rate	  (EIA	  2015)	  has	  focused	  more	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  as	  
hydro	  resources	  face	  increasing	  difficulty	  from	  droughts	  and	  floods.	  Tanzania’s	  
INDC	  promises	  to	  decrease	  overall	  emissions	  10-­‐20%	  below	  BAU	  in	  the	  coming	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years	  (2015),	  but	  BAU	  is	  a	  trend,	  not	  a	  single	  point	  in	  time,	  and	  still	  involves	  a	  
dramatic	  increase	  in	  natural	  gas	  fired	  power	  plants	  (Kichonge	  2014).	  On	  top	  of	  the	  
challenges	  of	  load	  shedding,	  climate	  effects	  on	  hydro,	  and	  expanding	  a	  highly	  
inefficient	  grid	  (23%	  line	  losses	  on	  average),	  TANESCO	  was	  also	  awarded	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  handling	  rural	  electrification,	  which	  it	  later	  delegated	  to	  a	  separate	  
agency	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  government	  support	  (Zerriffi	  2010;	  Smith	  2008).	  It	  is	  in	  rural	  
electrification	  that	  Tanzania	  will	  see,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  its	  future	  emissions	  and	  
economic	  growth.	  
The	  government’s	  earlier	  lack	  of	  support	  for,	  or	  really	  attention	  to,	  rural	  
electrification	  efforts	  contributed	  to	  the	  confusion	  that	  the	  sector	  faces	  today.	  
Rather	  than	  a	  concerted,	  policy-­‐supported	  drive	  to	  thoughtfully	  electrify	  Tanzania’s	  
rural	  majority,	  the	  recent	  effort	  has	  been	  a	  mix	  of	  for-­‐profit	  businesses	  selling	  solar	  
appliances,	  NGOs	  and	  non-­‐profits	  installing	  islanded	  systems	  under	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
financial	  mechanisms	  (and	  an	  equally	  wide	  range	  of	  success),	  and	  individual	  
residents	  gradually	  building	  their	  own	  systems	  as	  incremental	  profits	  have	  fed	  
incremental	  additions.	  
This	  paper	  opened	  with	  a	  brief	  anecdote	  from	  the	  author’s	  experience	  in	  the	  
village	  of	  Luhunga,	  in	  the	  highland	  region	  of	  Iringa;	  this	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  case	  example	  
of	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  electrification	  in	  a	  rural	  community	  far	  from	  the	  national	  
grid.	  
4.4.1:	  Rural	  Tanzania:	  Luhunga,	  Iringa	  
The	  description	  of	  Luhunga	  as	  “far”	  from	  the	  grid	  may	  be	  a	  misleading;	  the	  
grid	  dead-­‐ends	  in	  several	  villages	  within	  walking	  distance.	  Two	  hours	  to	  the	  North	  is	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the	  village	  of	  Mdabulo,	  as	  much	  of	  a	  commercial	  hub	  as	  the	  fringe	  collection	  of	  
villages	  can	  claim.	  It	  is	  the	  terminus	  of	  a	  TANESCO	  transmission	  spur	  and,	  day	  or	  
night,	  electric	  light	  and	  loud	  music	  spill	  out	  into	  its	  main	  road	  from	  shops,	  clubs,	  and	  
one	  particularly	  music-­‐heavy	  barbershop.	  Four	  hours	  through	  tea	  plantations	  to	  the	  
West	  from	  Luhunga	  is	  Sawala,	  one	  of	  several	  larger	  villages	  along	  the	  district’s	  Loop	  
Road,	  which	  snakes	  out	  from	  the	  A104,	  Tanzania’s	  main	  corridor	  to	  the	  South.	  
Sawala,	  itself	  several	  hours	  by	  bus	  from	  the	  paved	  highway,	  also	  bears	  the	  telltale	  
signs	  of	  recent	  electrification	  and	  the	  resulting	  burgeoning	  population.	  An	  
impossible	  web	  of	  wires	  crisscrosses	  its	  way	  from	  building	  to	  building	  along	  the	  
village’s	  densest	  axis;	  each	  of	  the	  dozens	  of	  shops	  accurately	  advertises	  electricity	  
with	  colorful	  LEDs,	  radios,	  and	  TVs	  showing	  Tanzanian	  soap	  operas.	  
If	  Sawala	  and	  Mdabulo	  represent	  where	  villages	  are	  headed,	  Luhunga	  
represents	  their	  origin.	  With	  a	  14.2%	  rural	  electrification	  rate,	  and	  a	  poverty	  ratio	  
well	  over	  34%	  (the	  national	  poverty	  ratio),	  Tanzania’s	  70%	  rural	  population	  will	  be	  
long	  in	  awaiting	  TANESCO	  grid	  extension	  (IMF	  2015).	  Communities	  are	  thus	  left	  to	  
their	  own	  devices,	  often	  without	  assistance	  or	  direction	  from	  energy	  organizations.	  
In	  some	  ways,	  the	  evolution	  of	  energy	  resources	  in	  these	  off-­‐grid	  areas	  could	  be	  
considered	  analogous	  to	  incomplete	  Western	  energy	  development	  on	  steroids.	  
The	  biomass	  that	  fueled	  the	  country’s	  needs	  through	  most	  of	  its	  history	  and	  
that	  led,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  colonial	  agriculture,	  to	  widespread	  deforestation,	  is	  still	  
in	  wide	  use.	  In	  Luhunga,	  people	  cook	  exclusively	  with	  firewood	  or	  charcoal,	  both	  
sourced	  in	  the	  surrounding,	  dwindling	  rainforest.	  Firewood	  harvesting	  is	  a	  daily	  
chore	  for	  women	  and	  girls,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  poor	  or	  displaced	  boys,	  and	  is	  locally	  
	   115	  
understood	  as	  one	  of	  the	  more	  dangerous	  activities	  because	  of	  rape.	  Firewood	  has	  
the	  distinct	  advantage	  of	  being	  free;	  charcoal,	  though	  also	  labor-­‐intensive	  and	  
seasonal,	  is	  moderately	  affordable	  and	  far	  more	  efficient.	  A	  100-­‐litre	  gunia	  of	  
charcoal	  could	  cost	  between	  Tsh	  5,000	  and	  10,000	  (USD	  2.50	  to	  4.50),	  depending	  on	  
scarcity,	  and	  could	  last	  a	  household	  for	  a	  month	  (exchange	  based	  on	  Feb,	  2016	  
rates).	  
Lighting	  is	  provided	  by	  a	  mix	  of	  candles	  (less	  popular),	  kerosene	  lamps	  
(more	  popular),	  pressure	  lamps	  (briefly	  popular	  and	  then	  nearly	  extinct)	  and,	  more	  
recently,	  battery/solar-­‐powered	  LEDs.	  Despite	  their	  low	  quality	  –	  Chinese	  has	  
replaced	  kishenzi	  in	  the	  lexicon	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  “cheap”	  or	  “low	  quality”	  products	  –	  
the	  LED	  lights	  quickly	  became	  popular	  for	  their	  unprecedented	  efficiency	  and	  
accessibility	  everywhere	  from	  city	  shops	  to	  rural	  traveling	  markets.	  
The	  ubiquity	  of	  electric	  appliances	  in	  un-­‐electrified	  villages,	  even	  before	  the	  
emergence	  of	  LEDs	  on	  the	  market,	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  mobile	  phones.	  Leap-­‐
frogging	  landlines	  (in	  much	  the	  way	  RETs	  are	  expected	  to	  leap-­‐frog	  fossil	  fuels	  in	  
rural	  electrification),	  mobile	  phones	  rapidly	  cornered	  the	  communication	  market	  in	  
Tanzania,	  creating	  a	  sudden	  demand	  for	  charging	  capability	  in	  every	  corner	  of	  the	  
country.	  Local	  entrepreneurs	  responded	  quickly	  and	  creatively,	  repurposing	  
motorcycle	  batteries	  and	  discarded	  wires	  in	  homemade,	  decidedly	  not-­‐to-­‐code,	  
charging	  stations.	  Owners	  would	  charge	  phones	  for	  a	  few	  hundred	  Tsh	  and,	  when	  
the	  batteries	  ran	  out,	  would	  give	  them	  to	  the	  bus	  conductors	  on	  their	  way	  to	  town.	  
The	  conductors	  would	  charge	  the	  batteries	  on	  the	  grid	  in	  town,	  return	  them	  to	  the	  
owners	  in	  the	  village,	  and	  collect	  a	  small	  fee	  for	  their	  efforts.	  Business	  success,	  in	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this	  capacity	  or	  any	  other,	  often	  led	  to	  purchasing	  a	  small	  solar	  panel,	  thereby	  
solidifying	  an	  owner’s	  place	  in	  the	  charging	  market.	  
These	  battery	  stations	  joined	  diesel	  generators	  as	  the	  source	  of	  “quality”	  
power	  in	  the	  village.	  While	  the	  generators	  could	  power	  the	  heavy	  AC	  appliances,	  like	  
the	  TV	  in	  the	  local	  guesthouse	  or	  the	  sound	  system	  that	  the	  school	  rented	  for	  special	  
functions,	  batteries	  provided	  other	  services.	  A	  barber	  shop	  offered	  the	  requisite	  
haircut	  to	  local	  students,	  local	  shops	  stayed	  open	  late	  without	  burning	  through	  their	  
own	  stocks	  of	  candles	  and	  kerosene,	  and	  mobile	  phone	  charging	  grew	  into	  an	  
established	  business	  model	  complete	  with	  competitive	  pricing	  and	  growing	  
demand.	  
The	  first	  major	  electrification	  effort	  came	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  and	  is	  prefaced	  
in	  the	  opening	  paragraphs	  of	  this	  paper.	  The	  UK-­‐based	  solar	  NGO,	  on	  
recommendation	  from	  a	  nearby	  British	  NGO	  and	  invitation	  from	  the	  school,	  
installed	  a	  three-­‐panel	  array,	  inverter,	  and	  battery	  bank	  on	  the	  roof	  of	  the	  local	  
secondary	  school.	  The	  roughly	  360	  W	  system	  powered	  three	  outlets	  in	  the	  school	  
office,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  CFL	  bulbs	  in	  each	  of	  five	  classrooms.	  The	  original	  plan	  was	  to	  
provide	  light	  to	  students	  during	  evening	  “prep”	  time,	  and	  power	  to	  the	  office	  in	  the	  
eventuality	  of	  using	  a	  computer.	  
The	  solar	  NGO’s	  model	  required	  that	  the	  school	  pay	  back	  10%	  of	  the	  Tsh	  
10,000,000	  installation	  cost,	  which	  amounted	  to	  Tsh	  1,000,000	  or	  about	  USD	  800	  at	  
the	  time.	  Project	  designers	  argued	  that	  the	  school	  could	  tap	  into	  the	  mobile	  charging	  
market,	  charging	  Tsh	  300	  per	  phone,	  over	  a	  dozen	  phones	  a	  day,	  and	  pay	  the	  system	  
off	  over	  a	  year	  or	  two.	  The	  10%	  payment	  clearly	  would	  not	  sustain	  the	  NGO’s	  efforts,	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especially	  with	  a	  largely	  European	  staff	  requiring	  Western	  salaries	  and	  lifestyles.	  
The	  repayment	  was	  mainly	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  community	  bought	  
into	  the	  system	  and	  felt	  responsibility	  for	  its	  success,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  source	  
of	  income	  for	  the	  school.	  The	  remaining	  90%	  or	  more	  of	  the	  funding	  came	  from	  
donors.	  	  
This	  model	  had	  become	  dominant	  in	  the	  world	  of	  the	  development	  project	  at	  
the	  time:	  poor	  communities	  that	  could	  never	  afford	  the	  upfront	  cost	  would	  still	  be	  
able	  to	  access	  electricity,	  they	  would	  have	  some	  level	  of	  much-­‐celebrated	  local	  
ownership	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  they	  would	  be	  free	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  newfound	  
business	  opportunities	  that	  the	  project	  provided.	  In	  theory	  it	  seemed	  ideal.	  The	  
school	  should	  have	  been	  able	  to	  make	  back	  the	  10%	  within	  a	  year	  or	  two	  with	  room	  
to	  spare,	  and	  then	  gone	  on	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  25-­‐year	  lifetime	  
of	  the	  system,	  minus	  expenditures	  like	  battery	  and	  bulb	  replacements.	  The	  profit	  
should	  have	  gone	  to	  expand	  the	  system	  in	  a	  feedback	  loop,	  thereby	  growing	  the	  
service	  exponentially.	  Once	  grown	  the	  school	  should	  have	  leased	  the	  system	  
additions	  to	  neighbors,	  powered	  a	  computer	  lab,	  hired	  new	  teachers…	  the	  sky	  
should	  have	  been	  the	  limit.	  Instead,	  after	  two	  years,	  the	  NGO	  was	  threatening	  the	  
school	  with	  system	  recall	  due	  to	  non-­‐payment,	  the	  batteries	  were	  all	  but	  depleted,	  
and	  only	  a	  few	  of	  the	  original	  switches	  and	  bulbs	  remained	  intact	  in	  the	  classrooms.	  
As	  far	  as	  anyone	  communicated	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  NGO’s	  model	  was	  excellent.	  
After	  Tanzanian	  technicians	  installed	  the	  system,	  they	  instructed	  the	  teachers	  on	  the	  
proper	  discharge	  depth	  of	  the	  batteries	  (50%,	  indicated	  on	  the	  charge	  controller)	  
before	  the	  system	  should	  be	  turned	  off,	  and	  even	  provided	  educational	  materials	  to	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use	  in	  the	  classroom.	  The	  school	  designated	  one	  teacher	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  
monitoring	  the	  system,	  instructed	  its	  staff	  to	  collect	  fees	  for	  charging	  phones,	  and	  
elected	  a	  contact	  person	  with	  whom	  the	  NGO	  would	  stay	  in	  touch.	  In	  addition	  the	  
school	  hired	  a	  second	  night	  watchman	  specifically	  to	  protect	  the	  new	  system.	  
Petty	  theft	  is	  common	  enough	  in	  the	  village	  and	  almost	  never	  involves	  direct	  
conflict,	  while	  grander	  theft	  is	  rare	  and	  is	  almost	  always	  met	  with	  strong	  retribution.	  
Three	  local	  men	  who	  had	  stolen	  from	  and	  then	  burned	  a	  fabric	  shop	  were	  caught	  
and	  punished	  by	  having	  their	  eyes	  removed,	  being	  burned	  at	  the	  stake,	  and	  then	  
being	  beheaded,	  their	  bodies	  left	  in	  the	  road	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  other	  would-­‐be	  thieves.	  
Another	  man	  had	  hired	  primary	  school	  students	  to	  steal	  bags	  of	  cement	  from	  the	  
school	  construction	  project,	  and	  he	  fled	  the	  village	  as	  soon	  as	  neighbors	  got	  wind	  
that	  he	  might	  be	  responsible.	  The	  shear	  reputation	  surrounding	  theft	  in	  the	  village	  
was	  likely	  enough	  to	  keep	  the	  main	  components	  –	  batteries,	  inverter,	  and	  panels	  –	  
safe.	  Smaller	  components	  –	  switches,	  sockets,	  and	  bulbs	  –	  were	  easier	  to	  steal	  and	  
less	  likely	  to	  be	  missed,	  and	  no	  one	  ever	  discovered	  who	  stole	  them.	  One	  morning	  
the	  teachers	  found	  a	  Seussian	  stack	  of	  chairs	  in	  one	  of	  the	  classrooms,	  and	  several	  of	  
the	  CFL	  bulbs	  missing.	  
Teachers	  at	  the	  time	  speculated	  that	  the	  theft	  was	  not	  done	  out	  of	  a	  great	  
understanding	  of	  likely	  profit.	  The	  benefits	  didn’t	  outweigh	  the	  risks	  in	  this	  case:	  
switch	  casings,	  plastic	  conduit,	  and	  CFL	  bulbs	  do	  not	  fetch	  a	  high	  price	  on	  the	  black	  
market,	  especially	  not	  when	  simpler	  alternatives	  exist.	  CFLs	  especially	  did	  not	  
compete	  with	  the	  more	  versatile,	  efficient	  LEDs.	  Instead,	  the	  reason	  seemed	  to	  lie	  in	  
the	  perception	  of	  these	  devices.	  In	  a	  village	  that	  had	  never	  seen	  these	  components	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before,	  their	  “developed”	  appearance,	  especially	  to	  younger	  children	  who	  would	  
have	  needed	  a	  stack	  of	  chairs	  to	  reach	  the	  roof	  beams,	  might	  have	  drawn	  attention	  
more	  than	  knowledge	  of	  their	  actual	  worth.	  But	  theft	  was	  the	  least	  of	  the	  problems;	  
the	  school	  could,	  and	  did,	  replace	  those	  components	  with	  little	  additional	  trouble.	  
The	  system’s	  gradual	  degradation	  resulted,	  rather,	  from	  misuse.	  
4.4.2:	  Luhunga:	  System	  Misuse	  
Physically,	  the	  weak	  point	  in	  the	  system	  was	  the	  batteries	  –	  not	  because	  they	  
were	  low	  quality,	  but	  because	  batteries	  are	  most	  susceptible	  to	  misuse	  and	  
therefore	  the	  canary	  in	  the	  coal	  mine	  when	  operation	  is	  sub-­‐par.	  Lithium	  Ion	  (Li-­‐
ion)	  batteries	  do	  not	  technically	  have	  a	  maximum	  depth	  of	  discharge	  (MDoD),	  
meaning	  they	  can	  be	  discharged	  fully	  and	  still	  function	  properly,	  as	  a	  opposed	  to	  
lead-­‐acid	  batteries	  which	  may	  have	  a	  30%	  or	  so	  MDoD.	  The	  capacity	  of	  the	  battery	  
(in	  kWh),	  however,	  is	  reduced	  over	  time,	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  reduction	  is	  accelerated	  by	  
deeper	  discharge.	  A	  100	  Wh	  Li-­‐ion	  battery,	  for	  example,	  could	  potentially	  provide	  
the	  whole	  100	  Wh	  if	  needed.	  But	  the	  chemical	  strain	  on	  the	  electrolyte	  and	  exchange	  
membranes	  from	  maximum	  discharge	  reduces	  the	  battery’s	  overall	  capacity.	  The	  
next	  time	  the	  battery	  charges,	  it	  might	  only	  acquire	  99	  Wh,	  then	  98	  Wh,	  and	  so	  on.	  
Anyone	  selling	  or	  installing	  a	  battery	  will	  recommend	  a	  MDoD	  to	  the	  
operator	  in	  order	  to	  optimize	  the	  performance	  and	  lifetime.	  A	  lead-­‐acid	  battery	  with	  
a	  30%	  MDoD	  can	  provide	  30%	  of	  its	  total	  capacity	  before	  recharge	  is	  recommended	  
or	  the	  battery	  performance	  degrades.	  Li-­‐ion	  batters	  typically	  carry	  a	  recommended	  
MDoD	  of	  80%,	  a	  significant	  improvement	  over	  lead-­‐acid.	  The	  challenge	  to	  operators	  
is	  to	  know	  when	  the	  battery	  has	  reached	  this	  point.	  It	  is	  not	  actually	  possible	  to	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measure	  the	  instantaneous	  kWh	  charge	  of	  a	  battery,	  and	  so	  the	  most	  that	  solar	  
systems	  can	  do	  is	  guess,	  either	  manually	  or	  digitally.	  
Many	  charge	  controllers	  now	  take	  automatic	  voltage	  readings	  on	  the	  battery	  
in	  order	  to	  estimate	  its	  instantaneous	  charge.	  The	  voltage	  changes	  slightly	  and	  non-­‐
linearly	  as	  the	  battery	  is	  discharged;	  by	  comparing	  the	  instantaneous	  voltage	  to	  the	  
characteristic	  charge/discharge	  curve	  (the	  two	  curves	  are	  different),	  the	  charge	  
controller	  can	  get	  a	  decent	  estimate	  of	  the	  current	  charge	  (kWh)	  remaining	  on	  the	  
battery	  (See	  Figure	  4.1	  for	  examples	  of	  discharge	  curves;	  charging	  follows	  a	  similar	  
pattern	  with	  typically	  a	  higher	  intermediate	  voltage).	  If	  a	  MDoD	  is	  programmed	  into	  
the	  charge	  controller,	  it	  can	  automatically	  shut	  off	  the	  system,	  or	  at	  least	  provide	  a	  
warning	  to	  the	  operator,	  when	  the	  battery	  is	  getting	  too	  low	  for	  comfort.	  This	  keeps	  
systems	  safe	  and	  makes	  operators	  less	  responsible	  for	  effects	  that	  they	  likely	  do	  not	  
understand.	  Luhunga’s	  situation,	  though,	  was	  different.	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Figure	  4.1:	  Characteristic	  Discharge	  Curves,	  Example	  (Electropaedia,	  2016)	  
	  
When	  the	  Luhunga	  Secondary	  School	  solar	  system	  came	  online,	  most	  charge	  
controllers	  did	  not	  automatically	  shut	  off	  the	  system	  upon	  reaching	  the	  MDoD,	  
leaving	  the	  operator(s)	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  monitoring.	  In	  Luhunga,	  this	  fell	  to	  the	  
teachers,	  who	  had	  access	  to	  the	  charge	  controller	  and	  outlets.	  The	  office	  rule	  
(whether	  official	  or	  de	  facto)	  was	  that	  teachers	  could	  charge	  their	  phones	  or	  
otherwise	  make	  use	  of	  the	  outlets	  for	  free.	  The	  practice	  quickly	  expanded	  to	  include	  
charging	  friends’	  and	  families’	  phones	  as	  well,	  and	  then	  the	  phones	  of	  favored	  
students,	  without	  demanding	  the	  customary	  Tsh	  300	  fee.	  During	  the	  days	  of	  the	  dry	  
season,	  the	  system	  was	  able	  to	  handle	  the	  load	  without	  trouble.	  But	  during	  the	  rainy	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season	  or	  at	  night,	  the	  heavy	  use	  from	  phone	  charging	  often	  drew	  the	  batteries	  
down	  well	  below	  50%,	  the	  MDoD	  recommended	  by	  the	  NGO.	  
The	  effect	  was	  gradual	  but	  noticeable	  to	  those	  keeping	  track.	  Unaware	  of	  the	  
causes,	  students	  saw	  their	  evening	  prep	  time	  reduced,	  minute	  by	  minute,	  until	  a	  
rainy	  season	  prep	  period	  would	  last	  one	  hour	  of	  the	  original	  three,	  and	  a	  half	  hour	  of	  
sun	  the	  next	  morning	  would	  completely	  “charge”	  the	  batteries.	  Profits	  that	  the	  NGO	  
had	  predicted	  from	  phone	  charging	  dwindled	  and	  ceased	  entirely.	  When	  the	  school	  
missed	  its	  10%	  payment	  deadline,	  and	  then	  missed	  the	  extended	  deadline,	  the	  NGO	  
called	  the	  western	  volunteer	  teacher	  (not	  the	  contact	  teacher	  or	  headmaster)	  to	  
threaten	  full	  system	  recall	  if	  the	  school	  didn’t	  pay	  immediately.	  Lacking	  any	  savings	  
from	  phone	  charging,	  the	  school	  raised	  the	  money	  by	  leveeing	  an	  additional	  fee	  on	  
its	  students,	  thereby	  meeting	  its	  10%	  goal.	  There	  was	  no	  contingency	  plan	  to	  
replace	  the	  two	  batteries,	  each	  of	  which	  cost	  between	  Tsh	  600,000	  and	  1,000,000	  –	  
more	  than	  the	  school’s	  annual	  budget.	  
The	  NGO’s	  short	  research	  period	  left	  them	  with	  few	  details	  to	  work	  with.	  
Between	  the	  engineer’s	  initial	  visit	  in	  late	  November,	  which	  was	  purely	  for	  a	  
technical	  evaluation,	  and	  the	  full	  installation	  in	  late	  December,	  there	  was	  no	  other	  
village/school	  visit	  or	  follow-­‐up	  information	  gathering	  session.	  The	  NGO	  had	  its	  own	  
set	  of	  experiences	  and	  assumptions	  that	  informed	  its	  project	  design;	  the	  
peculiarities	  of	  the	  school	  or	  village	  never	  factored	  into	  the	  equation,	  and	  no	  one	  on	  
the	  receiving	  end	  of	  the	  project	  thought	  to	  question	  those	  decisions.	  The	  promise	  of	  
free	  electricity	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  force	  against	  constructive	  criticism.	  
	   123	  
4.4.3:	  Luhunga:	  Power	  Structures	  
In	  the	  Nepal	  and	  Indian	  case	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  customers	  
are	  whole	  or	  large	  parts	  of	  democratically-­‐governed	  communities.	  When	  the	  system	  
is	  designed,	  its	  financial	  viability	  depends	  on	  customers’	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  
pay,	  and	  the	  ultimate	  success	  of	  the	  system	  depends	  on	  a	  collective	  interest	  in	  its	  
correct	  operation.	  A	  school	  works	  very	  differently:	  instead	  of	  a	  democratic,	  
collective	  interest,	  operational	  decisions	  are	  made	  or	  ignored	  by	  a	  single	  authority.	  
And	  instead	  of	  continuous	  collective	  payment,	  the	  school	  administration	  bears	  the	  
sole	  responsibility	  of	  complying	  with	  payback	  schemes	  and	  finding	  the	  income	  to	  do	  
it.	  This	  situation	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  buy-­‐in	  and	  “ownership.”	  
A	  percentage	  buy-­‐in,	  such	  as	  the	  10%	  expected	  of	  Luhunga	  Secondary	  School,	  
can	  serve	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  in	  a	  recipient	  entity	  as	  long	  as	  that	  sense	  is	  
universal.	  When	  one	  person	  or	  group	  (the	  school	  administration)	  feels	  
responsibility,	  but	  no	  one	  else	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  (teachers,	  students)	  beyond	  the	  
free	  services	  provided,	  it	  is	  a	  simple	  step	  to	  abuse	  the	  original	  intent	  of	  the	  project	  
designer.	  The	  school	  administration	  is	  responsible	  for	  profiting	  from	  the	  system’s	  
excess	  generation,	  but	  it	  is	  far	  simpler	  to	  levee	  a	  fee	  on	  the	  students.	  The	  fee	  itself	  
does	  not	  imbue	  the	  students	  with	  the	  blessing	  of	  ownership,	  however,	  as	  they	  still	  
have	  no	  control	  over	  the	  system’s	  long-­‐term	  success;	  it	  is	  more	  a	  recipe	  for	  
resentment.	  
The	  teachers	  are	  on	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  bearing	  no	  burden	  of	  
payment	  nor	  adverse	  effects	  from	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  system.	  At	  Luhunga,	  like	  
many	  village	  schools,	  teacher	  turnover	  was	  close	  to	  100%	  annually.	  The	  
	   124	  
government	  assigned	  new	  teachers	  to	  the	  school	  every	  year,	  but	  most	  never	  arrived.	  
Lacking	  any	  alternatives,	  the	  school	  often	  hired	  recent	  advanced	  secondary	  school	  
graduates	  (two	  years	  older	  than	  Luhunga	  graduates)	  to	  teach.	  After	  several	  months	  
most	  of	  these	  volunteer	  teachers	  left	  to	  pursue	  university	  or	  other	  jobs.	  Not	  only	  
was	  buy-­‐in	  minimal	  from	  the	  teaching	  staff,	  but	  so	  was	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  
system,	  which	  was	  not	  effectively	  relayed	  to	  new	  faculty	  every	  few	  months.	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  Luhunga’s	  solar	  installation,	  the	  NGO	  was	  entering	  a	  solar	  
market	  seemingly	  bursting	  with	  potential	  customers.	  The	  Tanzanian	  Ministry	  of	  
Education	  and	  Vocational	  Training	  (MoEVT)	  was	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  decade-­‐long	  
school	  building	  spree,	  creating	  village	  secondary	  schools	  all	  over	  the	  country.	  The	  
schools	  had	  (somewhat)	  reliable	  funding,	  ideal	  locations	  in	  commercial	  village	  hubs,	  
and	  a	  high	  need	  for	  electricity.	  To	  a	  solar	  project	  designer,	  this	  was	  as	  close	  to	  a	  
sure-­‐fire	  success	  as	  one	  could	  get	  given	  the	  potential	  for	  economic	  generating	  
activities	  and	  quick	  payback.	  But	  the	  government	  had	  not	  preceded	  the	  expansion	  
effort	  with	  a	  similar	  push	  to	  train	  teachers,	  so	  most	  of	  these	  new	  schools	  were	  
dramatically	  understaffed	  and	  struggling	  to	  gain	  a	  foothold	  as	  competitive	  
educational	  institutions	  for	  an	  underserved	  rural	  population.	  Though	  not	  a	  
universal	  problem,	  teacher	  turnover	  and	  dissatisfaction	  was	  common	  enough	  to	  
warrant	  careful	  research	  and	  planning	  for	  school-­‐based	  projects	  of	  any	  kind.	  
From	  the	  NGO’s	  perspective,	  the	  10%	  payback	  from	  the	  school	  was	  
insignificant	  to	  its	  funding.	  More	  important	  than	  the	  money	  itself	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
was	  repaid,	  showing	  outside	  donors	  that	  the	  model	  was	  successful	  in	  sustainably	  
electrifying	  a	  village	  school.	  Regardless	  of	  its	  individual	  employees’	  likely	  desire	  to	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see	  the	  project	  truly	  be	  sustainable,	  the	  NGO’s	  interests	  were	  officially	  met	  when	  the	  
school	  completed	  its	  payment,	  regardless	  of	  what	  followed.	  This	  reflects	  not	  on	  the	  
organization’s	  motives	  or	  ethics,	  but	  on	  the	  donor-­‐centric	  model	  of	  outside-­‐funded	  
development	  itself.	  Long-­‐term	  buy-­‐in	  and	  ownership	  are	  not	  enough	  when	  isolated	  
on	  the	  receiving	  end;	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  thoughtful	  planning,	  the	  project	  
designer	  needs	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  project’s	  success	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  
project	  itself,	  not	  just	  the	  payback	  period	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  
About	  four	  years	  after	  the	  solar	  installation,	  a	  contrasting	  model	  of	  rural	  
electrification	  began	  selling	  power	  to	  a	  string	  of	  villages,	  including	  Luhunga.	  Curving	  
East	  and	  South	  from	  Mdabulo	  (North	  of	  Luhunga),	  successive	  mountain	  ridges	  are	  
home	  to	  a	  series	  of	  previously	  un-­‐electrified	  villages	  considered	  “bush”	  even	  by	  
Tanzanian	  standards.	  The	  villages	  follow	  a	  U-­‐shape,	  curving	  back	  West	  towards	  
Luhunga,	  and	  near	  the	  trough	  of	  this	  U	  is	  the	  outlet	  from	  the	  combined	  drainages	  of	  
this	  section	  of	  the	  highlands.	  The	  escarpment	  provides	  enough	  head	  to	  draw	  power	  
from	  the	  stream,	  and	  in	  2009	  a	  British	  company	  began	  building	  a	  hydroelectric	  
system	  and	  installing	  power	  poles	  along	  the	  village	  road,	  promising	  power	  in	  the	  
near	  future.	  In	  2012	  power	  generation	  began	  and,	  by	  2013,	  it	  had	  reached	  Luhunga.	  
As	  in	  Khotang,	  individual	  customers	  were	  responsible	  for	  wiring	  their	  houses	  
and	  paying	  a	  connection	  fee;	  beyond	  that	  they	  were	  charged	  for	  continuing	  service,	  
with	  the	  British	  company	  acting	  as	  a	  local	  utility.	  The	  hydroelectric	  facility	  is	  subject	  
to	  seasonal	  flow	  changes;	  much	  of	  it	  is	  spring-­‐fed	  but	  then	  augmented	  by	  the	  5-­‐	  or	  6-­‐
month	  rainy	  season.	  Because	  the	  facility	  was	  designed	  based	  on	  the	  generation	  
potential	  of	  the	  watershed,	  rather	  than	  the	  expected	  demand,	  the	  number	  of	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customers	  and	  their	  usage	  patterns	  determine	  the	  frequency	  and	  duration	  of	  load	  
shedding.	  The	  dry	  season	  sees	  more	  power	  shortages	  signaling,	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Nepal,	  
an	  opportunity	  for	  solar	  to	  serve	  a	  vital	  role.	  
4.4.4:	  Tanzania:	  Entities	  Converge	  
In	  February	  of	  2014,	  the	  government	  of	  Tanzania	  officially	  declared	  its	  push	  
for	  solar	  power	  with	  its	  One	  Million	  Solar	  Homes	  initiative.	  With	  a	  USD	  100	  million	  
investment,	  the	  plan	  aims	  to	  electrify	  roughly	  10%	  of	  the	  country’s	  homes	  at	  a	  price	  
that	  is	  competitive	  with,	  or	  even	  beats,	  that	  of	  kerosene	  (Off	  Grid:	  Electric	  2016).	  
Due	  to	  the	  steep	  decline	  of	  solar	  costs,	  the	  World	  Bank	  estimates	  that	  solar	  is	  in	  grid	  
parity	  with	  hydro	  (meaning	  their	  costs	  are	  roughly	  equal	  per	  kWh	  delivered,	  in	  this	  
case	  USD	  0.20)	  and	  is	  cheaper	  than	  fuel	  oil	  (USD	  0.25	  per	  kWh)	  (2015).	  To	  meet	  this	  
goal,	  the	  Rural	  Energy	  Agency	  has	  partnered	  with	  a	  private	  company,	  Off	  Grid:	  
Electric,	  to	  provide	  the	  full	  range	  of	  services.	  
Off	  Grid:	  Electric	  (hereafter	  Off	  Grid),	  which	  counts	  USAID,	  the	  IFC,	  and	  solar	  
financing-­‐pioneer	  SolarCity	  among	  its	  investors,	  acts	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  distributed	  utility.	  
For	  a	  minimum	  of	  USD	  0.20	  a	  day,	  customers	  can	  gradually	  pay	  off	  the	  home	  
systems	  that	  Off	  Grid	  installs	  for	  less	  than	  they	  typically	  pay	  for	  kerosene	  or	  other	  
lighting	  or	  electricity	  services.	  Unlike	  GP,	  MGP,	  or	  the	  solar	  NGO	  in	  Luhunga,	  Off	  Grid	  
does	  not	  sell	  solar	  systems	  and	  appliances.	  Instead,	  the	  company	  leases	  systems	  and	  
appliances	  desired	  by	  the	  customer,	  and	  then	  charges	  a	  daily/monthly	  fee	  until	  
everything	  is	  paid	  off.	  Local	  suppliers	  and	  technicians	  provide	  the	  service	  directly,	  
and	  customers	  have	  access	  to	  a	  24/7	  tech	  support	  hotline	  (USAID	  2014).	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At	  its	  core,	  Off	  Grid	  is	  both	  mimicking	  and	  making	  use	  of	  a	  locally	  analogous	  
sector,	  telecommunications.	  Mobile	  phones	  in	  Tanzania	  offered	  individual,	  
affordable,	  and	  deployable	  communication	  options	  long	  before	  landline	  
infrastructure	  would	  have	  become	  affordable	  for	  rural	  communities.	  As	  mobile	  
phones	  proliferated,	  industries	  and	  businesses	  learned	  to	  harness	  their	  universal	  
access	  in	  new	  ways:	  health	  clinics	  and	  extension	  agents	  could	  provide	  advice	  and	  
information	  to	  remote	  patients,	  and	  food	  distribution	  centers	  could	  streamline	  their	  
supply	  chains.	  Arguably	  the	  most	  singularly	  influential	  innovations,	  however,	  were	  
pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  vouchers	  and	  a	  system	  of	  remote	  payment.	  
In	  Nepal,	  India,	  and	  Tanzania,	  as	  well	  as	  much	  of	  the	  developing	  world,	  
mobile	  phone	  service	  is	  paid	  for	  incrementally,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  flat	  rate	  used	  in	  
the	  U.S.	  and	  much	  of	  the	  West.	  You	  can	  visit	  almost	  any	  shop,	  rural	  or	  urban,	  and	  
purchase	  vouchers	  for	  a	  specified	  number	  of	  minutes	  or	  texts.	  After	  you	  pay	  and	  
receive	  the	  voucher,	  you	  enter	  the	  code	  into	  your	  phone	  and	  your	  account	  
automatically	  updates	  with	  your	  new	  balance.	  When	  you	  run	  out	  of	  minutes,	  you	  
just	  purchase	  more	  vouchers.	  This	  system	  allows	  network	  service	  providers	  to	  
avoid	  the	  challenge	  of	  making	  “plans”	  appropriate	  for	  certain	  categories	  of	  
customers,	  and	  instead	  allows	  customers	  to	  use	  freely	  and	  pay	  accordingly.	  
It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  users	  to	  realize	  that	  this	  system	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
method	  of	  remote	  payment.	  If	  a	  farmer	  in	  Luhunga	  ordered	  seeds	  from	  Dar	  es	  
Salaam,	  the	  farmer	  could	  purchase	  an	  equivalent	  amount	  worth	  of	  phone	  voucher,	  
transfer	  the	  balance	  to	  the	  supplier	  via	  his	  phone,	  and	  thus	  the	  supplier	  was	  paid.	  
The	  only	  step	  missing	  was	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  cash	  the	  voucher	  in.	  M-­‐PESA,	  which	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started	  in	  Kenya	  and	  has	  since	  spread	  in	  form	  if	  not	  name	  to	  most	  of	  the	  developing	  
world,	  formalized	  this	  system	  by	  providing	  the	  full,	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  service.	  Customers	  
can	  purchase	  M-­‐PESA	  voucher	  and	  transfer	  it	  to	  another	  user,	  who	  can	  then	  cash	  it	  
in.	  
Off	  Grid:	  Electric	  has	  filled	  an	  analogous	  gap	  in	  rural	  electricity	  service.	  
Customers	  pay	  a	  daily/monthly	  rate	  based	  on	  the	  system	  they	  receive	  –	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  panel	  or	  array,	  appliances,	  etc.	  –	  via	  a	  mobile	  phone	  voucher	  system.	  Vouchers	  
can	  be	  purchased	  in	  person	  at	  local	  kiosks	  and	  entered	  into	  the	  phone,	  or	  paid	  for	  
with	  the	  sector-­‐specific	  variant	  of	  M-­‐PESA,	  M-­‐Power.	  Whenever	  a	  client	  decides	  to	  
change	  her	  system	  by	  adding	  more	  capacity	  or	  by	  leasing	  different	  appliances,	  Off	  
Grid’s	  local	  affiliates	  perform	  the	  upgrade	  at	  no	  cost,	  and	  the	  client’s	  balance	  
increases	  accordingly.	  But	  Tanzania’s	  solar	  initiative,	  despite	  the	  simplified	  
financing	  and	  repayment	  mechanisms,	  is	  not	  without	  its	  challenges	  or	  limits.	  
Among	  these	  challenges	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  Luhunga-­‐type	  recap,	  where	  a	  
client	  does	  not	  make	  timely	  payments	  and	  the	  system	  is	  recalled	  –	  a	  lose-­‐lose	  
situation	  for	  everyone.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  cost	  Off	  Grid	  resources	  to	  recall	  a	  solar	  
system,	  it	  damages	  the	  image	  of	  the	  non-­‐paying	  client	  and	  the	  solar	  initiative	  itself.	  
Tough	  action	  may	  encourage	  timely	  payment	  and	  realistic	  choices	  when	  requesting	  
a	  system,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  discourage	  participation	  for	  fear	  of	  retribution	  in	  an	  
already	  uncertain	  financial	  situation.	  The	  scale	  and	  timeline	  of	  the	  solar	  initiative	  
may	  serve	  to	  mitigate	  the	  non-­‐payment	  scenario,	  however.	  
Assuming	  that	  electricity	  service	  is	  replacing	  use	  of	  other	  fuels,	  like	  kerosene,	  
and	  that	  the	  USD	  0.20	  per	  day	  is	  already	  less	  than	  what	  a	  household	  would	  be	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paying	  for	  those	  fuels,	  non-­‐payment	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  of	  ability,	  but	  rather	  one	  of	  
familiarity.	  Where	  once	  a	  client	  had	  purchased	  kerosene	  directly	  from	  a	  shop,	  stored	  
it,	  and	  used	  it,	  she	  now	  would	  be	  purchasing	  a	  non-­‐tangible	  good	  using	  an	  
abstraction	  of	  money.	  Once	  you	  have	  purchased	  kerosene	  enough	  times,	  its	  
monetary	  value	  is	  perceptible	  in	  its	  weight,	  smell,	  etc.	  Electricity	  is	  difficult	  to	  value	  
without	  being	  familiar	  with	  it,	  and	  the	  money	  itself	  moves	  invisibly.	  But	  the	  scale	  
(10%	  of	  households	  nationwide)	  encourages	  participation,	  particularly	  among	  
neighbors.	  Similar	  initiatives	  in	  the	  past	  have	  failed	  because	  the	  project	  was	  too	  
small	  to	  gain	  attention	  and	  therefore	  confidence,	  or	  the	  technology	  was	  too	  new	  to	  
deserve	  household	  investment.	  A	  national	  project	  can	  overcome	  challenges	  of	  
participation	  by	  using	  components	  that	  clients	  have	  become	  familiar	  with	  and	  have	  
seen	  function	  effectively.	  The	  scale	  of	  deployment	  may	  result	  in	  a	  new	  normal	  in	  
some	  communities;	  having	  one’s	  system	  recalled	  due	  to	  non-­‐payment	  would	  
therefore	  go	  against	  the	  new	  normal	  and	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  
the	  rule.	  
4.4.4:	  Tanzania:	  Short-­‐Term	  Goals,	  Short-­‐Term	  Impact	  
The	  One	  Million	  Solar	  Homes	  initiative	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  scaled-­‐up,	  lease-­‐
based	  SHS	  program.	  Its	  goal	  is	  to	  provide,	  or	  at	  least	  help	  drive,	  electricity	  
development	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  grid	  could	  not	  reach	  even	  if	  generation	  was	  
increased.	  Several	  questions	  that	  this	  raises	  are:	  What	  happens	  if	  or	  when	  the	  grid	  
arrives	  in	  these	  communities?	  What	  if	  individual	  clients	  want	  to	  scale	  up	  to	  grid-­‐
quality	  power,	  either	  in	  preparation	  for	  eventual	  connection	  or	  simply	  in	  order	  to	  
operate	  large	  appliances?	  Given	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  funding	  on	  which	  this	  program	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depends,	  can	  a	  company	  like	  Off	  Grid	  continue	  this	  method	  sustainably?	  The	  
answers	  are	  necessarily	  speculative	  but	  raise	  some	  intriguing	  points.	  
First	  up	  is	  cost.	  Scaling	  in	  this	  case	  faces	  the	  same	  issue	  that	  MGP	  faces	  in	  
Uttar	  Pradesh:	  unmetered,	  DC	  systems	  are	  affordable	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  but	  scaling	  up	  
to	  grid-­‐quality	  power	  requires	  a	  disproportionate	  price	  hike.	  Inverters	  are	  well	  out	  
of	  the	  range	  of	  affordability	  for	  most	  customers,	  and	  individual	  meters	  would	  drive	  
household	  rates	  out	  of	  parity	  with	  kerosene	  or	  other	  options.	  This	  leaves	  Off	  Grid	  
with	  the	  option	  of	  flat	  rates	  and	  DC	  service.	  However,	  given	  the	  company’s	  leasing	  
model	  and	  individual	  installations	  (instead	  of	  communal	  micro-­‐grids),	  there	  is	  
significantly	  more	  individual	  customer	  freedom	  to	  adjust	  systems	  to	  household	  
needs.	  If	  Off	  Grid	  offered	  the	  service	  a	  household	  could,	  conceivably,	  lease	  an	  
inverter	  for	  its	  own	  use.	  But	  the	  company	  will	  likely	  not	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  grid-­‐quality	  
services	  widely	  or	  cheaply,	  leaving	  communities	  that	  expect	  imminent	  grid	  service	  
in	  limbo,	  not	  knowing	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  it	  to	  invest	  in	  solar.	  But	  even	  with	  grid	  
extension,	  is	  it	  worth	  it	  to	  connect?	  Or	  can	  future	  needs	  be	  met	  over	  time	  with	  
distributed	  generation	  alone?	  
Grid	  rates	  from	  TANESCO	  are	  comparable	  to	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.	  –	  about	  USD	  
0.11	  per	  kWh	  compared	  to	  USD	  0.12,	  respectively	  (EIA	  2015).	  At	  the	  low	  
consumption	  rates	  of	  rural	  households,	  grid	  connection	  could	  mean	  substantial	  
savings	  over	  even	  Off	  Grid’s	  low	  USD	  0.20	  per	  day,	  and	  it	  would	  power	  AC	  and	  high	  
voltage	  appliances.	  But	  as	  Tanzania	  explores	  more	  natural	  gas,	  which	  has	  a	  tendency	  
to	  fluctuate	  on	  the	  international	  market	  (TZ	  does	  not	  have	  reserves	  of	  its	  own),	  and	  
considering	  the	  lower	  ROI	  for	  extending	  to	  rural	  areas,	  the	  low	  price	  of	  grid	  power	  is	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likely	  to	  increase.	  In	  addition,	  locally	  generated	  and	  used	  power	  can	  be	  attractive	  for	  
other	  reasons:	  avoiding	  load	  shedding,	  having	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  one’s	  own	  
resources,	  increased	  awareness	  of	  and	  responsibility	  for	  individual	  consumption,	  
and	  others	  are	  all	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  but	  very	  real	  where	  consumers	  are	  directly	  
dependent	  on	  their	  own	  sources.	  But	  social	  benefits	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  weighed	  
against	  low	  grid	  prices;	  rural	  customers	  would	  need	  some	  assurance	  that	  
distributed	  generation	  could	  scale	  to	  their	  future	  needs	  and	  still	  compete	  with	  the	  
grid.	  
If	  the	  leasing	  model	  employed	  by	  Off	  Grid	  continues	  to	  provide	  quality	  
components	  and	  appliances	  with	  reasonable	  payback	  rates,	  scaling	  may	  drive	  its	  
own	  market.	  While	  some	  customers	  will	  continue	  to	  require	  only	  basic	  services,	  
others	  may	  advance	  their	  income	  to	  allow	  for	  greater	  generation	  or	  storage	  
capacity,	  inverters,	  and	  higher-­‐end	  appliances.	  Renewable	  energy	  technologies	  
continue	  to	  drop	  in	  price	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  continue	  doing	  so	  as	  the	  market	  
establishes	  itself	  and	  technology	  advances.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  at	  this	  stage,	  
investors	  are	  realizing	  that	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  are	  typically	  low-­‐risk;	  
therefore	  banks	  and	  lenders	  can	  require	  lower	  interest	  rates	  and	  drive	  competition	  
in	  the	  market.	  The	  RET	  industry,	  in	  short,	  is	  steaming	  towards	  greater	  affordability	  
and	  market	  penetration	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  While	  grid	  prices	  stagnate	  or	  
even	  increase	  (this	  is	  true	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  as	  well),	  the	  cost	  of	  distributed	  
generation	  continues	  to	  decrease.	  It	  may	  therefore	  be	  in	  a	  community’s	  long-­‐term	  
interest	  to	  invest	  in	  its	  own	  flexible,	  homegrown,	  local	  generation	  than	  in	  the	  
extension	  of	  an	  aging	  grid.	  Historically,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  currently,	  the	  national	  
	   132	  
grid	  has	  benefited	  from	  an	  economy	  of	  scale;	  but	  with	  electricity	  generation	  markets	  
in	  flux	  it	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  grids	  to	  adapt	  on	  the	  fly	  with	  smart	  metering	  
technology	  and	  renewable	  integration.	  
Another	  potential	  red	  flag	  raised	  by	  Off	  Grid’s	  model	  is	  its	  dependence	  on	  
donors,	  the	  largest	  of	  which	  are	  proudly	  mentioned	  in	  announcement	  publications	  
(USAID	  2014;	  Guardian	  2015).	  A	  mix	  of	  international	  aid	  agencies	  has	  pumped	  
hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  USD	  into	  getting	  the	  Million	  Solar	  Homes	  project	  off	  the	  
ground.	  As	  with	  GP,	  which	  received	  the	  same	  order	  of	  magnitude	  in	  start-­‐up	  funds	  
for	  its	  micro-­‐grids,	  Off	  Grid’s	  donors	  intend	  for	  their	  investment	  to	  kick-­‐start	  a	  
sustainable	  business	  rather	  than	  serve	  as	  a	  continuous	  source	  of	  funding.	  Without	  
(local)	  proof	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  customers	  will	  make	  regular	  payments	  and	  sustain	  
the	  company’s	  expansion,	  the	  donors	  are	  taking	  a	  risk.	  The	  model	  could	  founder	  and	  
deprive	  future	  endeavors	  of	  similar	  start-­‐up	  funds	  if	  customers	  fail	  to	  pay.	  However,	  
several	  factors	  indicate	  advantages	  that	  One	  Million	  Solar	  Homes	  has	  over	  projects	  
in	  other	  case	  studies	  discussed	  here.	  
First,	  given	  the	  combined	  earner-­‐payer	  nature	  of	  each	  customer,	  Off	  Grid	  can	  
avoid	  a	  Luhunga-­‐esque	  situation	  of	  split	  incentives	  (whereby	  the	  school	  
administration	  could	  charge	  students	  for	  the	  service	  that	  primarily	  benefited	  
faculty).	  This	  small	  difference	  could	  encourage	  repayment	  among	  individual	  
household	  and	  business	  customers	  in	  a	  way	  that	  Luhunga	  could	  not.	  Second,	  the	  
remote	  voucher	  payment	  system	  relies	  on	  an	  established	  method	  of	  personal	  
accountability	  (a	  la	  mobile	  phones)	  and	  avoids	  MGP’s	  issue	  of	  personal	  relationships	  
between	  bill	  customers	  and	  bill	  collectors.	  Third,	  the	  entire	  initiative,	  though	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implemented	  by	  a	  single	  for-­‐profit	  company	  and	  its	  affiliates,	  has	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  
Tanzanian	  Rural	  Electrification	  Administration.	  This	  particular	  public	  backing	  
imbues	  the	  entire	  project	  with	  flagship	  status,	  sending	  a	  clear	  message	  to	  investors	  
and	  customers	  alike	  that	  success,	  if	  not	  guaranteed,	  is	  at	  least	  a	  major	  priority	  for	  
the	  country.	  In	  summary,	  Off	  Grid’s	  model,	  short	  any	  forecasts	  on	  payback	  periods,	  
appears	  to	  include	  best	  practices	  learned	  from	  several	  sectors	  and	  avoid	  many	  of	  
the	  difficulties	  encountered	  in	  other	  scenarios	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  It	  is	  a	  step	  
in	  the	  direction	  of	  learning	  from	  bottom-­‐up	  initiatives	  and	  building	  on	  local	  norms	  
and	  capacity.	  
4.5:	  Case	  Studies	  Summary	  
The	  table	  below	  gives	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  discussed	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  No	  two	  case	  studies	  have	  identical	  conditions,	  and	  the	  reader	  should	  note	  
key	  differences	  in	  the	  timing	  and	  scope	  of	  each	  subject.	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Table	  4.1:	  Case	  study	  factors	  comparison	  
	  
	   Cases	  




TZ:	  OMSH	   Uttar	  
Pradesh	  
Voltage	   Grid-­‐level	   Low	   Grid-­‐level	   Low/Variable	   Low	  
Type	   AC	   AC	   AC	   DC	   DC	  










2015	   2008	   2014	   2015	   2011	  
Status	  (Q1	  
2016)	  
Ongoing	   Failed	   Ongoing	   Planning	   Ongoing	  
Scale	   Village	   School	   Building/	  City	  
Block	  























High	   Low	   High	   High	   Moderate	  
Planning	   Long	   Rapid	   Moderate	   Rapid	   Rapid	  
Policy	  Support	   Subsidy,	  
Government	  
Initiative	  
















Despite	  key	  differences	  between	  major	  factors	  –	  scale	  and	  timing	  being	  
primary	  –	  trends	  appear	  between	  projects	  that	  have	  failed	  to	  meet	  long-­‐term	  goals,	  
those	  that	  face	  significant	  challenges,	  and	  those	  that	  have	  found	  early	  success	  
(though	  uncertain	  futures).	  These	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  with	  an	  
eye	  towards	  drawing	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  projects	  anywhere.	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Chapter	  5:	  Discussion	  
In	  Rural	  Electrification:	  Strategies	  for	  Distributed	  Generation,	  Zerriffi	  (2010)	  
ends	  his	  opening	  chapter	  with	  a	  lesson	  for	  those	  working	  in	  electricity	  development:	  
studies	  of	  best	  practices,	  challenges,	  and	  methods,	  should	  be	  broad.	  Single	  anecdotal	  
cases	  are	  just	  that	  –	  singular:	  they	  offer	  few	  specific	  recommendations	  that	  are	  
relevant	  to	  other	  situations.	  By	  seeking	  to	  understand	  all	  rural	  electrification	  efforts	  
generally,	  we	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  falling	  into	  the	  aforementioned	  “silver	  bullet”	  or	  “Big	  
Plan”	  trap	  (Easterly	  2006).	  Noting,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  30%	  investment	  tax	  credit	  in	  
solar	  projects	  spurred	  development	  and	  increased	  access	  in	  a	  region	  of	  Nepal	  may	  
lead	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  tax	  credits	  would	  benefit	  all	  countries	  where	  electricity	  
access	  is	  low.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  discount	  tax	  credits,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  imprudent	  to	  
pressure	  governments	  into	  policy	  decisions	  they	  may	  not	  want	  and	  that	  may	  not	  
actually	  benefit	  them.	  Distributed	  generation	  as	  an	  industry	  is	  in	  rapid	  flux	  and	  
differences	  from	  one	  site	  to	  another,	  even	  in	  close	  proximity,	  can	  be	  significant.	  
Development	  efforts	  have	  historically	  operated	  via	  top-­‐down	  plans	  based	  on	  
ideology	  more	  than	  experience,	  and	  little	  consideration	  for	  site	  diversity.	  We	  can	  
better	  serve	  rural	  electrification	  efforts	  by	  using	  case	  studies	  that	  analyze	  the	  
development	  practice	  itself,	  questioning	  viability	  and	  sustainability,	  and	  then	  
supporting	  local	  efforts.	  
This	  paper	  analyzes	  specific	  cases	  based	  on	  their	  apparent	  similarities	  to,	  and	  
underlying	  differences	  from,	  one	  another.	  No	  one	  case	  study	  presented	  here	  should	  
be	  taken	  as	  a	  packaged	  lesson	  to	  adjust	  and	  recreate	  elsewhere	  but,	  rather,	  all	  of	  the	  
case	  studies	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  comparison	  to	  one	  another,	  their	  commonalities	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and	  differences	  dissected.	  Once	  understood,	  a	  project	  developer	  has	  the	  tools	  to	  
apply	  not	  the	  facts	  of	  each	  study	  but	  the	  common	  approach	  they	  demand	  for	  local	  
propriety.	  
5.1:	  From	  Aid	  to	  Enterprise	  
The	  world	  development	  project,	  or	  what	  McMichael	  terms	  “globally	  
organized	  economic	  development”	  (2000),	  operates	  within	  a	  capitalist	  global	  
economy.	  Governments,	  corporations,	  or	  well-­‐funded	  NGOs	  may	  be	  able	  to	  “do”	  
development	  where	  and	  how	  they	  choose,	  but	  the	  bulk	  of	  DG	  is	  driven	  by	  for-­‐profit	  
companies	  like	  GP,	  MGP,	  and	  Off	  Grid.	  Project	  developers	  are	  therefore	  responsible	  
for	  considering	  the	  role	  that	  these	  companies	  can	  play	  and	  how	  each	  project	  might	  
become	  a	  long-­‐term	  enterprise	  for	  both	  the	  developer	  and	  the	  recipient	  community.	  
This	  paper	  has	  discussed	  in	  detail	  because	  it	  is	  the	  single	  most	  important	  
indicator	  of	  a	  given	  DG	  method’s	  financial	  future.	  But	  this	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  
advocating	  utilitarian	  approaches	  to	  addressing	  a	  very	  real	  need.	  As	  ROI	  determines	  
a	  project’s	  success	  from	  the	  company’s	  perspective,	  so	  the	  project’s	  success	  
influences	  the	  likelihood	  of	  other,	  similar	  projects	  elsewhere.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
business-­‐centric	  view	  of	  DG	  development	  is	  not	  based	  in	  any	  allegiance	  to	  capitalism	  
but,	  instead,	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  sustainability.	  
This	  paper’s	  case	  studies	  represent	  a	  range	  of	  financial	  sustainability.	  On	  one	  
end	  is	  the	  solar	  NGO	  in	  Luhunga,	  which	  depends	  at	  least	  90%	  on	  a	  continuous	  
source	  of	  outside	  funding.	  On	  the	  other	  is	  MGP,	  which	  was	  established	  with	  start-­‐up	  
funds	  from	  donors	  and	  later	  became	  locally	  self-­‐sustaining.	  In	  the	  middle	  are	  GP’s	  
Khotang	  projects	  in	  Nepal	  and	  Off	  Grid’s	  One	  Million	  Solar	  Homes	  project	  in	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Tanzania,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  still	  in	  initial	  development	  phases	  and	  not	  independent	  
of	  donor	  funds.	  While	  the	  donor-­‐dependence	  example	  in	  Luhunga	  demonstrates	  the	  
causes	  of	  failure	  in	  a	  system	  with	  minimal	  local	  buy-­‐in/ownership,	  the	  relative	  
“success”	  of	  the	  other,	  business-­‐based	  case	  studies	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine.	  Each	  is	  
continuously	  encountering	  challenges	  that	  make	  “success”	  a	  subjective	  term	  and	  
each	  differs	  from	  Luhunga.	  
Primary	  among	  these	  differences	  is	  the	  history	  of	  stability	  of	  previous	  
projects.	  GP	  has	  been	  designing	  solar	  projects	  for	  years	  and	  quickly	  became	  one	  of	  
Nepal’s	  most	  successful	  and	  reputable	  solar	  companies.	  Its	  push	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  
micro-­‐grids	  demonstrates	  diversity:	  if	  successful,	  the	  Khotang	  project	  will	  expand	  
the	  company’s	  energy	  initiatives;	  if	  not,	  the	  company’s	  other	  projects	  may	  make	  up	  
for	  its	  losses.	  Off	  Grid	  also	  has	  a	  history	  of	  growth,	  having	  used	  its	  leasing	  model	  for	  
several	  years,	  and	  has	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  national	  governments.	  MGP,	  even	  
facing	  scalability	  challenges,	  has	  nonetheless	  established	  an	  economic	  presence	  as	  
the	  single	  largest	  employer	  in	  its	  operating	  area	  within	  Uttar	  Pradesh.	  Though	  
limited	  in	  scope,	  these	  case	  studies	  indicate	  the	  intrinsic	  resiliency	  in	  a	  business	  
approach,	  however	  eventual,	  to	  DG	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  donor-­‐dependent	  approach.	  
Second	  is	  the	  relative	  level	  of	  research	  done	  in	  advance	  of	  these	  projects.	  
Though	  the	  solar	  NGO	  in	  Luhunga	  has	  had	  numerous	  successful	  projects	  (including	  
one	  at	  a	  nearby	  primary	  school),	  its	  research	  was	  minimal	  and	  primarily	  technical	  
rather	  than	  social.	  MGP	  has	  iterated	  its	  design	  over	  the	  years	  in	  several	  countries;	  
GP	  spent	  over	  a	  year	  researching	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  Khotang	  communities	  
before	  designs	  were	  completed,	  and	  Off	  Grid	  understood	  and	  made	  use	  of	  analogous	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industries	  –	  communication	  technology	  and	  leasing	  models	  –	  and	  local	  markets	  
rather	  than	  relying	  on	  some	  “universal”	  model.	  
Case	  study	  funding	  situations	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  5.1	  below.	  While	  each	  
of	  the	  five	  employs	  a	  slightly	  different	  method,	  the	  trend	  shows	  that	  the	  four	  cases	  
that	  pursue	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  financial	  model	  were	  the	  most	  successful	  (viable,	  
sustainable)	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing.	  The	  one	  donor-­‐funded	  case	  is	  the	  least	  
successful,	  having	  failed	  to	  establish	  local	  ownership	  or	  long-­‐term	  financial	  
sustainability.	  
Table	  5.1:	  Case	  study	  financial	  models,	  summary	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This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  business	  approaches	  will	  succeed	  or	  that	  all	  donor-­‐
funded	  projects	  will	  fail	  –	  there	  are	  appropriate	  applications	  of	  each,	  and	  this	  
paper’s	  sample	  size	  is	  far	  too	  small	  to	  draw	  general	  conclusions.	  There	  are	  plenty	  of	  
exceptions	  on	  both	  sides,	  though	  to	  what	  extent	  “success”	  is	  measured	  may	  vary	  
widely.	  Instead,	  this	  paper	  posits	  that	  a	  basic	  business	  ethic	  has	  intrinsic	  value	  (as	  a	  
development	  approach,	  not	  as	  any	  specific	  financial	  structure),	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  
purely	  aid	  approach,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  a	  development	  project.	  An	  aid	  ethic	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places	  the	  perceived	  need	  of	  a	  community	  first,	  but	  then	  becomes	  party	  to	  a	  race	  for	  
donor	  funds	  that	  must	  be	  balanced	  with	  a	  drive	  toward	  long-­‐term	  sustainability.	  A	  
business	  ethic,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  demands	  attention	  to	  details	  that	  may	  pay	  off	  
later	  in	  the	  project’s	  lifetime.	  That	  attention	  raises	  issues	  that	  short-­‐term	  courtship	  
of	  donor	  funds	  do	  not.	  
The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  “enterprise”	  coin	  is	  the	  client	  community	  itself.	  One	  
common	  and	  recommended	  way	  of	  ensuring	  profit	  from	  a	  community	  project	  (and	  
income	  for	  that	  community	  regardless	  of	  ownership)	  is	  to	  focus	  system	  design	  on	  
locally	  initiated	  income-­‐generating	  activities.	  If	  customers	  can	  make	  money	  with	  
their	  newfound	  electricity,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  pay.	  This	  
serves	  both	  the	  developer	  and	  the	  community,	  which	  will	  eventually	  acquire	  
ownership	  and	  will	  need	  the	  capital	  to	  expand	  and	  maintain.	  
MGP	  and	  Off	  Grid	  serve	  such	  a	  wide	  base	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  either	  
to	  target	  specific	  income	  generating	  activities	  to	  utilize,	  though	  both	  companies	  cite	  
longer	  business	  hours	  (MGP	  2016)	  and	  new	  business	  opportunities	  that	  benefit	  
their	  customers	  generally.	  More	  direct	  examples	  come	  from	  Khotang,	  where	  GP	  
designed	  its	  micro-­‐grids	  to	  accommodate	  specific	  business	  ventures	  in	  each	  village.	  
In	  Harkapur,	  the	  community	  identified	  several	  hotels	  that	  would	  offer	  electricity	  to	  
their	  guests	  and	  therefore	  see	  a	  higher	  influx	  of	  customers	  and	  capital.	  Kaduwa’s	  
perch	  on	  the	  mountains	  between	  two	  commercial	  hubs	  –	  Halesi	  and	  the	  river	  town	  –	  
along	  with	  its	  robust	  dairy	  production	  makes	  it	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  a	  dairy	  chiller.	  
Local	  producers	  could	  then	  sell	  their	  milk,	  gee,	  and	  yoghurt	  to	  a	  larger	  market	  and	  
possibly	  eliminate	  waste.	  Chyasmitar	  is	  the	  most	  remote	  of	  the	  three	  but	  is	  home	  to	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a	  secondary	  school	  and	  a	  nearby	  stationery	  shop.	  The	  shop’s	  ability	  to	  expand	  with	  
solar	  power	  rather	  than	  diesel	  could	  allow	  it	  to	  serve	  the	  school,	  government	  offices,	  
and	  other	  villages	  that	  need	  printing,	  copying,	  internet,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
The	  company’s	  response	  to	  locally	  identified	  income	  generating	  
opportunities	  served	  a	  dual	  purpose:	  it	  reinforced	  the	  community’s	  ability	  to	  pay	  
and	  ensured	  the	  presence	  of	  local	  advocates	  invested	  in	  the	  project’s	  success.	  Even	  
the	  Luhunga	  NGO	  prescribed	  income-­‐generating	  activities	  that,	  though	  not	  fully	  
realized,	  were	  intended	  to	  create	  financial	  sustainability	  along	  the	  same	  lines.	  These	  
examples	  suggest	  that	  locally	  identified	  opportunities	  created	  by	  development	  
projects	  should	  inform	  the	  project	  design.	  
The	  moral	  of	  the	  story	  is	  that	  donor	  funding	  is	  often	  necessary	  for	  new	  
methods	  of	  DG	  to	  be	  explored,	  or	  even	  for	  established	  models	  to	  be	  kick-­‐started	  
elsewhere.	  But	  it	  should	  not	  serve	  as	  a	  permanent	  income	  source	  for	  the	  developer.	  
If	  it	  does,	  the	  model	  in	  question	  is	  not	  sustainable	  and	  will	  likely	  fail	  when	  the	  
funding	  ceases.	  Developers	  should	  instead	  use	  donor	  funding	  as	  seed	  money,	  and	  
rely	  on	  an	  informed,	  thoughtful,	  locally	  appropriate	  business	  model	  to	  continue	  
forward.	  
5.2:	  Local	  Stakeholders	  
Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  outlined	  the	  case	  of	  local	  buy-­‐in	  and	  ownership,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  reasons	  that	  such	  claims	  should	  be	  met	  with	  skepticism.	  Early	  
community/customer	  input	  informs	  crucial	  design	  decisions;	  true	  partnership	  
builds	  mutual	  trust	  and	  respect	  and	  requires	  communication	  from	  the	  beginning;	  
and	  joint	  ownership	  ensures	  that	  each	  party’s	  best	  interests	  are	  tied	  to	  those	  of	  the	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project.	  But	  more	  than	  that,	  local	  stakeholders	  play	  a	  key	  role	  by	  demanding	  
accountability	  and	  providing	  much	  needed	  feedback	  to	  the	  developer	  or	  joint	  
owner.	  Developers	  must	  take	  the	  position	  that	  feedback	  is	  never	  “wrong”	  –	  honestly	  
held	  opinions	  reveal	  real	  or	  perceived	  failures	  and	  successes	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  
should	  inform	  decisions	  to	  fix	  a	  problem,	  promote	  realistic	  expectations,	  or	  adapt	  
projects	  accordingly.	  
Luhunga	  demonstrates	  a	  failure	  to	  empower	  local	  stakeholders.	  Unaware	  of	  
the	  real	  danger	  of	  battery	  depletion,	  and	  in	  only	  occasional	  contact	  with	  the	  NGO’s	  
office	  in	  the	  distant	  city	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  the	  school	  never	  communicated	  the	  
problem	  to	  the	  NGO	  and	  never	  received	  support.	  Instead	  the	  school	  administration	  
figured	  that,	  if	  the	  system	  fell	  apart,	  at	  least	  it	  was	  free.	  A	  better	  arrangement	  would	  
have	  seen	  the	  school	  have	  a	  say	  in	  the	  project	  and	  give	  the	  NGO	  feedback	  as	  it	  
iterated	  its	  system	  design.	  “What	  would	  encourage	  diligent	  monitoring	  of	  the	  
battery’s	  MDoD?”	  might	  have	  been	  a	  standard	  question,	  for	  example,	  given	  that	  it	  
addresses	  the	  major	  weakness	  of	  the	  design.	  A	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  in	  this	  case	  
might	  also	  have	  yielded	  support	  for	  more	  appropriate	  income	  generating	  activities.	  
The	  GP	  and	  MGP	  cases	  contain	  some	  positive	  examples.	  In	  Khotang,	  the	  ADB-­‐
caused	  installation	  delay	  created	  frustration	  among	  local	  stakeholders	  and	  
customers.	  Once	  they	  communicated	  their	  frustration	  up	  the	  chain,	  GP	  decided	  to	  
install	  temporary	  systems	  to	  regain	  the	  communities’	  trust	  and	  reaffirm	  its	  
commitment	  to	  complete	  the	  project.	  Without	  community	  buy-­‐in,	  the	  frustration	  
would	  not	  have	  evolved	  into	  direct	  feedback	  to	  the	  company	  given	  that	  a	  delay	  in	  
unrequested	  (lacking	  any	  buy-­‐in)	  electricity	  would	  hardly	  be	  considered	  a	  “loss.”	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Similarly,	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  local	  staff	  and	  customers	  noted	  the	  difference	  in	  quality	  
between	  MGP’s	  micro-­‐grids	  and	  the	  nearby	  donor-­‐funded	  micro-­‐grid,	  and	  
complained	  to	  MGP.	  Though	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  solution,	  the	  company	  understood	  the	  
source	  and	  extent	  of	  local	  frustration.	  In	  addition,	  the	  local	  stakeholders	  and	  MGP	  
itself	  share	  interest	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  services,	  and	  can	  communicate	  directly	  to	  
determine	  the	  best	  way	  forward.	  
Community	  buy-­‐in	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  nod	  of	  approval	  for	  receiving	  power,	  or	  
the	  occasional	  payment:	  it	  serves	  as	  the	  communication	  link,	  a	  basis	  for	  mutual	  trust	  
and	  understanding	  between	  developer	  and	  client.	  Without	  buy-­‐in,	  clients	  may	  
answer	  a	  developer’s	  questions	  with	  the	  answers	  they	  know	  she	  wants	  to	  hear	  
(“Will	  you	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  battery	  MDoD?”	  “Of	  course.”).	  But	  buy-­‐in	  makes	  mutual	  
understanding	  necessary	  for	  both	  parties,	  and	  therefore	  gets	  the	  project	  started	  
with	  both	  on	  equal	  footing.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.2.3,	  recipient	  stakeholders	  in	  a	  DG	  project	  may	  feel	  
any	  level	  of	  “equality”	  or	  lack	  thereof	  with	  the	  developer	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐
making	  power	  and	  deference	  (Bickel,	  2009).	  A	  true	  partnership	  includes	  many	  
levels	  of	  equality,	  from	  decision-­‐making	  to	  actual	  ownership,	  and	  can	  take	  the	  form	  
of	  something	  as	  common	  as	  a	  vendor-­‐customer	  relationship	  or	  as	  complex	  as	  a	  SPV.	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  arrangement,	  however,	  a	  developer	  must	  understand	  that	  lack	  of	  
partnership,	  even	  under	  the	  best	  of	  intentions,	  disempowers	  the	  local	  stakeholder	  
and	  can	  adversely	  affect	  project	  viability.	  An	  act	  of	  charity,	  though	  perhaps	  
admirable	  and	  even	  necessary	  in	  some	  situations,	  deprives	  recipients	  of	  ownership	  
in	  all	  but	  the	  literal	  sense.	  Even	  if	  a	  developer	  cannot	  expect	  monetary	  input	  from	  a	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stakeholder,	  one	  can	  establish	  ownership	  in	  other	  ways,	  whether	  via	  in-­‐kind	  
contributions	  (labor,	  land,	  construction	  materials,	  hosting	  crews,	  etc.),	  a	  place	  as	  a	  
representative	  in	  the	  SPV,	  or	  simply	  as	  a	  customer	  with	  the	  freedom	  to	  tailor	  a	  
purchase	  (GP	  2015).	  Despite	  the	  complexity	  and	  infinite	  variability,	  the	  
empowerment	  of	  local	  stakeholders	  can	  be	  a	  developer’s	  greatest	  asset.	  
Disempowerment,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  disastrous.	  As	  Rich	  (1994)	  states,	  
“Surely,	  if	  decades	  of	  failed	  international	  development	  efforts	  have	  taught	  us	  
anything,	  it	  is	  the	  folly	  of	  induced,	  uniform,	  top-­‐down	  projects.	  Such	  schemes	  ignore	  
and	  often	  destroy	  the	  local	  knowledge	  and	  social	  organization	  on	  which	  sound	  
stewardship	  of…	  equitable	  economic	  development	  depend[s]”	  (quoted	  in	  Adams	  
2001,	  334)	  
5.3:	  Operating	  Between	  Worlds	  
The	  above	  challenges	  and	  their	  many	  offshoots	  are	  so	  pervasive	  that	  it	  can	  be	  
easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  subtler,	  less	  quantifiable	  challenges	  that	  can	  plague	  a	  project	  
throughout	  its	  development.	  When	  operating	  as	  a	  developing	  entity,	  one	  necessarily	  
works	  between	  worlds.	  On	  one	  side	  is	  the	  receiving	  entity	  –	  a	  customer	  or	  
community	  –	  and	  on	  the	  other	  side	  is	  the	  support	  entity	  –	  a	  donor	  or	  financier.	  
When	  planning	  or	  even	  imagining	  the	  play-­‐by-­‐play	  of	  a	  DG	  project,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  
all	  the	  pieces	  coming	  together:	  if	  the	  developer	  performs	  each	  task	  in	  a	  timely	  
fashion	  and	  leaves	  some	  schedule	  and	  budget	  room	  for	  flexibility,	  the	  project	  may	  
proceed	  smoothly.	  But,	  as	  seen	  in	  GP’s	  micro-­‐grid	  project,	  every	  player	  has	  her	  own	  
constraints	  and	  places	  pressure	  on	  every	  other	  player,	  whether	  in	  the	  form	  of	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delayed	  financing	  or	  materials,	  fluctuating	  prices,	  changes	  to	  the	  labor	  force,	  or	  any	  
other	  unpredictable	  setback.	  
	   GP	  received	  donor	  funding,	  the	  bulk	  of	  it	  from	  the	  ADB,	  for	  its	  pilot	  project	  in	  
Khotang.	  The	  ADB	  has	  a	  continuing	  interest	  in	  exploring	  DG	  options	  and	  frequently	  
funds	  “small”	  pilot	  projects.	  To	  the	  ADB,	  a	  USD	  100,000	  grant	  is	  fairly	  small,	  likely	  
making	  it	  easier	  to	  approve	  than	  larger	  projects,	  but	  also	  less	  of	  a	  priority	  for	  its	  
staff.	  To	  GP,	  however,	  the	  grant	  is	  the	  largest	  they’ve	  received,	  and	  its	  proper	  
stewardship	  could	  determine	  the	  future	  of	  DG	  for	  Nepal	  and	  for	  a	  large	  piece	  of	  the	  
company’s	  business	  ventures.	  If	  the	  project	  hit	  a	  roadblock	  the	  funding	  might	  
disappear	  along	  with	  the	  largest	  DG	  pilot	  initiative	  in	  the	  region.	  
	   The	  delay	  in	  funding	  (or,	  more	  accurately,	  the	  delay	  in	  opening	  the	  bidding	  to	  
source	  grid	  components)	  stirred	  frustration	  in	  the	  villages	  that	  had	  already	  waited	  a	  
year	  for	  the	  project	  to	  commence.	  Essentially,	  the	  ADB	  almost	  scuttled	  its	  own	  pilot	  
project	  but	  the	  villages,	  particularly	  the	  SPV	  partners,	  saw	  the	  delay	  as	  GP’s	  
responsibility.	  
	   Frustrations	  in	  development	  projects	  frequently	  occur	  at	  the	  community	  
level.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  paper,	  practitioners,	  governments,	  and	  others	  
often	  adopt	  the	  classic	  stereotypes	  of	  rural	  communities	  (see	  Introduction).	  Faced	  
with	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  simple	  project	  that,	  to	  the	  developer,	  should	  have	  been	  an	  
obvious	  success,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  blame	  community	  incompetence,	  corruption,	  or	  other	  
failures	  to	  meet	  western	  “boot	  strap”	  ideals	  essential	  to	  readily	  adopting	  innovative	  
methods	  of	  self-­‐reliance.	  In	  my	  personal	  experience	  with	  long-­‐time	  foreign	  service	  
and	  NGO	  workers,	  the	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  criticism	  can	  become	  a	  contagious	  way	  to	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share	  frustration	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  local	  communities.	  “The	  fallacy”	  is	  the	  popular	  
mindset	  that	  “because	  I	  have	  studied	  and	  lived	  in	  a	  society	  that	  somehow	  wound	  up	  
with	  prosperity	  and	  peace,	  I	  know	  enough	  to	  plan	  for	  other	  societies	  to	  have	  
prosperity	  and	  peace”	  (Easterly	  2006,	  26).	  But	  when	  the	  effort	  fails,	  the	  fault	  must	  
lie	  with	  the	  developed,	  not	  the	  developer.	  
	   Working	  with	  small	  communities,	  especially	  in	  another	  culture,	  can	  be	  
frustrating.	  Contrasting	  perspectives	  regarding	  timeliness	  and	  punctuality;	  
communication	  barriers,	  both	  verbal	  and	  non-­‐verbal;	  and	  differing	  perceptions	  of	  
when	  “business-­‐like”	  assertiveness	  becomes	  pushiness	  are	  common	  challenges	  (GP	  
2015).	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  frustration,	  it	  is	  the	  developer’s	  responsibility	  to	  avoid	  
becoming	  frustrated	  with	  local	  cultural	  norms	  and	  appreciate	  that	  there	  are	  
profound	  cultural	  differences	  between	  developer	  and	  client	  (Adams	  2001;	  Easterly	  
2006).	  Learning	  to	  work	  with	  a	  community	  on	  its	  own	  schedule	  and	  by	  its	  own	  
customs	  can	  mean	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  project’s	  grudging	  completion	  and	  
actual	  success.	  
	   In	  Luhunga	  the	  solar	  NGO	  might	  have	  noticed	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  school	  
administration’s	  non-­‐verbal	  communication,	  indicating	  that	  the	  school	  really	  did	  not	  
have	  a	  mechanism	  to	  recoup	  the	  10%	  cost,	  and	  had	  only	  the	  barest	  intention	  to	  
monitor	  the	  batteries’	  MDoD.	  The	  signs	  would	  be	  obvious	  or	  at	  least	  perceptible	  to	  
anyone	  local,	  none	  of	  whom	  had	  the	  NGO’s	  interests	  in	  mind	  upon	  receipt	  of	  the	  
system.	  Cultural	  understanding	  also	  would	  have	  benefited	  the	  NGO’s	  attempts	  to	  
engage	  the	  school	  about	  its	  repayment	  plan.	  It	  is	  considered	  bad	  form,	  for	  instance,	  
to	  communicate	  with	  a	  western	  volunteer	  teacher	  rather	  than	  the	  headmaster	  or	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appointed	  contact	  teacher.	  The	  NGO	  did	  this	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  
involved	  could	  be	  clearly	  understood,	  a	  need	  created	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  native	  Swahili	  
speakers	  on	  the	  administrative	  staff.	  The	  NGO’s	  staff	  composition	  has	  changed	  since	  
2008	  but,	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  lack	  of	  local	  stakeholder	  involvement	  led	  to	  many	  of	  the	  
misunderstandings	  with	  the	  secondary	  school	  (acknowledging,	  again,	  that	  the	  NGO	  
has	  many	  other,	  successful	  projects	  and	  continues	  to	  flourish	  in	  Tanzania)	  
	   Off	  Grid:	  Electric	  has	  partially	  avoided	  the	  situation	  by	  serving	  a	  non-­‐specific	  
and	  changing	  customer	  base.	  As	  purely	  a	  business	  (via	  a	  leasing	  model	  rather	  than	  
as	  a	  “developer,”	  per	  se)	  it	  does	  not	  deal	  directly	  with	  individual	  customers	  in	  their	  
communities,	  nor	  does	  it	  have	  to	  engage	  in	  design	  nor	  accommodate	  a	  range	  of	  
willingness	  to	  pay.	  It	  does,	  however,	  have	  to	  answer	  to	  its	  donors	  and	  comply	  with	  
their	  standards.	  In	  addition,	  Off	  Grid	  hires	  local	  contractors	  for	  installation	  and	  
maintenance,	  which	  adds	  another	  step	  in	  the	  process.	  This	  also	  adds	  another	  layer	  
of	  communication	  that	  the	  company	  has	  to	  maintain	  –	  processing	  lease	  requests	  
from	  customers	  and	  contracting	  installation	  with	  local	  companies,	  thereby	  
multiplying	  the	  potential	  for	  miscommunication	  in	  the	  event	  that	  one	  partner	  entity	  
falls	  behind,	  goes	  out	  of	  business,	  or	  otherwise	  can’t	  satisfy	  its	  contract.	  
The	  arrangement	  may	  have	  its	  advantages,	  however:	  with	  the	  added	  
contractor	  level	  between	  developer	  (Off	  Grid)	  and	  customer	  (individual	  
households),	  the	  company	  can	  essentially	  outsource	  its	  local	  communication	  needs	  
to	  companies	  that	  know	  the	  communities	  and	  understand	  the	  business	  side	  of	  the	  
project.	  This	  is	  an	  over-­‐simplification;	  Off	  Grid	  still	  needs	  to	  monitor	  the	  
effectiveness	  and	  reliability	  of	  its	  contractors	  and	  gauge	  their	  performance	  through	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customer	  feedback.	  But	  given	  the	  national	  scale	  of	  Off	  Grid’s	  operation,	  it	  would	  be	  
more	  difficult	  for	  the	  company	  to	  become	  conversant	  in	  the	  languages	  and	  norms	  of	  
all	  120-­‐plus	  tribes	  in	  Tanzania	  (the	  Wapare,	  if	  the	  stereotypes	  are	  to	  be	  believed,	  
have	  a	  stronger	  history	  with	  business	  development	  than	  the	  Wahehe)	  than	  to	  rely	  
on	  local	  outfits.	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  development	  project	  model,	  certain	  best	  practices	  have	  
long	  been	  discussed	  and	  accepted	  for	  operating	  between	  donor	  entity	  and	  recipient	  
community	  (Adams	  2001;	  McMichael	  2000;	  Chambers	  1997).	  Many	  of	  these	  extend	  
naturally	  from	  the	  bottom-­‐up,	  community-­‐centric	  approach	  to	  development	  
discussed	  in	  this	  paper.	  They	  include	  the	  empowerment	  of	  local	  actors	  to	  pursue	  
local	  passions,	  fluency	  in	  the	  local	  language,	  a	  “listen	  first”	  ethic,	  and	  many	  more	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  illustrated	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  However,	  these	  practices	  are	  
only	  possible	  if	  the	  developer	  (1)	  maintains	  open	  and	  frequent	  communication	  with	  
all	  partners,	  and	  (2)	  acknowledges	  from	  the	  beginning	  its	  own	  biases,	  assumptions,	  
and	  privilege	  relative	  to	  its	  partners.	  
5.5:	  Information	  Gathering	  
Many	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  related	  discussions	  reference	  “research”	  as	  the	  
means	  of	  gathering	  necessary	  information	  about	  a	  community’s	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  
income	  generating	  potential,	  electricity	  needs,	  and	  other	  factors	  that	  affect	  a	  
developer’s	  design	  decisions.	  The	  method	  by	  which	  information	  is	  gathered,	  
however,	  is	  far	  from	  established	  in	  practice	  (for	  this,	  as	  for	  other	  practices	  discussed	  
in	  this	  paper,	  the	  academic	  world	  has	  what	  it	  considers	  established	  guidelines;	  to	  
what	  extent	  those	  are	  translated	  into	  practice	  is	  less	  clear).	  Some,	  like	  the	  solar	  NGO	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in	  Luhunga,	  don’t	  engage	  in	  much	  beyond	  a	  physical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  site	  and	  a	  
cursory	  information	  session	  with	  the	  client	  (in	  which	  information	  generally	  goes	  
from	  developer	  to	  client	  instead	  of	  the	  other	  way	  around).	  Others,	  like	  GP,	  perform	  
multiple	  surveys,	  community	  meetings,	  individual	  interviews,	  and	  site	  visits	  to	  get	  
as	  wide	  and	  redundant	  an	  information	  base	  as	  possible	  before	  gauging	  viability	  or	  
finalizing	  designs.	  But	  many	  of	  the	  results	  proved	  irrelevant,	  and	  GP	  is	  still	  
experimenting	  with	  information	  gathering	  techniques	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  formalized	  
method	  set	  by	  the	  DG	  development	  community	  (a	  need	  expressed	  directly	  by	  GP	  
during	  the	  research	  period).	  
In	  the	  area	  of	  information	  gathering	  (and	  other	  practices),	  the	  DG	  
development	  world	  is	  behind	  other	  sectors	  of	  development	  such	  as	  biodiversity	  
conservation	  (Adams	  2001,	  341),	  agroforestry,	  and	  others.	  While	  other	  sectors	  have	  
existed	  for,	  in	  most	  cases,	  over	  a	  century,	  electricity	  development	  is	  young	  and	  
struggling	  to	  overcome	  both	  its	  own	  inexperience	  and	  the	  relatively	  poor	  energy	  
literacy	  among	  its	  clients	  and	  partners.	  Few	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  
presented	  in	  this	  paper,	  for	  example,	  followed	  the	  methods	  of	  information	  gathering	  
that	  have	  become	  common	  practice	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  development.	  Some,	  like	  GP,	  
experimented	  with	  outdated	  theories	  of	  surveys	  while	  others,	  like	  the	  solar	  NGO	  in	  
Luhunga,	  didn’t	  even	  go	  that	  far.	  
Take,	  for	  example,	  Khotang.	  GP	  performed	  several	  iterations	  of	  surveys,	  some	  
designed	  by	  foreign	  consultants,	  with	  varying	  results.	  One	  round	  of	  surveys,	  written	  
by	  a	  consultant	  entirely	  in	  English,	  was	  received	  by	  participants	  as	  too	  long,	  
impersonal,	  and	  complex,	  and	  was	  considered	  unreliable	  for	  the	  response	  it	  evoked.	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A	  subsequent,	  streamlined	  survey	  included	  a	  Nepali	  translation	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  
conducted	  locally,	  and	  simplified	  many	  questions	  to	  multiple	  choice	  or	  rankings	  to	  
avoid	  ambiguity.	  But	  when	  the	  communities	  conducted	  the	  surveys,	  they	  found	  that	  
many	  questions	  had	  been	  poorly	  translated	  and	  others,	  which	  had	  been	  written	  as	  
opinion	  questions,	  were	  simply	  left	  unanswered.	  In	  Kaduwa,	  the	  village	  official	  
conducting	  the	  surveys	  with	  the	  author	  often	  filled	  in	  his	  own	  answers	  while	  the	  
“participants”	  sat	  quietly,	  a	  common	  challenge	  when	  working	  through	  translators.	  
These	  results,	  too,	  were	  largely	  discarded.	  
The	  second	  round	  of	  surveys	  illustrated	  a	  fundamental	  flaw	  in	  the	  simplistic	  
question-­‐and-­‐answer	  method	  of	  information	  gathering.	  By	  its	  logic	  any	  developer,	  
local	  or	  foreign,	  simply	  needs	  to	  formulate	  appropriate	  questions	  in	  an	  accessible	  
format	  and	  either	  interview	  participants	  individually	  or	  give	  them	  the	  form	  to	  
return	  later.	  The	  assumed	  advantages	  are	  that,	  if	  done	  individually,	  some	  group	  
dynamics	  are	  avoided	  that	  might	  otherwise	  bias	  the	  results.	  In	  Khotang,	  for	  
example,	  the	  author	  was	  concerned	  that	  wealthier	  men	  would	  be	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  
receive	  the	  survey,	  thereby	  ignoring	  women’s	  and	  poorer	  residents’	  opinions	  of	  GP’s	  
service	  and	  energy	  needs	  in	  general.	  The	  surveys	  would	  also	  be	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
voice	  concerns	  that	  did	  not	  come	  up	  in	  the	  crowded	  format	  of	  GP’s	  earlier	  
community	  meetings.	  In	  fact,	  while	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  questions	  was	  valid,	  the	  
atmosphere	  and	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  made	  them	  less	  
attractive	  than	  open,	  participatory	  methods.	  
Surveys	  are	  a	  popular	  form	  of	  information	  gathering,	  but	  they	  may	  not	  be	  
appropriate	  even	  when	  simple	  questions	  and	  answers	  seem	  like	  a	  harmless	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approach	  (discussed	  later	  in	  this	  section).	  Other	  developers	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
sectors	  use	  anonymous	  voting,	  hand	  raising,	  town	  hall	  meetings,	  group	  
visualizations,	  community	  mapping	  exercises,	  and	  even	  spectrum	  exercises	  to	  gauge	  
the	  full	  range	  of	  community	  buy-­‐in	  and	  need.	  Any	  DG	  developer	  can	  prepare	  for	  
their	  own	  research	  efforts	  by	  evaluating	  their	  effectiveness.	  But	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  the	  developer	  conducts	  these	  methods,	  and	  the	  relative	  roles	  of	  the	  facilitator	  
and	  participants,	  can	  make	  as	  much	  of	  a	  difference	  as	  the	  method	  itself	  (Chambers	  
1997).	  
In	  his	  frequently	  cited	  book	  Whose	  Reality	  Counts?	  Putting	  the	  First	  Last	  
(1997),	  Robert	  Chambers	  outlines	  methods	  and	  recommendations	  for	  participatory	  
information	  gathering,	  or	  what	  is	  termed	  Participatory	  Rural	  Assessment	  (PRA).	  
Though	  the	  actual	  methods	  could	  take	  any	  form,	  some	  lessons	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  during	  any	  PRA	  –	  some	  of	  these	  are	  paraphrased	  and	  contextualized	  in	  
Table	  5.2	  below.	  




Literature,	  experience,	  and	  common	  sense	  all	  reveal	  locals’	  advantages	  with	  
regards	  to	  gauging	  local	  capacity,	  interest,	  etc.	  Local	  participants	  are	  generally	  
more	  adept	  at	  identifying	  previously	  unknown	  factors,	  revealing	  high	  levels	  of	  
detail,	  and	  inventing	  creative	  methods	  of	  community	  mapping	  and	  information	  
gathering	  than	  their	  outsider	  counterparts.	  Openness	  and	  flexibility	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  the	  developer	  can	  lead	  not	  only	  to	  more	  freedom	  of	  conversation,	  but	  also	  to	  
more	  innovative	  and	  locally	  appropriate	  means	  of	  catalyzing	  that	  conversation.	  
GP	  used	  town	  hall-­‐style	  meetings	  to	  present	  ideas	  and	  get	  community	  feedback.	  
Though	  some	  diversity	  of	  opinion	  may	  have	  suffered	  for	  it,	  the	  collective	  
brainstorming	  and	  community	  capacity	  identification	  was	  far	  more	  informed	  
than	  individual	  surveys	  could	  have	  been.	  
Measuring	  vs.	  
Comparing	  
Questions	  of	  exact	  measurement	  can	  illicit	  subjective	  responses	  and	  may,	  at	  
times,	  be	  awkward.	  Comparisons	  allow	  for	  greater	  nuance	  to	  be	  communicated	  
and	  can	  be	  expressed	  more	  quickly	  and	  visually.	  
In	  general,	  participants	  in	  an	  electrification	  project	  are	  unfamiliar	  with	  industry	  
quantities	  and	  units,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  gather	  information	  on	  consumption,	  
durations,	  etc.	  If	  participants	  can	  instead	  communicate	  their	  needs,	  situation,	  or	  
concerns	  via	  spatial	  or	  temporal	  comparisons,	  the	  developer	  can	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  
not	  only	  need,	  but	  also	  motives	  and	  social	  politics.	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Verbal	  vs.	  Visual	   Whereas	  surveys	  and	  interviews	  require	  verbal	  or	  written	  communication,	  
visual	  activities	  can	  be	  more	  inclusive	  by	  reducing	  the	  dominance	  of	  one	  
participant,	  and	  by	  being	  more	  accessible	  to	  illiterate	  or	  introverted	  
participants.	  In	  addition,	  visualization	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  initiated	  by	  the	  
facilitator	  but	  can	  be	  created	  entirely	  in	  the	  moment,	  resulting	  in	  more	  




In	  some	  instances	  the	  use	  of	  formal	  materials	  may	  appear	  “elitist”	  and	  end	  up	  
disempowering	  certain	  participants.	  The	  use	  of	  pen	  and	  paper,	  for	  example,	  
may	  be	  the	  most	  obvious	  choice	  to	  developers	  and	  even	  local	  facilitators,	  but	  
may	  also	  be	  out	  of	  place	  in	  rural	  settings.	  Facilitators	  can	  make	  use	  of	  local	  
materials	  that	  equalize	  all	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  reduce	  the	  feeling	  of	  
formality	  to	  encourage	  openness	  and	  familiarity,	  and	  make	  the	  activity	  easily	  
replicable.	  
In	  Khotang,	  the	  author	  used	  paper	  surveys	  that,	  to	  the	  local	  facilitators,	  were	  
entirely	  acceptable.	  But	  the	  surveys	  were	  clearly	  out	  of	  place	  while	  sitting	  on	  
the	  floors	  or	  low	  stools	  of	  individuals’	  homes,	  where	  chalk	  or	  charcoal	  are	  used	  
to	  draw,	  and	  the	  floor	  or	  dusty	  ground	  functions	  as	  the	  pallet.	  The	  distinction	  
may	  seem	  minor	  to	  the	  “outsider”	  developer,	  but	  these	  materials	  reinforce	  the	  




For	  many	  of	  the	  same	  reasons,	  the	  rapport	  and	  atmosphere	  established	  by	  the	  
facilitator	  can	  bias	  the	  results	  if	  done	  poorly.	  Formality,	  as	  discussed,	  creates	  
tension	  by	  pitting	  the	  outsider	  as	  detective	  and	  the	  participant	  as	  a	  holder	  of	  
information	  to	  be	  extracted.	  By	  relaxing,	  resisting	  the	  urge	  to	  rush	  or	  otherwise	  
stick	  to	  some	  arbitrary	  rule,	  and	  listening	  rather	  than	  interviewing,	  a	  facilitator	  
can	  learn	  more	  than	  what	  she	  originally	  set	  out	  to	  learn.	  With	  the	  right	  rapport	  
(established	  over	  a	  little	  time	  and	  understanding	  of	  local	  respect	  and	  norms),	  
participants	  should	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  free	  to	  delve	  into	  whatever	  they	  have	  on	  
their	  minds	  and	  speak	  freely	  as	  their	  opinions	  are	  of	  honest	  interest,	  not	  just	  
importance	  to	  a	  list	  of	  data.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  too,	  the	  author	  failed	  to	  conduct	  the	  Khotang	  surveys	  effectively.	  
Left	  unattended	  until	  the	  last	  day	  in	  the	  villages,	  the	  surveys	  had	  to	  be	  
conducted	  quickly	  and	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  translator,	  the	  village	  chairman.	  Due	  to	  
the	  time	  crunch	  and	  the	  facilitator’s	  aforementioned	  misuse	  of	  the	  survey	  
questions,	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  informal	  but	  mildly	  tense.	  The	  author’s	  presence	  
as	  “seeker	  of	  information”	  did	  little	  to	  relax	  the	  mood	  and	  established	  the	  role	  
of	  expert	  rather	  than	  pupil,	  detective	  rather	  than	  interested	  friend.	  
Individual	  vs.	  
Group	  
While	  individual	  surveys	  or	  interviews	  may	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  address	  
marginalized	  members	  of	  a	  community,	  a	  group	  activity	  allows	  for	  greater	  
overlap	  of	  knowledge.	  As	  with	  peer	  review,	  these	  activities	  give	  participants	  the	  
chance	  to	  check,	  edit,	  or	  corroborate	  their	  peers’	  contributions	  to	  the	  
conversation.	  Somewhat	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  group	  activities	  often	  lead	  to	  more	  
accurate	  quantitative	  results	  and	  greater	  ease	  with	  sensitive	  subjects.	  A	  
question	  or	  comment	  that	  one	  participant	  might	  keep	  to	  herself	  may	  be	  voiced	  
by	  another,	  beginning	  a	  conversation	  that	  might	  not	  otherwise	  have	  occurred.	  
	  
In	  a	  theme	  that	  runs	  parallel	  to	  this	  paper’s	  thesis,	  Chambers	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  
easy	  to	  gather	  information	  incorrectly,	  or	  to	  adopt	  too	  quickly	  a	  method	  that	  was	  
reported	  to	  work	  elsewhere.	  Practitioners	  do	  well	  to	  consider	  not	  just	  the	  
information	  gathering	  method	  itself,	  but	  the	  reason	  that	  it	  did	  or	  did	  not	  work	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elsewhere,	  and	  whether	  similar	  conditions	  apply.	  Which	  parts	  of	  society	  did	  or	  did	  
not	  have	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  process?	  How	  do	  participants’	  perceptions	  compare	  from	  one	  
community	  to	  another?	  Information	  gathering	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  respondents	  more	  
than	  just	  the	  responses	  (Cambers	  1997).	  A	  developer	  may	  prefer	  to	  know	  exactly	  
which	  topics	  will	  be	  discussed	  and	  which	  data	  will	  be	  collected,	  but	  one	  can	  learn	  far	  
more	  by	  creating	  a	  culturally	  relevant	  environment	  in	  which	  participants	  feel	  free	  to	  
express	  and	  create,	  and	  then	  listening	  (Sirolli	  2012).	  There	  will	  always	  be	  concerns	  
and	  unpredictable	  factors	  –	  who	  is	  empowered	  or	  disempowered	  by	  the	  process,	  
how	  participants	  feel	  about	  the	  use	  of	  information	  they	  offer,	  whether	  information	  
is	  being	  misrepresented	  for	  any	  reason,	  and	  so	  on	  (Chambers	  1997).	  But	  the	  
openness	  encouraged	  by	  the	  PRA	  method	  (or	  equivalent)	  can	  be	  more	  accurate	  and	  
accessible	  in	  aggregate	  than	  the	  potentially	  biased	  or	  misrepresented	  information	  
produced	  through	  individual	  methods	  such	  as	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  or	  surveys.	  As	  
Inglis	  says:	  “if	  information	  is	  wrong	  to	  begin	  with,	  no	  amount	  of	  statistical	  
manipulation	  will	  enable	  it	  to	  help	  the	  project	  staff	  make	  good	  decisions”	  (quoted	  in	  
Chambers	  1997,	  142).	  
A	  final	  consideration	  relevant	  to	  all	  information-­‐gathering	  sessions	  is	  that	  of	  
honesty.	  Experience	  has	  shown	  that	  communities	  or	  individuals	  that	  have	  been	  on	  
the	  receiving	  end	  of	  development	  projects	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  agree	  with	  developers	  
or	  give	  answers	  that	  they	  think	  the	  developers	  want	  to	  hear.	  Luhunga	  is	  a	  prime	  
example:	  the	  school	  was	  (and	  still	  is)	  the	  recipient	  of	  many	  projects	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  
nearby	  NGO	  run	  by	  long-­‐time	  ex-­‐pats,	  and	  is	  in	  a	  district,	  region,	  and	  country	  full	  to	  
bursting	  with	  international	  aid	  money	  and	  organizations.	  When	  a	  developer	  asks	  the	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headmaster	  if	  the	  faculty	  will	  take	  care	  of	  a	  free	  electricity	  system,	  the	  correct	  
answer	  is	  “yes,”	  when	  “no”	  might	  mean	  losing	  out	  to	  another	  school.	  An	  efficient	  
cook	  stove	  project	  in	  another	  village	  offered	  villagers	  the	  stoves	  for	  free	  and	  asked	  if	  
indoor	  air	  quality	  was	  improving.	  The	  correct	  answer,	  again,	  was	  “yes”	  even	  if	  the	  
new	  stoves	  served	  as	  shelves	  or	  rat-­‐proof	  bean	  receptacles.	  The	  moral	  of	  the	  story	  is	  
not	  to	  distrust	  people,	  but	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  community’s	  or	  individual’s	  incentive	  
for	  answering	  one	  way	  or	  another	  and	  to	  have	  basic	  cultural	  understanding	  and	  
communication	  abilities.	  The	  developer	  and	  community	  may	  have	  very	  different	  
ideas	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  “yes”	  and	  “no.”	  
Conclusion:	  Pushing	  All	  Fronts	  
To	  reiterate	  the	  main	  thesis	  of	  this	  paper,	  bottom-­‐up	  rural	  electricity	  
development	  encourages	  viable	  and	  sustainable	  projects	  that	  build	  on	  local	  capacity	  
and	  meet	  local	  needs.	  The	  variability	  in	  electricity	  consumption	  across	  both	  distance	  
and	  time	  is	  such	  that	  top-­‐down	  planning	  efforts	  by	  outside	  entities	  tend	  to	  fail.	  Even	  
two	  neighboring	  villages	  may	  be	  best	  served	  by	  different	  DG	  methods	  (or	  even	  the	  
grid,	  as	  in	  one	  Terai	  case),	  finance	  structures,	  and	  technology	  choices.	  Despite	  the	  
challenge	  this	  presents	  to	  developers,	  investors,	  and	  policy	  makers,	  pursuing	  
diverse	  energy	  development	  approaches	  can	  have	  advantages.	  A	  diversity	  of	  
approaches	  can	  encourage	  rapid	  iteration,	  enhance	  flexibility,	  and	  result	  in	  
improved	  performance.	  Given	  the	  urgency	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  slow	  pace	  of	  
adaptation	  in	  established	  grids,	  a	  flexible	  and	  locally	  grounded	  DG	  industry	  can	  
adapt	  quickly	  to	  changing	  climates,	  both	  literal	  and	  figurative.	  One	  important	  lesson	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suggested	  by	  these	  studies	  is	  not	  to	  rely	  on	  any	  one	  mechanism	  for	  DG	  but,	  instead,	  
to	  push	  all	  fronts.	  
	   The	  proverbial	  “tech	  fix,”	  which	  many	  hope	  will	  solve	  the	  climate	  crisis,	  is	  
inappropriate	  in	  rural	  electrification	  efforts.	  The	  technology	  to	  generate	  electricity	  
with	  zero	  or	  low	  carbon	  emissions	  already	  exists;	  the	  tech	  fix	  has	  already	  happened.	  
The	  demand	  for	  RETs	  is	  growing;	  but	  local	  entrepreneurs	  need	  markets,	  markets	  
need	  investors,	  and	  investors	  need	  culturally	  appropriate	  and	  flexible	  policies	  to	  
reduce	  risk.	  In	  rural	  electricity	  development,	  everyone	  has	  a	  part	  to	  play.	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Appendices	  
Appendix	  A:	  DSM	  Technology	  Summaries	  
Common	  current	  limiter	  technology	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Characteristics	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  current	  limiters	  (From	  Harper	  2013;	  reproduced	  from	  ESMAP	  
2000)	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DSM	  technology	  examples	  and	  brief	  descriptions	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Examples	  of	  DSM	  devices	  by	  company	  (Reproduced	  from	  Harper	  2013)	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